Regina Metro. Co. v. N.Y.S. Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Regina Metro. Co. v. N.Y.S. Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 35 N.Y.3d 332, 154 N.E.3d 972, 130 N.Y.S.3d 759 (N.Y. 2020)
• Decision Date: 02 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 2 ,No. 3,No .4,1,2 ,3,.4
• Parties: In the Matter of REGINA METROPOLITAN CO., LLC, Respondent, v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL, Appellant, Leslie E. Carr et al., Intervenors–Respondents. (And Another Proceeding). Joel Raden et al., Appellants, v. W7879, LLC, et al., Respondents. James Taylor et al., Respondents, v. 72A Realty Associates, L.P., Appellant, et al., Defendant. Elizabeth Reich, et al., Appellants, v. Belnord Partners, LLC, et al., Respondents.

35 N.Y.3d 332

154 N.E.3d 972

130 N.Y.S.3d 759

In the Matter of REGINA METROPOLITAN CO., LLC, Respondent,

v.NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL, Appellant,Leslie E. Carr et al., Intervenors–Respondents.

(And Another Proceeding).

Joel Raden et al., Appellants,

v.W7879, LLC, et al., Respondents.

James Taylor et al., Respondents,

v.

72A Realty Associates, L.P., Appellant,

et al., Defendant.

Elizabeth Reich, et al., Appellants,

v.Belnord Partners, LLC, et al., Respondents.

No. 1

No. 2

No. 3

No .4

Court of Appeals of New York.

Decided April 2, 2020

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

In our tripartite form of government, the Legislature determines the public policy of this State, recalibrating rights and changing course when it deems such alteration appropriate as it grapples with enduring problems and rises to meet new challenges facing our communities. It is the distinct role of the courts to interpret the laws to give effect to legislative intent while safeguarding the constitutional rights of impacted individuals. We fulfill both core functions in these four appeals, which present a common issue under the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL): what is the proper method for calculating the recoverable rent overcharge for New York City apartments that were improperly removed from rent stabilization during receipt of J–51 benefits prior to our 2009 decision in Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P. , 13 N.Y.3d 270, 890 N.Y.S.2d 388, 918 N.E.2d 900 (2009).

As explained below, when leave was granted in these cases, the RSL mandated that, absent fraud, an overcharge was to be calculated by using the rent charged on the date four years prior to filing of the overcharge complaint (the "lookback period") as the "base date rent," adding any legal increases applicable during the four-year lookback period and computing the difference between that legal regulated rent and the rent actually charged to determine if the tenant was overcharged during the recovery period. In such cases, consideration of rental history predating the four-year lookback and statute of limitations period was prohibited. While the appeals to this Court were pending, the Legislature – as is its prerogative – enacted the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA), making sweeping changes to the RSL, the majority of which are not at issue in these appeals. As relevant here, Part F of the HSTPA includes amendments that, among other things, extend the statute of limitations, alter the method for determining legal regulated rent for overcharge purposes and substantially expand the nature and scope of owner liability in rent overcharge cases (see L 2019, ch 36, Part F). The tenants in these cases urge us to apply the new overcharge calculation provisions to these appeals that were pending at the time of the HSTPA's enactment, some of which seek recovery of overcharges incurred more than a decade before the new legislation.

The validity of Part F is not in question here – but significant issues are raised concerning whether the presumption against retroactive application of statutes has been rebutted and, if so, whether application of certain amendments relating to overcharge calculation in Part F to these appeals involving conduct that occurred years prior to its enactment comports with fundamental notions of substantial justice embodied in the Due Process Clause. Retroactive application of the overcharge calculation amendments would create or considerably enlarge owners' financial liability for conduct that occurred, in some cases, many years or even decades before the HSTPA was enacted and for which the prior statutory scheme conferred on owners clear repose. Because such application of these amendments to past conduct would not comport with our retroactivity jurisprudence or the requirements of due process, we resolve these claims pursuant to the law in effect when the purported overcharges occurred. Notwithstanding the hyperbole employed by our dissenting colleagues, our analysis of the narrow legal issue presented by application of the overcharge calculation amendments to these appeals turns entirely on conventional and time-honored principles of judicial review. "We are, of course, mindful ... of the responsibility ... to defer to the Legislature in matters of policymaking," but it is the role of the judicial branch "to interpret and safeguard constitutional rights and review challenged acts of our co-equal branches of government – not in order to make policy but in order to assure the protection of constitutional rights" ( Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 925, 931, 769 N.Y.S.2d 106, 801 N.E.2d 326 [2003] ). As to the HSTPA, today we fulfill this quintessential judicial function in holding that a limited suite of enforcement provisions may not be applied retroactively and opine in no way on the vast majority of that legislation or its prospective application.

These rent overcharge cases arose in the wake of our 2009 decision in Roberts, interpreting RSL provisions relating to New York City's J–51 program, which offered tax benefits to building owners who made capital improvements to their residential properties. Buildings electing to receive J–51 benefits become subject to the rent stabilization scheme (RSL [Administrative Code of City of NY] § 11–243[b], [i][1], [t] ). From 1993 until the enactment of the HSTPA in 2019, the RSL contained "luxury deregulation" provisions, permitting an owner of a stabilized unit to deregulate if the rent exceeded a statutory threshold and (1) the tenant vacated or (2) the tenants' combined income exceeded a statutory threshold (former RSL §§ 26–504.1, 26–504.2). As early as 1996, first in an opinion letter and later promulgated as an agency regulation, the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR)¹ took the position that statutory language precluding luxury deregulation of apartments during receipt of J–51 benefits did not apply to buildings that were already subject to the RSL prior to receipt of those benefits (see Roberts, 13 N.Y.3d at 281–282, 890 N.Y.S.2d 388, 918 N.E.2d 900 ; former Rent Stabilization Code [RSC] [9 NYCRR] § 2520.11[r][5], [s][2] ). In Roberts, this Court rejected DHCR's long-standing statutory interpretation and concluded that luxury deregulation was unavailable in any building during receipt of J–51 benefits ( 13 N.Y.3d at 285–287, 890 N.Y.S.2d 388, 918 N.E.2d 900 ). In 2011, the Appellate Division held that Roberts applied retroactively ( Gersten v. 56 7th Ave. LLC, 88 A.D.3d 189, 198, 928 N.Y.S.2d 515 [1st Dept 2011], appeal withdrawn 18 N.Y.3d 954, 944 N.Y.S.2d 482, 967 N.E.2d 707 [2012] ).

Each of these cases involves an apartment that was treated as deregulated consistent with then-prevailing DHCR regulations and guidance before this Court rejected that guidance in Roberts. Indeed, the tenants took occupancy years prior to Roberts following a deregulation later revealed by that decision to have been improper, believing they were renting non-stabilized apartments at market rents. None of these tenants promptly challenged the deregulated status of their apartments and years – in some cases, over a decade – passed during which the tenants and their landlords renewed and renegotiated free-market leases.² After we decided Roberts, these tenants commenced overcharge claims under the RSL. In Regina Metro., the tenants filed an administrative complaint with DHCR and, in the remaining three cases, the tenants commenced actions in Supreme Court. The central issue below in each of these cases – sent to this Court by leave of the Appellate Division before enactment of the HSTPA – was how to calculate the "legal regulated rent" in order to determine whether a recoverable overcharge occurred and its amount.³ Before we address the tenants' request that we resolve these appeals under the new law, we must determine the parties' rights under the statutory scheme in effect when the overcharges occurred.

I.

In an overcharge claim, the tenant seeks monetary damages for excessive rent paid during the recovery period.⁴ The method for calculating the amount of recoverable damages – i.e., the overcharge – is governed by the RSL. We therefore examine the text of the relevant statutes, as the best indicator of legislative intent ( Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [1998] ), mindful that legislative history may also be considered as an aid to interpretation ( Altman v. 285 W. Fourth LLC, 31 N.Y.3d 178, 185, 75 N.Y.S.3d 465, 99 N.E.3d 858 [2018] ; see Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463–464, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98 [2000] ). When a statute is part of a broader legislative scheme, we construe its language "in context and in a manner that harmonizes the related provisions and renders them compatible" ( Matter of M.B., 6 N.Y.3d 437, 447, 813 N.Y.S.2d 349, 846 N.E.2d 794 [2006] [internal punctuation and citation omitted] ).

The rules governing calculation of an overcharge are found in the provisions of the RSL addressing enforcement and the statute of limitations for overcharge claims (RSL § 26–516; CPLR 213–a ). Before the enactment of the HSTPA, overcharge claims were subject to a four-year statute of limitations that precluded the recovery of overcharges incurred more than four years preceding the imposition of a claim (former RSL § 26–516[a][2]; former CPLR 213–a ; see Conason v. Megan Holding LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 1, 6 N.Y.S.3d 206, 29 N.E.3d 215 [2015] ). The statutes further directed that "no determination of an overcharge and no award or calculation of an award of the amount of an overcharge may be based upon an overcharge having occurred more than four years before" initiation of the claim (former RSL § 26–516[a][2]; see former CPLR 213–a ).⁵

A provision added as part of the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997 (1997 RRRA) expressly "preclude[d] examination of the rental history of...