Regis Coll. v. Town of Weston

Decision Date22 May 2012
Docket NumberSJC–10919.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesREGIS COLLEGE v. TOWN OF WESTON & others.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Catherine J. Savoie, Boston, for the plaintiff.

George X. Pucci, Boston, for town of Weston & another.

Lisa C. Goodheart, Boston, for the interveners.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Donald V. Rider, Jr., City Solicitor, & Christopher J. Petrini, Barbara J. Saint Andre, Framingham, & Heather W. Kingsbury, Worcester, for City Solicitors and Town Counsel Association & another.

Robert J. McCarron, Edgartown, for Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts.

F. Beirne Lovely, Jr., for Archdiocese of Boston.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

LENK, J.

The Dover Amendment, G.L. c. 40A, § 3, second par., exempts from certain local zoning laws land or structures that are to be used by nonprofit educational institutions for “educational purposes.” The plaintiff, a private college, brought suit against a town and a local zoning authority (defendants), seeking, among other things, a declaration that its proposed development of residential and educational facilities for older adults known as Regis East qualifies for protection under the Dover Amendment. A Land Court judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed and we granted its application for direct appellate review. Because we cannot conclude that the plaintiff “has no reasonable expectation” of demonstrating that Regis East will primarily operate in furtherance of educational purposes, Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991), we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Land Court.2

1. Background. a. Facts. The parties stipulate that the plaintiff is a “non-profit educational corporation” within the meaning of the Dover Amendment. 3 The plaintiff offers both graduate and undergraduate degrees, operates a continuing education program designed for senior citizens residing in the town of Weston (Weston) and surrounding communities, and maintains established nursing and social work programs.

The plaintiff is affiliated with the Congregation of the Sisters of St. Joseph, a Catholic religious order whose members continue to form a majority of the plaintiff's board of governors. Since 1927, either the plaintiff or the Sisters of St. Joseph have held title to approximately 130 acres of land in Weston. The plaintiff's campus presently occupies approximately seventy of these acres, and is located on the western side of Wellesley Street, a street that bisects the larger parcel of campus land. The proposed development, Regis East, will be across the street on a site of approximately sixty acres that is at present largely wooded and undeveloped.

As planned, Regis East will comprise eight buildings, with a total built area of 766,600 square feet.4 The motion judge inferred based on facts in the record that the residential units themselves would occupy approximately 470,000 square feet, accounting for approximately sixty per cent of the built area. The remaining (nonresidential) area is expected to be used for a variety of purposes, including dining, meetings and events, fitness activities, healthcare, and recreation. The project's nonresidential area will also house classrooms, a “Children's Center,” and an “Adult Day Care Center.” The nonresidential area will contain a central connecting “promenade,” with two levels of parking underneath it.

Residents at Regis East will live in apartment units of about 1,300 square feet. They are expected to average seventy-five years of age at the time of their arrival. They will be admitted based on an application and interview process, the details of which remain unspecified. Residents will be required to pay an entrance fee of between $700,000 and $1 million that, in large part, will be returnable to them, or their estates, should they leave. They will also pay a monthly fee of approximately $4,000.5

The plaintiff indicates by affidavit that residents will be assigned “academic advisors” and will be required to enroll in a minimum of two courses per semester,6 which they will choose in consultation with their advisors. Residents will be able to satisfy the minimum course requirement through courses offered to students enrolled in degree-granting programs, the current continuing education program, or self-directed study approved by the resident's academic advisor and by a person holding the title of “the Dean of the East Campus.”

Residents will also be able to enroll in more than the minimum required level of classes, and potentially to pursue degrees and certificates awarded to the plaintiff's current student body. Further, residents will be assigned a “wellness coordinator,” and will be required to take health and fitness classes offered “through” the plaintiff. The plaintiff avers that these requirements will be individualized and coordinated through a “Wellness and Education Curriculum Plan” that will account for each resident's individual intellectual and physical abilities and interests, and that will be approved by the dean.

The plaintiff also anticipates a level of integration between Regis East and its existing campus. Residents will have full access to facilities and events on the west campus. West campus students also are expected to be able to take advantage of nursing and social work opportunities that may arise at Regis East. The plaintiff emphasizes, in particular, that students enrolled in its degree-granting nursing programs could potentially obtain clinical placements at Regis East.7 However, the plaintiff has provided few specifics on how such internships and clinical placements will be implemented.

b. Procedural history. In 2005, the plaintiff petitioned the zoning board of appeals of Weston (zoning board) for relief from certain of Weston's municipal zoning regulations that would otherwise preclude construction of the Regis East development. The zoning board denied this petition, based in part on its determination that it did not have jurisdiction to find that Weston's zoning regulations were preempted by the Dover Amendment. The plaintiff then brought an action in the Land Court against Weston and its zoning board.

A Land Court judge determined that the zoning board did have jurisdiction to determine whether the project was protected under the Dover Amendment, and remanded the matter for such a determination. On remand, the zoning board again denied the plaintiff's petition. The parties then returned to the Land Court. The judge subsequently granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff's proposed use of Regis East did not fall within the protection of the Dover Amendment.

The judge rested his decision on a determination that Regis East's educational purpose “seems subordinate to [the plaintiff's] desire to provide elderly housing and/or a source of revenue.” He noted further that the record was “unclear” whether the plaintiff would in practice insist on the residents participating in educational programs, and specifically whether the plaintiff would in fact evict residents who failed to complete the minimum course requirement. Finally, he echoed the defendants' concern that “elements” of the project's educational components were “vague.”

2. Discussion. We first address the scope of the Dover Amendment's protection of “the use of land or structures for ... educational purposes.” Concluding that the statute protects only those uses serving primarily educational purposes, we then address whether the plaintiff has shown that the record before the motion judge contains evidence sufficient to create a material dispute of fact whether Regis East has as its dominant purpose a goal that “reasonably could be described as educationally significant.” Whitinsville Retirement Soc'y, Inc. v.Northbridge, 394 Mass. 757, 761 n. 3, 477 N.E.2d 407 (1985) (Whitinsville ).

a. Standard of review. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676, 863 N.E.2d 537 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571 N.E.2d 357 (1991), and cases cited.

b. Scope of protected educational purposes. The Dover Amendment provides, in relevant part:

[N]or shall any [zoning] ordinance or by-law prohibit, regulate or restrict the use of land or structures for religious purposes or for educational purposes on land owned or leased by the commonwealth or any of its agencies, subdivisions or bodies politic or by a religious sect or denomination, or by a nonprofit educational corporation; provided, however, that such land or structures may be subject to reasonable regulations concerning the bulk and height of structures and determining yard sizes, lot area, setbacks, open space, parking and building coverage requirements” (emphasis added).

We have construed this text on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Whitinsville, supra at 759–761, 477 N.E.2d 407;Fitchburg Hous. Auth. v.Board of Zoning Appeals of Fitchburg, 380 Mass. 869, 872–874, 406 N.E.2d 1006 (1980)( Fitchburg );Kurz v. Board of Appeals of N. Reading, 341 Mass. 110, 113, 167 N.E.2d 627 (1960). In so doing, we have emphasized that the word “education,” as employed in Massachusetts statutes and cases, “is a broad and comprehensive term.” Mount Hermon Boys' Sch. v. Gill, 145 Mass. 139, 146, 13 N.E. 354 (1887). We have refused to limit Dover Amendment protection to traditional or conventional educational regimes.

We have also, however, recognized two commonsense and interrelated limits on the statute's application. The first is that the...

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