Rehl v. Billetz

• Decision Date: 11 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 52A05–1105–PL–246.,52A05–1105–PL–246.
• Citation: 963 N.E.2d 1
• Parties: Anthony J. REHL, Sr. and Bessie A. Rehl, Appellants, v. Robert V. BILLETZ and Joy A. Billetz, Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

963 N.E.2d 1

Anthony J. REHL, Sr. and Bessie A. Rehl, Appellants,

v.Robert V. BILLETZ and Joy A. Billetz, Appellees.

No. 52A05–1105–PL–246.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Jan. 11, 2012.

Jeffry G. Price, Peru, IN, Attorney for Appellants.

Patrick J. Roberts, Roberts Law Firm, Peru, IN, Attorney for Appellees.

OPINION

BROWN, Judge.

Anthony and Bessie Rehl appeal the judgment of the trial court in favor of Robert and Joy Billetz regarding an access easement. The Rehls raise two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in entering judgment for the Billetzes. We affirm.

The facts most favorable to the judgment follow. Prior to 1991, Clyde and Marjorie Allmon owned a tract of land in Miami County, Indiana, and operated a campground on a northern portion of the property. Pursuant to an installment contract, the Allmons executed a warranty deed on June 28, 1991, conveying to the Billetzes a portion of their land which included the property upon which the campground was located (the “Billetz Property”), and the Allmons retained a two-acre portion of the land abutting County Road 200 North (the retained parcel hereinafter referred to as the “Rehl Property”). In order to provide access to the Billetz Property from County Road 200 N., the Allmons also granted an easement (the “Easement”) for ingress and egress to the Billetz Property over the Rehl Property. The language of the Easement, which was described in the legal description attached to the deed, in terms of a carve-out to the Rehl Property retained by the Allmons, provides:

Subject to an easement 30 feet in width off of the entire west side of said 2.00 acre tract. Said easement is for ingress and egress to lands to the north of said 2.00 acre tract, commonly known as R.R. # 6, Box 583, Peru, Indiana.

Appellants' Appendix at 51.

In March 1997, the Rehls entered into a lease with an option to purchase in connection with the Rehl Property with the estate of Marjorie Allmon (the “Marjorie Estate”).

In August 1998, the Marjorie Estate and the Billetzes entered into a release agreement to settle matters regarding the installment contract related to the Billetz Property. The release agreement recited the language of the Easement. In connection with the release agreement, the personal representative of the Marjorie Estate executed a personal representative's deed on September 15, 1998.

In February 1999, the Rehls purchased the Rehl Property from the Marjorie Estate. The June 28, 1991 warranty deed and the September 15, 1998 personal representative's deed, both of which contained the language setting forth the Easement, were recorded in the Miami County recorder's office on April 9, 1999.

On January 22, 2008, the Rehls filed a complaint against the Billetzes alleging that “the ongoing operation of [the Billetzes's] campground business has increased, or added to, the burden upon their real estate imposed by the original easement granted in favor of [the Billetzes]” and that the “burden is now unreasonable.” Id. at 14. The Rehls also stated that they “verily believe [the Billetzes] have access from their real estate to the county road directly south of [the Rehl Property], and therefore the easement in question is not a way of necessity.” Id. The Rehls requested “an order determining the original easement granted for the benefit of [the Billetzes] and their real estate to be forfeited” and “for an injunction terminating the [Billetzes] further use of the easement....” Id.

A bench trial was held on November 30, 2010, at which the Rehls requested findings and conclusions pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 52 and the parties presented evidence and testimony regarding the grant of the Easement and the traffic upon and use of the Easement.¹ On May 10, 2011, the court entered a judgment for the Billetzes and against the Rehls which provided in part:

Findings of fact:

1. The parties own adjacent real estate located in Miami County, Indiana.

2. The common predecessor in title to the parties were Clyde and Marjorie Allmon, who owned the combined tract.

3. The Allmons operated a campground on the property currently owned by the [Billetzes], and maintained their residence on the property currently owned by the [Rehls].

4. In 1991, the Allmons sold the campground business and real estate to the [Billetzes]. In addition to the fee simple title conveyed to the [Rehls], the Allmons also conveyed an easement for ingress and egress over [ ] thirty (30) foot in width over the property they retained.

5. Some years later, the Allmons sold the real estate, subject to the easement to the [Rehls].

6. There has been significant previous litigation between the parties concerning the easement, and the [Rehls] have brought the instant suit seeking to extinguish the easement.

7. While the number of vehicles using the easement may have increased modestly since the original granting of the easement, that increase, if any, does not create a greater burden on the servient estate than was originally anticipated, agreed upon, and created by the Allmons, and is the actual use originally anticipated and agreed upon when the easement was created.

8. Other than traffic using the easement for its intended purpose, the use of the easement by the dominant estate does not interfere with the [Rehls'] use of the servient estate.

9. Any Conclusion of Law which would be more properly denominated a Finding of Fact is hereby incorporated herein as such.

Conclusions of law:

1. An appurtenant easement acquired by actual grant cannot be lost by non-use of the right by the dominant owner. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mutchman, 565 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind.App.1990), trans. denied.; Selvia v. Reitmeyer, 156 Ind.App. 203, 295 N.E.2d 869 (1973).

2. The axiom that the law does not favor forfeitures applies to easements. Schwartz v. Castleton Christian Church, Inc., 594 N.E.2d 473, 477 (Ind.App.1992)[, trans. denied ].

3. In Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Tishner, 699 N.E.2d 731, 739 (Ind.App.1998), it was held:

The owner of an easement (the dominant estate) possesses all rights necessarily incident to the enjoyment of the easement. Litzelswope v. Mitchell, 451 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ind.App.1983). He may make repairs, improvements, or alterations that are reasonably necessary to make the grant of the easement effectual. Id. The owner of the servient estate may use his property in any manner and for any purpose consistent with the ennjoyment [sic] of the easement and the dominant estate cannot interfere with the use. Holding v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 400 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Ind.App.1980). All rights necessarily incident to the enjoyment of the easement are possessed by the owner of the dominant estate and it is the duty of the servient owner to permit the dominant owner to enjoy his easement without interference. Id. The owner of the servient estate may not so use his land as to obstruct the easement or interfere with the enjoyment thereof by the owner of the dominant estate. Id.

4. A right of way over land is an interest in the servient estate, regardless of whether it was acquired by adverse use, or by express or implied grant. It cannot be extinguished except in a mode recognized by law. Thomas v. McCoy, 48 Ind.App. 403, 405, 96 N.E. 14, 15 (1911).

5. An easement for ingress and egress is not extinguished by the fact that the dominant owner has or acquires other land by which the dominant estate can connect to a public highway. Brock v. B & M Moster Farms, Inc., 481 N.E.2d 1106 (Ind.App.1985).

6. “The servient estate [may only be] burdened to the extent to accomplish the end for which the dominant estate was created (Citations omitted).” Brock, supra, at 1109.

7. There exists no other legal reason to support extinguishing the easement.

8. Any Finding of Fact which would be more properly denominated a Conclusion of Law is hereby incorporated herein as such.

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, by the Court that judgment should be, and it hereby is, entered in favor of the [Billetzes]. Costs to the [Rehls].

Id. at 9–12.

The issue is whether the trial court erred in entering judgment for the Billetzes. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). We may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Menard, Inc. v. Dage–MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied. In our review, we first consider whether the evidence supports the factual findings. Id. Second, we consider whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind.1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Menard, 726 N.E.2d at 1210. We give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. Id. While we defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence; rather we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (Ind.1999). We evaluate questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court's determination of such questions. Kwolek v. Swickard, 944 N.E.2d 564, 570 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citing McCauley v. Harris, 928 N.E.2d 309, 313 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), reh'g denied, trans. denied ), trans. denied.

The Rehls argue that “[a]s a general proposition, easements are limited to the purpose for which they are granted” and that “the owner of the dominant estate cannot subject the servient estate to extra burdens.” Appellants' Brief at 8. The Rehls argue that the Easement was “given for the sole purpose of allowing the grantees ingress and egress to the ‘lands to the north of the two acre tract’ ” and that “[s]pecifically, the [Easement] does not mention...