Reich v. General Motors Corp.

Decision Date18 July 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-3660,95-3660
Citation89 F.3d 313
Parties, 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1673, 1996 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 31,092 Robert B. REICH, Secretary of Labor, Petitioner, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DELCO CHASSIS DIVISION; and Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Respondents.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Bruce Justh (argued and briefed), Ann Rosenthal, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of Solicitor, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Brian W. Scovill, General Counsel, General Motors Corp., Detroit, MI, Arthur G. Sapper (briefed), Robert C. Gombar (argued). McDermott, Will & Emery, Washington, DC, for General Motors Corp., Delco Chassis Div.

Ray Darling, Secretary, OSHRC, Washington, DC, for Occupational Safety & Health Review Com'n.

Before: NORRIS, SILER, and GODBOLD, * Circuit Judges.

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.

The Secretary of Labor petitions for review of a final order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC") affirming an administrative law judge's decision to vacate three citations issued to respondent General Motors Corporation ("GM") for violating 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147. We agree with OSHRC that the citations should be vacated.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

Over the course of several visits to GM manufacturing plants, Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") compliance officers observed GM workers servicing three machines that remained connected to their power supplies throughout the servicing operation. OSHA cited GM for violating OSHA's lockout/tagout safety standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147. This standard requires that certain industrial machines be shut down and disconnected from their power source for the duration of servicing or repair operations. The standard's scope provision limits the applicability of the standard to "the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment in which the unexpected energization or start up of the machines or equipment, or release of stored energy could cause injury to employees." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(a)(1)(i). The standard does not define "unexpected."

GM appealed the citations to one of OSHRC's administrative law judges, who vacated the citations.

The Secretary petitioned OSHRC to reinstate the citations, arguing that the standard applies where injury "could occur in the event of an unintended" start up of a machine. However, OSHRC considered the standard's scope provision and concluded that the term "unexpected" renders the lockout standard inapplicable to machines that give servicing employees sufficient advance notice or warning of machine start up to allow them to vacate the zone of danger. OSHRC then reviewed the workings of the three machines and held that the Secretary's evidence failed to establish that the machines could have started up without first warning the servicing employee. In particular, OSHRC found that to service any of the three machines, an employee had to pass through electronically inter-locked gates that immediately deactivated the machines when opened. OSHRC further found that once deactivated, an eight to twelve step process had to be followed to restart each of the machines and that, either by audible or visual signals or the presence of company workers in the immediate area, this multi-step process would have alerted servicing employees that the machines were about to start up. Given the advance notice provided by the start-up warning sequences, OSHRC held that the standard did not apply to GM's machines because they could not be subject to "unexpected" energization.

On appeal, the Secretary does not dispute OSHRC's factual findings but argues that OSHRC erred in failing to apply his interpretation of the scope provision's reference to "unexpected" energizations. Shifting course a bit from his argument before the Commission, the Secretary now argues that "unexpected" means "unanticipated" or "unplanned-for."

II. Analysis

By its terms, the lockout standard's scope provision limits the applicability of the regulation to machines that could cause injury if they were to start up unexpectedly. The Secretary argues that the standard applies "whenever equipment could injure employees if it becomes activated before the servicing employee plans for it to be activated."

The Administrative Procedure Act requires this court to set aside agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This court accords substantial deference to the Secretary's construction of an OSHA standard if it is ambiguous and the Secretary's interpretation of it is reasonable. Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 156, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 1178-79, 113 L.Ed.2d...

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5 cases
  • IBP, Inc. v. Iowa Employment Appeal Bd.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 22, 1999
    ...be shut down and disconnected from their power source for the duration of servicing or repair operations. See Reich v. General Motors Corp., 89 F.3d 313, 314 (6th Cir.1996). 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(c) states in pertinent (c) General—(1) Energy control program. The employer shall establish a pr......
  • Otis Elevator Co. v. Sec'y Labor
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • August 15, 2014
    ...for instance, signaled when the jam would yield or the chain would begin to move. This case thus is unlike Reich v. General Motors Corporation, 89 F.3d 313 (6th Cir.1996), on which Otis Elevator relies. In Reich, the machines under repair were specifically designed not to start up until an ......
  • Crown Pacific v. Occupational Safety Comm'n
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • December 10, 1999
    ...to the "mounting and demounting" of rim wheels. Such a reading would render the word "related" meaningless. Cf. Reich v. General Motors Corp., 89 F.3d 313, 315-16 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, the ALJ's interpretation impermissibly stretches the meaning of "related activities" beyond those associa......
  • OH Cast Prod. v. Occup. Safe. & Health Review, s. 99-4409
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • November 30, 2000
    ..."arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Reich v. General Motors Corp., 89 F.3d 313, 315 (6th Cir. 1996). An administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference. See Udall v......
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