Reich v. Minnicus

• Decision Date: 22 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. IP 90-276-C.,IP 90-276-C.
• Citation: Reich v. Minnicus, 886 F.Supp. 674 (S.D. Ind. 1993)
• Parties: Kenneth W. REICH, Plaintiff, v. Michael MINNICUS and Larry Bowmer, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

886 F. Supp. 674

Kenneth W. REICH, Plaintiff, v.Michael MINNICUS and Larry Bowmer, Defendant.

No. IP 90-276-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

July 22, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John Emry, Franklin, IN, for Kenneth W. Reich.

David L. Steiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for Michael Minnicus and Lawrence Bowmer.

ENTRY DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

FOSTER, United States Magistrate Judge.

The plaintiff moves for a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdicts in favor of both defendants are against the weight of the evidence.The defendants responded.For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.

The plaintiff brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendantIndiana State Police Officers alleging that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights when, in August of 1989, they twice entered his property without a warrant and searched for and seized evidence of possible violations of federal and state laws.The defendants testified that they went to the plaintiff's residence on the first occasion in order to investigate an anonymous tip that there was a vehicle on the plaintiff's property with a missing Vehicle Identification Number ("V.I.N."), a possible violation of Indiana and federal laws.The defendants testified that after receiving no response to their knock at the plaintiff's house, they noticed persons walking around a garage or shop building about one hundred feet behind the residence.At that time, the rear portion of the plaintiff's property was surrounded by a fence which started behind the house and enclosed the shop building.There was no gate across the driveway which continued through the fence to the garage-shop building.The defendants testified that they drove back to the shop building, identified themselves to the plaintiff, and received his consent to examine vehicles and vehicle parts which were located in and around the shop building.The officers recorded V.I.N. numbers and left the property.Evidence presented at trial indicated that six days later, after determining that certain vehicle parts located on the plaintiff's property were from a stolen vehicle, the officers returned to the plaintiff's property and again drove back to the shop building without a warrant; they informed him of the results of their initial investigations and received his permission to search for and seize the alleged stolen parts and any other vehicles or vehicle parts that the officers believed might be stolen or possessed in violation of Indiana or federal laws.

The plaintiff asserts that his uncontradicted evidence showed that the property surrounding his shop building was protected curtilage and therefore that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they initially drove through the gate and proceeded to his shop building.Because the defendants had no right to be where they were when they allegedly asked the plaintiff for permission to search, the plaintiff contends any consents he gave were void as a matter of law as "fruits of the poisonous tree."The plaintiff concedes that the relevant Court's instructions accurately stated the law.(Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial("Plaintiff's Brief"), p. 12).

Standard.

Rule 59,Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a new trial may be granted following a jury verdict "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States...."

The test to be applied in determining whether a motion for a new trial should be granted is whether "the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving."Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan,311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 194, 85 L.Ed. 147(1940).

General Foam Fabricators v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc.,695 F.2d 281, 288(7th Cir.1982).SeeDavlan v. Otis Elevator Co.,816 F.2d 287, 289(7th Cir.1987);Valbert v. Pass,866 F.2d 237, 239(7th Cir.1989);Fleming v. County of Kane, State of Illinois,898 F.2d 553, 559(7th Cir.1990);Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc.,977 F.2d 1178, 1182(7th Cir.1992), cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1274, 122 L.Ed.2d 669(1993);11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2805, p. 37(1973)."The authority to grant a new trial is confided almost entirely to the discretion of the trial court."Spanish Action Committee of Chicago v. City of Chicago,766 F.2d 315, 321(7th Cir.1985)(citingAllied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.,449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190, 66 L.Ed.2d 193(1980));seeForrester v. White,846 F.2d 29, 31(7th Cir.1988).¹

In determining whether to grant a new trial, the trial judge should accord great deference to the jury's verdict, Foster v. Continental Can Corp.,783 F.2d 731, 735(7th Cir.1986);Frieburg Farm Equipment, Inc. v. Van Dale, Inc.,756 F.Supp. 1191, 1192(W.D.Wis.1991), affirmed,978 F.2d 395(7th Cir.1992), and should not grant a new trial "unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done", 11 Wright & Miller, § 2803, p. 32.Courts should exercise their discretion to prevent miscarriages of justice and should disregard errors or defects which do not impact substantial rights of the moving party.See11 Wright & Miller, § 2805, p. 41.Unlike on a motion for a judgment n.o.v. or for a directed verdict, a trial judge ruling on a Rule 59(a)motion for a new trial may weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses, Spanish Action Committee,766 F.2d at 321, may grant the motion even in the presence of substantial evidence for the non-moving party, and is not required to read the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.See11 Wright & Miller, § 2806, p. 43.

Discussion.

The Court instructed the jury in part as follows regarding the issue of curtilage:

This right of privacy in the home, which is protected by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, applies also to the "curtilage" around the home.The curtilage is the area around the home which encompasses those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of the home.In determining whether a particular area is within the curtilage, you may take into account the proximity of the area to the home, whether and how the area is enclosed, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the possessor to protect the area from observation or access by the public....

The Fourth Amendment's protections also extend to private businesses not open to the general public.In that case, the concept of curtilage applies to the business premises just as with a dwelling.

Instructionno. 9.The plaintiff devotes much of his brief to reviewing the evidence he presented showing that his shop building was located within the curtilage of his home or business and he emphasizes that this evidence was uncontradicted.As the instruction suggested, however, the factors defining the curtilage of a home or business are necessarily flexible, indefinite, and fact-sensitive, requiring evaluation and interpretation in the particular context.After observing and hearing the evidence during trial, the Court is not left with the distinct impression that the jury's verdict represents a miscarriage of justice.The jury could have taken the raw facts and opinions presented at trial; evaluated them in totality, in context, and in the light of their own experience; and come to the reasonable conclusion, well-supported in the evidence, that the plaintiffs garage building was not located within the curtilage of his home or business.The defendants did, in fact, offer contrary evidence — e.g., the lack of a gate, the well-travelled driveway, the appearance of a hobby or personal business being conducted at the building, the absence of exclusionary signs, and the disrepair of portions of the surrounding fence — and they argued contrary interpretations of the plaintiff's evidence.The Court cannot say, after reviewing the evidence presented at trial, that the jury's conclusion that the property surrounding the plaintiffs shop building was not curtilage would have been against the weight of the evidence.

Such a finding, however, was not required to sustain the jury's verdict.After defining the concept of curtilage, the Court instructed the jury as follows:

You must decide whether the areas traversed by the defendants when they initially entered his property (the driveway and any ground traversed in encountering the plaintiff) were protected curtilage, and thus, that they violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by driving back to his shop in order to contact him, without a warrant or exception to the warrant requirement.You must also decide whether, and how much of, the areas searched by the defendants on the plaintiff's property constituted his protected curtilage, thus requiring a warrant or exception to the warrant requirement in order to enter and search.

Instructionno. 9.This instruction, to which the plaintiff did not object and does not now object, separated the object of the jury's curtilage analysis into two parts: first, the property around the garage structure and second, the access routes to the structure.Law enforcement officers on legitimate business do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they enter a curtilage over routes which are expressly or impliedly open to the public for access.1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, 2nd ed., § 2.3(c), p. 393(1987);People v. Houze,425 Mich. 82, 387 N.W.2d 807, 811 n. 1(1986);State of Washington v. Seagull,95 Wash.2d 898, 632 P.2d 44, 47(1981)(en banc);People v. Thompson,221 Cal.App.3d 923, 270 Cal.Rptr. 863, 873(2nd Dist.1990), review denied(Sept. 26, 1990...