Reid v. Buttigieg
| Decision Date | 23 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-1262 (TJK) |
| Parties | ROBENA G. REID, Plaintiff, v. PETE BUTTIGIEG, in his official capacity as Secretary of Transportation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Robena Reid contends that her federal employer tried for years to dissuade her from reporting illegal misconduct. Defendant her employer, moves for partial summary judgment and otherwise to dismiss her claims, arguing that it has already compensated her for any tangible harm arising from the acts she identifies. Reid does not deny that she was compensated but instead points to other harms that she says remain unremedied. Because the Court finds that any unremedied harm to Reid is immaterial under the governing law, it grants partial summary judgment to Defendant and dismisses the rest of the complaint.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids, among other things, retaliation against those who invoke its protections. See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59-70 (2006). Retaliation is actionable if it “produces an injury or harm.” Id. at 67. Such harm must be “materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 (quotation omitted). By contrast, reporting alleged misconduct does not “immunize” a reporter from “petty slights or minor annoyances.” Id. Whether a harm is material or petty Id. at 69.
The facts below are drawn mostly from Reid's complaint and assumed to be true. Where noted, her account is supplemented by other record evidence.
Reid is a financial economist for the Federal Transit Administration, a component of the Department of Transportation. ECF No. 28 (“Compl”) ¶ 4. She has worked for the Administration since 1999. Compl. ¶ 12. Several years into her tenure, Kimberly Gayle became Reid's direct supervisor. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 14-16. Most of the relevant events arise from conflicts between Reid and Gayle. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 17-21, 30-34.
Reid is also a self-described equal-employment-opportunity “gadfly.” ECF No. 32-1 at 6, 10. She has long been “a staunch [antidiscrimination] advocate” on behalf of herself and her colleagues. Id. at 6. On her own behalf, Reid filed some kind of complaint in 2006. See Compl. ¶¶ 7-8, 66-67. Around the same time, she filed another complaint alleging “harassment/discrim-ination for a disability and failure to provide reasonable accommodations.” See Compl. ¶ 20. Reid has also “represented” other Administration employees “in various employment matters . . ., including numerous . . . cases involving Title VII discrimination and retaliation issues.” Compl. ¶ 13; see also Compl. ¶¶ 17, 21-28, 44-45, 58, 77-78, 98, 103-04, 133-35, 178-80. In many such instances, Reid asked to use “official time”-that is, time for which she was paid-on those activities. See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 40, 103.
Reid believes her superiors wished to dissuade that activity. When Gayle became Reid's supervisor, other managers told Gayle that Reid was a “‘problem' employee because she filed numerous complaints.” Compl. ¶ 18. Reid describes many of her complaints as having been asserted “against” Gayle and other managers. Compl. ¶ 28. Gayle also complained about the number of challenges Reid filed or helped file and claimed Reid was filing them to “intimidate” her. Compl. ¶ 48. Another manager described the time Reid spent on complaints as “exorbitant” and stated that Reid “does that over her job as much as she can.” Compl. ¶ 49.
Shortly after Gayle became Reid's supervisor, the relationship between them “deteriorated.” Compl. ¶ 47. Reid attributes that decline to the fact that she is “ardent and passionate in her efforts to protect employee rights.” Id. Gayle had the final say over whether Reid could use official time to assist other employees with complaints or for any other purposes. See Compl. ¶¶ 83, 107. That authority spawned much conflict between Gayle and Reid.
Twice, Gayle denied Reid's requests to use official time to deliver work-related presentations. A few months before an industry conference, Reid shared her plans to deliver a presentation, which she believed had been approved. Compl. ¶¶ 51-53, 64. But in the lead-up to the presentation, Gayle made clear that she considered a poster that Reid had made for the presentation to be unapproved. Compl. ¶¶ 55-57. While she was considering Reid's request to use official time on that presentation, Gayle also reviewed some of Reid's requests to use official time to file anti-discrimination complaints. Compl. ¶¶ 54, 58-59. Gayle also “consulted” another manager about Reid's requests. Compl. ¶ 60. Ultimately, Gayle told Reid “she was not authorized to give her poster presentation while on duty time.” Compl. ¶ 63.
That decision, Reid says, “forced” her to use four hours of annual leave instead. Compl. ¶ 64. But the presentation was substantively related to Reid's work, and it helped her achieve an industry recertification. See Compl. ¶¶ 69-72. And Reid was the sole Administration employee “who was required to take leave to present.” Compl. ¶¶ 74-75. Reid thus believes that her officialtime request was denied to punish her for her complaint-related official-time requests. Compl. ¶ 76.
So Reid filed a new equal-employment-opportunity complaint about that alleged “reprisal.” Compl. ¶ 79.
A similar incident happened the next year. Reid timely expressed a desire to attend the same work-related conference. Compl. ¶ 87. But Gayle refused to approve an official-time request until Reid completed an unrelated assignment. Compl. ¶¶ 88-89. No other Administration employee's attendance at the conference was conditioned on completing a work assignment. Compl. ¶ 90. Because the conference began on a Sunday and Gayle did not confirm whether Reid was allowed to attend by the end of the workweek, Reid was unsure about the status of her request when the conference started. Compl. ¶¶ 89, 91-92. Other employees, though, got official-time credit for attending on both Sunday and Monday. See Compl. ¶¶ 95-96.
Gayle again eventually denied Reid's request. Compl. ¶¶ 95, 97. In the period between the two conferences-and on top of the new retaliation complaint on her own behalf-Reid continued to help other employees file complaints. Compl. ¶¶ 77-78, 82. Again, Gayle discussed Reid's use of official time with another manager. See Compl. ¶¶ 84-86. Reid thus believes that Gayle conditioned and then denied her request to use official time to attend the conference to punish Reid for participating in complaints against the Administration. Compl. ¶ 85.
A few months later, Gayle denied another of Reid's official-time requests. This time, Reid asked to use seven hours to help a colleague file a complaint. Compl. ¶ 98. Gayle told Reid she wished to discuss an assignment with her at the proposed time, so she denied the request. Compl. ¶¶ 99-100. But Reid says the assignment was not “urgent” and that, for various reasons, the assignment was not ripe for release. Compl. ¶¶ 101-02. She complains that this denial discouraged her from helping colleagues file complaints. Compl. ¶ 107.
The conflicts escalated from there. Soon after Gayle denied that official-time request, Reid and Gayle met to discuss an assignment. See Compl. ¶¶ 111, 114-16. According to Gayle, Reid was “loud,” “defiant,” and “aggressive[ ]” in that meeting. Compl. ¶ 115. But Reid disputes that characterization. Compl. ¶¶ 116-18. And on the same day, Gayle learned that she would need to provide an affidavit in an investigation into one of Reid's complaints. Compl. ¶ 112.
Two weeks after that meeting and affidavit request, Gayle sent Reid a “Letter of Caution.” Compl. ¶ 119. The letter threatened Reid with “corrective action.” Compl. ¶¶ 121-22. Reid believes that Gayle sent the letter to dissuade her from filing discrimination complaints, in part because an agency “Human Resource Specialist” later said the letter's impetus was Reid's “exorbitant” official-time requests to “represent people in their . . . complaints.” Compl. ¶ 123.
The conflict between Gayle and Reid came to a head during Reid's performance review that year. Reid recounts many details, but the upshot is that Gayle rated Reid's performance “unacceptable” in part because Reid “was not sufficiently focused on her work.” Compl. ¶ 132. Right before that review, Reid continued to participate in filing complaints, including by requesting that Gayle allow her to use official time to do so. Compl. ¶¶ 125, 133-35. Gayle also had met with other managers to discuss Reid's use of official time and invited another manager to sit in on Reid's review. See Compl. ¶¶ 125-28. The discord at the meeting led Reid to inform agency security that “she felt threatened and harassed” by Gayle. Compl. ¶ 131. Gayle, in turn, leveled a similar accusation based on an alleged (and disputed) remark that the Court construes as a reference to a work-related mass shooting. See Compl. ¶ 140.[1]Reid also alludes to an accusation about an offensive “hand gesture.” Compl. ¶ 158.[2]
Whatever happened at the performance-review meeting, the Administration put Reid on administrative leave four days later. See Compl. ¶¶ 136-39. The Administration did not warn Reid that it would do so; it disabled her building access while she was attending a meeting over lunch. See id. While she was on administrative leave, the Administration did not permit Reid to access her work email remotely. See Compl. ¶¶ 147-48. Reid believes both steps were retaliatory. See Compl. ¶¶ 151-52. She explains...
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