Reid v. Evans

• Decision Date: 20 January 2023
• Docket Number: 3:22-CV-46 (LAG),3:22-CV-53 (LAG)
• Parties: RHONDA REID, Plaintiff, v. TYNASHA EVANS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

RHONDA REID, Plaintiff,
v.
TYNASHA EVANS, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 3:22-CV-46 (LAG), 3:22-CV-53 (LAG)

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Albany Division

January 20, 2023

ORDER

LESLIE A. GARDNER, JUDGE

Before the Court are Plaintiff Rhonda Reid's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 3), Defendants State of Georgia and Michael Nail's (State Defendants) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15), Defendants Tynasha Evans, Tameka Chapman, Sharon Stembridge, and Greene County's (County Defendants) Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 17, 22), and the United States of America's (Federal Judges) Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 20); Reid v. Land (Reid II), No. 3:22-CV-53 (LAG), (Doc. 7) (M.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2022). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 3) is GRANTED, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) is GRANTED, the County Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 17, 22) are GRANTED, and the Federal Judges' Motion to Dismiss in Reid II, No. 3:22-CV-53 (LAG), (Doc. 7) is GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Rhonda Reid^[1] initiated this action on April 28, 2022, raising tort claims against Defendants Evans, Stembridge, and Chapman. (Doc. 1). On April 29, 2022,

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Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, adding the State of Georgia and Nail as Defendants and including more factual details about her tort claims. (Doc. 2). On May 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding United States District Judges Clay D. Land, C. Ashley Royal, Tilman E. Self, United States Magistrate Judge Charles H. Weigle, and the United States District Court for Middle District of Georgia as Defendants. (Doc. 3).^[2] The Second Amended Complaint also added allegations of a conspiracy to interfere with a case Plaintiff had pending in this Court and violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights and requested compensatory damages, court fees, and costs. (Id. at 2-16).

Between May 13 and 25, 2022, Defendants Evans, Chapman, Stembridge, Greene County, and Nail filed forms waiving service of a summons in this action. (Docs. 7-10, 12). The State Defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on June 30, 2022, and the County Defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on July 5, 2022. (Docs. 15, 17). On November 10, 2022, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Georgia moved to dismiss Defendants Judge Land, Judge Royal, Judge Self, and Judge Weigle.^[3] (Doc. 20); Reid II, No. 3:22-CV-53 (LAG), (Doc. 7). Defendants State of Georgia, Nail, Evans, Chapman, Stembridge, and Greene County sought a discovery stay pending resolution of the Motions to Dismiss, which the Court granted. (Docs. 16, 18, 19). Plaintiff has not responded to the Motions to Dismiss, which are now ripe for review. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.2.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual allegations in Plaintiff's filings are difficult to follow, as they and their attachments contain myriad run-on sentences, conclusory allegations, and anecdotes with no clear relevance to the named Defendants. The Court summarizes-to the best of its ability-Plaintiff's allegations against the named Defendants.

Plaintiff alleges the following facts: Defendants Evans, Stembridge, Chapman, Judge Land, Judge Weigle, Greene County, and the State of Georgia conspired to tamper with a writ of habeas corpus that Plaintiff had pending before this Court.^[4] (Doc. 3 at 2-3). Judge Land then “allowed [Defendant] Evans to steal [Plaintiff's] habeas corpus” case from this Court to state court, and Judge Land and Judge Weigle tampered with the court computer system to favor the opposing party and prevent Plaintiff from filing an appeal. (Id. at 2-3, 15). Specifically, Judge Land prematurely dropped Greene County and the State of Georgia as defendants in Plaintiff's case pending before him. (Id. at 3, 17). Additionally, Judge Land is blocking Plaintiff from closing one of her cases, he always lets “the other side win” in Plaintiff's cases, and he abuses his “oath of office and his power.” (Id. at 10, 19).

Further, while Plaintiff was paying child support, the State of Georgia and Greene County removed her children and sent them to South Carolina. (Doc. 2 at 4). Additionally, the state-court calendar system is intentionally confusing. (Id. at 2). In one of Plaintiff's state court cases, the judges and the clerk of court in Greene County-specifically Defendant Stembridge-forged documents and left one of her cases pending for six years while the statute of limitations ran. (Doc. 3 at 8, 10-11). When Plaintiff tried to appeal, the clerk of court refused to send an official transcript. (Id. at 11).

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Plaintiff raises claims for defamation, general personal injury, and conspiracy. (Id. at 16). She contends that Defendants abused the powers of their positions and caused her and her family great harm. (Id. at 18-19). Plaintiff asserts that she is afraid for her life and for her “family as well.” (Id. at 19).

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on its face if the complaint alleges enough facts to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). A complaint must plead “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The Court must “take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,” but the same liberal reading does not apply to legal conclusions. Anderson, 17 F.4th at 1344-45 (first citing Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010); and then citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions” cannot “unlock the doors of discovery.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Additionally, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted).

A court ordinarily does not consider anything beyond the complaint and documents attached thereto when ruling on a motion to dismiss. “A district court may take judicial notice of certain facts without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Horne v. Potter, 392 Fed.Appx. 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999)). This includes a document that: (1) the plaintiff references in the complaint, (2) that is central to the plaintiff's claim, (3) whose contents are not in dispute, and (4) that the defendant attaches to its motion to dismiss. Hi-Tech Pharms., Inc. v. HBS Int'l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). The requirement that the document's contents not be

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in dispute goes to authenticity. See Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The County Defendants attached Plaintiff's state habeas petition and two federal habeas petitions (Docs. 17-2, 17-3, 17-6) and the adjudication of those petitions (Docs. 17-4, 17-7) as exhibits to their Motion to Dismiss. See In re Reid, No. 16-CV-047 (Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2016); Reid v. Georgia, No. 3:17-CV-140 (CDL) (CHW) (M.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2017); Reid v. Nail, No. 3:21-CV-99 (CDL) (CHW) (M.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 2021). Additionally, Plaintiff attaches a portion of the docket report of her 2017 federal habeas case as an exhibit to her Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 3-1 at 3). The state and federal habeas case documents are referred to in the Second Amended Complaint, are central to Plaintiff's claim that Defendants conspired to interfere with the progress of her habeas actions, and their authenticity is undisputed. See Hi-Tech Pharms., Inc., 910 F.3d at 1189 (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court considers them; and such consideration of these documents does not convert the County Defendants' and the Federal Judges' Motions to Dismiss into motions for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d).

Generally, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“[A] pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” (citations omitted)). This leniency does not, however, permit courts to “act as de facto counsel or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants State of Georgia and Nail's Motion to Dismiss

The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 15-1 at 1 & n.1). While it is difficult for the Court to ascertain all of Plaintiff's specific claims, it appears that Plaintiff brings tort claims against Defendants State of Georgia and Nail. (Doc. 2 at 2). Plaintiff alleges that the State interfered with her

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cases in the Superior Court of Greene County. (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that the State conspired with Greene County to remove her children from her care and send them to South Carolina. (Id. at 4). In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants State of Georgia and Nail make the following arguments: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the State because Plaintiff failed to effect proper service on the State, and (2) the...