Reid v. Hartford Fuel Supply Co.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1935
• Citation: 120 Conn. 541,182 A. 141
• Parties: REID v. HARTFORD FUEL SUPPLY CO. et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

182 A. 141

120 Conn. 541

REID v. HARTFORD FUEL SUPPLY CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 3, 1935

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Carl Foster, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Wade Reid claimant, opposed by the Hartford Fuel Supply Company and another. From a judgment dismissing defendants' appeal to the superior court from a supplemental finding and award of the compensation commissioner for plaintiff and confirming the award, defendants appeal.

Error in part, and case remanded, with direction.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.

Where medical testimony was conflicting, finding of workmen's compensation commissioner that employee was permanently disabled was binding.

M. J Blumenfeld, of Hartford, for appellants.

Julius B. Schatz, and Arthur D. Weinstein, both of Hartford, for appellee.

HAINES, Judge.

While employed by the named defendant, the claimant, a colored man about 27 years of age, was accidentally injured by being buried in a pile of falling coal. The commissioner found that as a result of his injuries he was totally incapacitated for further gainful manual labor. By mutual agreement filed with and accepted by the commissioner, he received compensation at the rate of $9.35 per week to February 12, 1934. Upon claimant's motion a hearing was held by the commissioner who awarded a continuance of the payments, and also compensation for teeth lost by reason of the accident. Thereafter, at hearings on February 1, 11, and 18, 1935, the commissioner found that the claimant was suffering from a total incapacity which was permanent, and awarded him $3,573.14 by commuting his compensation for the remainder of the compensation period into a lump sum, payable directly to him forthwith, through his attorney's office.

The respondents deny that the claimant is permanently incapacitated, and contest the right of the commissioner to commute the compensation and direct its payment to the claimant. They seek many changes in the findings of the commissioner.

The medical testimony, both as to the condition of the claimant and as to the prognosis, was conflicting. There was ample testimony that the claimant was suffering from psychic shock, a nervous affection known medically as neurocirculatory asthenia. As to its permanency there was a disagreement; some of the doctors holding that it was impossible to say how long the condition would continue, while at least one, the doctor who was called in to see the man the day of the accident and who had had him in his care from March 1, 1934, until the hearing, gave it as his opinion that the man was permanently disabled. It was the right of the commissioner to accept this conclusion. Where medical testimony conflicts, the finding of the commissioner cannot be disturbed. Kosik v. Manchester Construction Co., 106 Conn. 107, 136 A. 870; Senzamici v. Waterbury Castings Co., 115 Conn. 446, 161 A. 860. A careful study of the record reveals evidence in support of all the material findings, with a single exception to which reference will hereafter be made.

It was found that the claimant was a vigorous man and in good physical condition, nowithstanding the nervous affection, but that the latter rendered him unable to carry on any gainful physical labor; that his life expectancy was not shortened, and it was reasonable to conclude that he would live far beyond the 10-year compensation period. The commissioner found further that the claimant had had some experience in handling coal and fruit, and that " if he could secure for himself equipment with which to peddle coal or fruit, he would be able to supervise the business and by hiring a couple of men make more per week than he is now receiving as compensation." He is without funds, and has a wife, child, and mother to support. In this situation the commissioner held that it was " necessary and just" that the remaining payments for the compensation period should be commuted into a single lump sum which was determined to be $3,573.14, and ordered that it be paid to the claimant by check forthwith through the office of his counsel.

Our statute provides that compensations " shall be paid directly to the persons entitled to receive them unless the commissioner, for good reason, shall order payment to those entitled to act for such persons; but, when he shall find it just or necessary, the commissioner may approve or direct the commutation, in whole or in part, of weekly compensations under the provisions of this chapter into monthly or quarterly payments, or into a single lump sum, which may be paid to the one *** entitled to the compensation. *** In any such case of commutation, a true equivalence of value shall be maintained. *** and, when commutation shall be made into a single lump sum, the commissioner may direct that it be paid to any savings bank, trust company or life insurance company which is authorized to do business within this state, to be held in trust for the beneficiary or beneficiaries under the provisions of this chapter and paid in conformity with the provisions of this chapter." General Statutes, § 5253.

It is apparent from the foregoing that in cases of this character a wide discretion is vested in the commissioner. The normal and usual method of paying compensation under the act is by weekly payments. This protects alike the beneficiaries and the respondents. Where the case is one of incapacity, the right to these...