Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., Huron School Dist. No. 2-2

Decision Date06 December 1989
Docket Number16525,Nos. 16514,s. 16514
Citation449 N.W.2d 240,57 Ed.LawRep. 1006
Parties57 Ed. Law Rep. 1006 Tom REID, Appellant and Appellee, v. HURON BOARD OF EDUCATION, HURON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2-2, Respondent and Appellant.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Linda Lea Viken of Finch, Viken, Viken & Pechota, Rapid City, for appellant and appellee.

Rodney Freeman, Jr. of Churchill, Manolis, Freeman & Kludt, Huron, for respondent and appellant.

MORGAN, Justice.

The Board of Education of the Huron School District (Board) appeals from a judgment reinstating Tom Reid (Reid) as the Huron High School boys' varsity basketball coach. By notice of review, Reid appeals that part of the trial court's order holding that the Continuing Contract Law (CCL), SDCL 13-43-9.1 through 13-43-13, does not apply to the coaching portions of a teacher's contract. We affirm the decision of the trial court for a different reason.

Reid is a tenured teacher who had been employed by Board for seven years. He was first employed by Board at the commencement of the 1982-83 school year. In addition to teaching ninth grade physical education and physical science, he was also the Huron High School boys' varsity basketball coach for seven years. Reid holds a valid South Dakota teaching certificate as required by SDCL 13-42-1. He is certified to teach all subjects within his areas of academic preparation, as well as an assignment outside his major areas of academic preparation: head coach.

March 21, 1988, was the third Monday in March, the deadline under SDCL 13-43-9.1 for Board to notify teachers of their intent to nonrenew their contracts. Despite the fact that Huron's varsity basketball season was completed by March 14, 1988, Reid was not notified on March 21, 1988, that the basketball coaching portion of his teaching contract would not be renewed.

Instead, on April 5, 1988, Reid was handed his 1988 coaching assessment evaluation by Barry Huitema (Huitema), Huron's Athletic Director, and was advised by Huitema that he was recommending to Board that they not offer Reid the head coaching duties for the year 1988-89. Reid was given twenty-four hours to reply to the 1988 coaching assessment evaluation. Huitema also informed Reid he could visit with Superintendent Robert Taylor and meet with Board, but Reid declined to do so on advice of counsel.

On April 19, 1988, Board held a special meeting and voted to accept Huitema's recommendation that Reid not be offered the basketball coaching assignment for 1988-89 school year. Though Board had all the evaluations of Reid's coaching from 1983 through 1988, as well as Reid's responses and the plan of assistance prepared by Huitema, they did not look at these documents, nor did they ask Huitema any questions or have any discussion on the issue of nonrenewal of Reid's coaching contract. Board relied exclusively on Huitema's recommendation. Under Reid's 1987-88 teaching contract, he was paid $22,822. Board's nonrenewal of the head basketball coaching job meant a $2,474.00 reduction in pay, a nearly eleven percent cut in Reid's teacher salary.

Reid appealed to the circuit court and a trial de novo was held, pursuant to SDCL 13-46-1. By stipulation of fact, both parties agreed that Reid was not given notice by the third Monday in March, 1988, that the portion of his teaching contract effecting his head coaching duties would not be renewed.

At trial, Huitema was unable to give a principal reason for recommending nonrenewal. He expressed his general concern, however, with the roller-coaster pattern of Reid's performance and evaluations from year to year. Despite this pattern, Huitema had recommended renewal of Reid's contract the previous six years. He also admitted that Reid was "a very good fundamentalist; his strengths being teaching skills, ball handling, and shooting." Further, testimony from Board President Ruth Sievert (Sievert) and Superintendent Taylor established that Board's decision to nonrenew the basketball coaching portion of Reid's contract was based solely on Huitema's recommendation and without any independent inquiry on the part of Board. Sievert did claim that she and Board had a generalized knowledge of the problems with Reid's coaching.

Reid offered evidence for the source of some of this negative information as being Board member Bill Eichman (Eichman). During the 1987-88 season, Reid had a confrontation with Eichman over who should coach the team. Reid sent Eichman a letter requesting that he stop interfering with the team because it was effecting player morale. Eichman's actions included the following: embarrassing one of the players by offering to buy him black basketball shoes (the team's colors are orange and black) and have him work off the debt for Eichman; offering to buy the coaches sport coats, though these items of clothing were not required in the dress code; commenting to parents that certain players were ball hogging and the coaches were not coaching properly; and, most critically, attending practice sessions, making notes, and then informing players of their mistakes. Reid's letter concluded by informing Eichman that he, and not Eichman, was hired to coach the basketball team. It was Eichman who had made the motion to dismiss Reid as head coach, which motion carried on a voice vote.

The trial court found that the CCL did not apply to the coaching provisions of Reid's contract. Nonetheless, it found Board's decision to nonrenew was arbitrary and characterized by an abuse of discretion under the provisions of SDCL 1-26-36(6), because Board abdicated its responsibility by relying on the recommendation of Huitema, instead of making an independent inquiry into the facts. The trial court ordered reinstatement of Reid as head basketball coach and compensation in the sum of $2,474.00, plus any prejudgment interest and costs.

On appeal, Board raises three issues:

(1) Whether the decision to nonrenew the coaching portion of Reid's contract was arbitrary and characterized by an abuse of discretion;

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant Board's motion for a new trial; and (3) Whether Reid's proper remedy is reinstatement as head basketball coach or simply damages.

By notice of review, Reid raises the key issue:

Whether the trial court's finding that the Continuing Contract Law does not apply to the coaching portion of a teacher's contract was clearly erroneous.

Since the applicability of the CCL to coaching is pivotal to the outcome of this case, we begin with the notice of review issue. Reid argues that because South Dakota law defines a coach as a "teacher" and the CCL requires that a "teacher" be notified when the terms and conditions of his contract are changed, the coaching portion of his contract was covered by the CCL. Further, he contends that since Board did not notify him of the change in the terms of his contract by the third Monday in March, his contract was automatically renewed.

Board, in response, argues that it would be impractical to apply the CCL to springtime extracurricular activities; therefore, the legislature did not intend for it to apply to coaching duties. Additionally, Board contends that case law from this state, and others, supports the proposition that the coaching provisions of a teacher's contract are not covered by the CCL.

We premise our discussion on several well-settled rules of statutory construction, starting with the rule that construction of a statute is a question of law and thus the decision below is fully reviewable without deference to the decision of the trial court. Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 884 (S.D.1984). In Famous Brands we also said:

The purpose of rules regarding the construction of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law, and said intention is to be ascertained by the court primarily from the language expressed in the statute. (cite omitted).

In applying legislative enactments, we must accept them as written. The legislative intent is determined from what the legislature said, rather than from what we or others think it should have said. (cite omitted).

While it is fundamental that we must strive to ascertain the real intention of the lawmakers, it is equally fundamental that we must confine ourselves to the intention as expressed in the language used.

Id. at 884-5.

SDCL ch. 13-43 encompasses employment of teachers and, as previously noted, SDCL 13-43-9.1 to 13-43-12 inclusive, comprise the CCL. For the purpose of the CCL, "teacher" is defined in SDCL 13-43-12 to mean any person engaged in the profession of teaching children, grades kindergarten through twelve, in the public schools of South Dakota and any person employed in the public schools as a principal, superintendent or other administrative school employee. SDCL 13-43-4 requires a written teacher's contract and SDCL 13-43-5, except in circumstances not applicable in this discussion, requires a teacher's certificate before such a contract can be signed.

Pertinent to our discussion whether coaching is covered under this definition, we must turn to the certification statutes. SDCL ch. 13-42 relates to teacher certification. SDCL 13-42-1 provides that no person shall be allowed to teach or administer "who does not have a valid certificate issued by the superintendent of elementary and secondary education authorizing said person to teach." SDCL 13-1-11 empowers the state board of education to make all rules carrying out supervisory functions as relates to elementary and secondary education. And, in particular, SDCL 13-42-3 provides, in pertinent part: "The South Dakota Board of Education may determine and prescribe all rules and requirements which an applicant must meet in order to be issued a teacher's certificate by the Superintendent of Education authorizing the holder thereof to accept a teaching or administrative position in any elementary or secondary school in the field...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • Weisbeck v. Hess
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • November 9, 1994
    ...is a question of law and is, therefore, fully reviewable without deference to the decision of the trial court. Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., 449 N.W.2d 240, 242 (S.D.1989). Pursuant to SDCL 19-13-7, "[a] patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclo......
  • Sander v. Geib, Elston, Frost Professional Ass'n
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • September 15, 1993
    ...of law and thus, the decision below is fully reviewable without deference to the decision of the trial court." Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., 449 N.W.2d 240, 242 (S.D.1989). "Moreover, when the question is which of two enactments the legislature intended to apply to a particular situation, 'te......
  • In re Adoption of D.M.
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 8, 2006
    ...is expressed through various methods including "[r]ules of practice and procedure . . . adopted by departments"); Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., 449 N.W.2d 240, 243 (S.D.1989) (concluding that "rules and regulations of an administrative agency governing proceedings before it, duly adopted and ......
  • Sioux Falls School Dist. v. Koupal
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • January 25, 1995
    ...The court's legal conclusions are fully reviewable. Kayser v. State Elec. Comm'n, 512 N.W.2d 746, 747 (S.D.1994); Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., 449 N.W.2d 240, 242 (S.D.1989). The decision will stand unless we are definitely and firmly convinced a mistake has been made. Selle v. Pierce, 494 N......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT