Reid v. Owens

Decision Date10 June 1937
Docket Number5758
Citation92 Utah 432,69 P.2d 265
CourtUtah Supreme Court
PartiesREID et al. v. OWENS et al

Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; Allen G. Thurman, Judge.

Action by Reva May Reid and others against W. F. Owens and others wherein defendant Wasatch Gas Company and another filed cross-complaint. From a judgment on a directed verdict in favor of defendant W. F. Owens, plaintiffs appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Thomas & Thomas, of Salt Lake City, for appellants.

Gardner Latimer & Evans, of Salt Lake City, for respondents.

Ingebretsen Ray, Rawlins & Christensen and Joseph Jones, all of Salt Lake City, for cross-complainants and respondent.

EVANS, District Judge. EPHRAIM HANSON and LARSON, JJ., FOLLAND, Chief Justice, MOFFAT, Justice, concurring. WOLFE, J., being disqualified, did not participate.

OPINION

EVANS, District Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a directed verdict in favor of the defendant W. F. Owens, and involves the question as to the effect to be given to certain extrajudicial admissions relied upon by appellants to establish his liability.

The plaintiffs sued to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of their father, Clair G. Reid, who was struck and killed by an automobile owned by the defendant W. F. Owens, but which, at the time of the accident, was being driven by the defendant George Owens, his seventeen year old son. It is alleged, and at the trial evidence was offered tending to prove, that George Owens was negligent in the operation of the car at the time of the accident, and that as a result of such negligence the deceased father of the minor plaintiffs met his death. Upon this issue the jury failed to agree and the court declared a mistrial. The cause is still pending, except as to the defendant W. F. Owens, in whose favor the court granted a motion for a directed verdict upon the ground that there was no evidence tending to show that the defendant George Owens was an habitually careless driver, or any substantial evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant W. F. Owens knew or should have known that the defendant George Owens was an habitually careless driver.

An examination of the record discloses that there was no independent evidence offered by plaintiffs in support of the allegations that George Owens was an incompetent, careless, unsafe, and reckless driver, habitually driving the automobile at a high and dangerous rate of speed. The only evidence offered on behalf of plaintiffs, and which it is contended should have required the submission of the question to the jury, is found in the testimony of Mary Ethel Reid and Bryan Reid. Mary Ethel Reid testified that after the death of her husband, the defendant W. F. Owens came to her home, and in the course of a conversation said: "My boy is like all boys; he drives too fast and is careless. We have taken out five thousand dollars of insurance and we will do all we can to help you get that." Bryan Reid, a brother of the deceased, testified that on that occasion, W. F. Owens said that the boy was driving too fast; that he was not a careful driver and it worried them considerably, and for that reason he took out protection for him.

It is contended by the plaintiff that this evidence constituted not only knowledge on the part of the father of the son's habits, but that it also made out a prima facie case as to the careless habits of the son. It is contended by the defendant that the evidence of the alleged admissions of W. F. Owens bears only on the question of his knowledge and not on the independent fact of the son's habitual carelessness in driving.

At the close of plaintiff's case, defendants moved for a nonsuit, which motion, however, was denied, indicating that the court at this stage of the proceedings adopted the plaintiffs' theory. The granting of a directed verdict constitutes a rejection of that theory.

The complaint alleged that George Owens was a careless and reckless driver and that his habits in such respect were well known to the defendant W. F. Owens, notwithstanding which he permitted the boy to drive the car. These allegations were denied. If, however, the answer had admitted the alleged statements attributed to the defendant W. F. Owens, no proof would need be offered as to that issue. Of if, notwithstanding the denials in the answer, the defendant W. F. Owens had made such admissions in open court, the effect would be the same. Here the alleged admissions being extrajudicial, require proof, and the fact as to whether or not the admission was made becomes an issue to be submitted to the jury.

If the father had reason to believe that his son was a careless driver, from observation of his habits, or otherwise, it would be his duty to deny the son the use of the car. The son's reputation is not necessarily the only source of knowledge as to his habits of driving. It is not so much a question as to what others may believe in that respect as to what the father himself may know as to the fact or as to the son's reputation.

"When an admission is clearly proved and shown to have been made with deliberation, it is not necessarily weak evidence, nor does it require corroboration. On the contrary, when admissions are so proved, they may have great inherent force as evidence. To the extent of the subject matter of the admission it makes out a prima facie case, and dispenses with other proof of the fact admitted, until rebutted, and a finding resting solely upon an extra-judicial admission is not, for that reason, unsupported by substantial evidence."3 Jones' Comm. on Evid. § 1072.

"While a litigant in a cause may not necessarily be concluded by his extra judicial admission of facts, yet whatever is so voluntarily admitted by him against himself may reasonably be taken to be true; and he ordinarily may not complain if it is treated as true." Midgley v. Campbell Building Co., 38 Utah 293, 112 P. 820, 822.

In the case of Peterson v. Richards , 73 Utah 59, 272 P. 229, 233, testimony was offered on behalf of plaintiff to the effect that the defendant had stated:

"I do admit that we injured her hand in the operating room, but as far as money is concerned, I do not care at all about the money because the insurance company has to take care of that, but it is the publicity part of it that I don't like."

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6 cases
  • Saunders v. Prue
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • May 5, 1941
    ... ... 31, ... 131 S.W.2d 574; Greenie v. Nashua Buick Co. (N.H.), ... 158 A. 817; Anderson v. Daniel (Mass.), 101 So. 498; ... Owens v. Carmichael's U-Drive Autos (Cal.), 2 ... P.2d 580; Seinsheimed v. Burkhart (Tex.), 122 S.W.2d ... 1063; Elliott v. Harding (Ohio), 140 N.E. 338; ... Lloyd v. Noakes (Pa.), 96 Pa.Super. 164; ... Buckingham v. Gilbert, 163 N.C. 306; Reid v. Owens ... (Utah), 69 P.2d 265 ...           ... OPINION ... [151 S.W.2d 479] ...           [235 ... Mo.App. 1248] ... ...
  • Reid v. Owens
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • August 31, 1939
    ...has been tried three times, and this is the second time it has been before this court on appeal. The earlier opinion is reported in 92 Utah 432, 69 P.2d 265. This action out of an automobile accident in September 1932, wherein the defendant, George Owens, drove a car which struck Clair G. R......
  • Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • October 27, 1937
    ... ... actual case. In the case of Rocca v ... Steinmetz , 189 Cal. 426, 208 P. 964, 965, similar in ... fact to one of our own, Reid v. Owens , 69 ... P.2d 265, the action was brought against the father and son; ... against the latter on the basis of [93 Utah 458] having by ... ...
  • Herland v. Izatt
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • January 30, 2015
    ...owner liable for the negligent actions of the driver.”).53 123 Utah 238, 258 P.2d 438, 439 (1953) (emphasis added).54 Reid v. Owens, 92 Utah 432, 69 P.2d 265, 265–66 (1937) (recognizing a duty in a wrongful death negligence action not premised on Utah's motor-vehicle owner liability statute......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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