Reid v. Reid

• Decision Date: 30 December 1959
• Citation: 348 P.2d 29,219 Or. 500
• Parties: Norman REID, Margaret Hoover, and Elizabeth Gass, Respondents, v. Ella L. REID, as an individual and as executrix of the estate of Clifford F. Reid, deceased, Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 29

348 P.2d 29

219 Or. 500

Norman REID, Margaret Hoover, and Elizabeth Gass, Respondents, v. Ella L. REID, as an individual and as executrix of the estate of Clifford F. Reid, deceased, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 1.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 13, 1959.

Decided Dec. 30, 1959.

Orval Thompson and H. M. Weatherford argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Weatherford & Thompson, Albany.

H. W. Devlin, McMinnville, argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Cummins & Devlin and Marsh, Marsh & Dashney, McMinnville.

Before McALLISTER, C. J., and PERRY, O'CONNELL and REDDING, JJ.

REDDING, Justice pro tem.

This is a suit by the plaintiffs to have it decreed that they are the owners in fee simple of a 78-acre tract of farm land located near Dayton, in Yamhill County. From a decree in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant has taken this appeal.

The plaintiffs seek the relief prayed for in their complaint on two theories. In their first cause of suit plaintiffs allege that the execution and delivery of the deed of February 7, 1925, hereinafter referred to, from their parents, Clair Reid and Verda Reid, to Clifford F. Reid was conditioned upon an agreement that said grantee could regain title to said real property upon payment to Clair J. Reid of the sum of approximately $6,000, advanced by said grantors in discharge of certain liens on said property. Clifford F. Reid having wholly failed to fulfill said condition within a reasonable time, plaintiffs ask that said deed be cancelled and removed as a cloud on the title of the real property which is the subject of this suit. In their second cause of suit the plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to the real property in question by virtue of adverse possession thereof.

At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case upon plaintiffs' first cause of suit the trial court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed said suit upon said first cause. The trial then proceeded upon plaintiffs' second cause of suit. At the conclusion of the trial the court found that the plaintiffs had gained title to the real property in question by adverse possession and granted plaintiffs the relief prayed for in their complaint. The defendant, Ella Reid, individually and as executrix of the estate of Clifford F. Reid, in her appeal from the judgment and decree of the lower court, contends that Clifford F. Reid acquired title to the property in question from Clair J. Reid and Verda Reid by deed dated February 7, 1925.

During the year 1912, Clifford Reid and his wife, the defendant, Ella Reid, purchased the land in question herein and thereafter operated it as a dairy farm, while living in Portland, where Clifford was engaged in business. The land purchased was situated adjacent to the home place then owned by James and Mary Reid, parents of Clifford and Clair Reid, and operated by Clair Reid as a grain farm.

In September, 1923, the defendant and her husband, Clifford F. Reid, moved to Los Angeles, California, and subsequent thereto and upon their first return to Oregon, Clifford rented the property in question to Clair. In the words of the defendant: 'Clair was to run the ranch, take care of the ranch, pay the taxes, and to have the out-put of the farm.'

Subsequent to said rental and on the 10th of October, 1924, without consideration so far as the record shows, except for a recital in the deed of payment of $10, Clifford F. Reid and Ella L. Reid, his wife, deeded the property in issue to Clair J. Reid and Verda Reid, his wife. After receipt of such deed Clair J. Reid and Verda Reid borrowed monies from the United States National Bank of McMinnville, with which they paid an existing and matured mortgage on the property in the principal sum of $4,800, together with accrued interest, and also paid an unsatisfied judgment against Clifford F. Reid in the approximate sum of $1,500 which was a lien on the property; acquired several quitclaim deeds to clear the title to the property; thereafter placed a mortgage on the property in favor of the Federal Land Bank to secure a loan in the sum of $5,000; and thereafter and on February 7, 1925, executed a warranty deed in favor of Clifford F. Reid which they mailed to said grantee on February 9, 1925, at his Los Angeles office and in which they warranted said property to be free and clear of all encumbrance. There is no evidence of any consideration having been paid for said deed, except for the recital in said instrument. Subsequent thereto said grantors sold a silo located on the premises and with the approval of Clifford converted a dairy barn located thereon to a turkey brooder house, and after discussing the matter with Clifford, Clair tiled the property for drainage purposes. Clair also caused a survey of one line to be run; sold growing timber from the property, and mortgaged said property for a second time.

For purposes of securing credit, Clair Reid listed the 78 acres in question among his assets in at least 12 annual financial statements filed with the United States National Bank of McMinnville from October 18, 1925, to April 23, 1941.

Clifford Reid and the defendant continued to live in the vicinity of Los Angeles, California, and were present in Oregon only on short visits. The plaintiffs' parents, Clair and Verda Reid, remained in Oregon and in possession of the land in dispute until the time of their demise. Clair Reid, his wife Verda Reid, and the plaintiffs herein have continuously farmed the land in question since Clair was placed in charge of the land when Clifford moved to California in 1923 and have at all times, except for vacations, resided on the home place adjoining said property. No rental whatever has been paid to or demanded by Clifford Reid, except that plaintiffs and their parents, now deceased, have at all times since 1923 to date paid the real property taxes on the property and the premiums on the fire insurance policies covering the improvements located thereon.

Clifford Reid and his brother Clair were exceedingly friendly; each bore toward the other a deep and genuine affection at all times. The defendant testified in this regard as follows:

'Q. What was the relationship that existed between these two brothers? A. Very close relationship. The [sic] thought a great deal of each other.

'Q. Can you describe Clifford's attitude toward Clair? A. He would have done anything for him.

'Q. What do you mean by that? A. Give him anything--help him in any way possible. He thought more of him than I have even known a man to man [sic] to think of a brother.

'Q. What was Clair's attitude or feeling toward Clifford? A. Same way--just the same.

* * *

* * *

'Q. What was Clair's attitude and feeling toward Clifford? A. Never anything but the closest love for him.

'Q. Did this mutual feeling between the brothers--how long did it continue? A. Years.

'Q. Did it continue until the time of Clair's death? A. Yes.'

After becoming established in California, Clifford was very successful in his business enterprises and was generous in many ways with Clair and the members of Clair's family.

Clair died in 1944, and his widow Verda thereafter, by written instrument, leased the 78 acres in question, together with the home place, on a year to year basis, to her son Norman, one of the plaintiffs herein. This lease arrangement continued until her death in 1953.

Norman Reid, having been advised in 1937 and again in 1940 by his father that Clifford held a deed to the 78 acres, made a trip to Los Angeles in January, 1954, after his mother's death in quest of a quitclaim deed from Clifford to clear the title to the property, which he considered an asset of his mother's estate. Because of the condition of Clifford's health, Clifford having suffered a serious heart attack shortly prior thereto, Norman at the suggestion of the defendant refrained from discussing with Clifford the subject of the quitclaim deed. The deed was left with the defendant, but nothing was ever heard from Clifford with reference thereto. Subsequently and on October 1, 1954, the deed of February 7, 1925, from Clair Reid and Verda Reid to Clifford Reid was received by mail for recording by the county clerk of Yamhill County. Clifford passed away on June 3, 1955, leaving defendant Ella L. Reid surviving him.

Under the undisputed facts of this case it would appear that plaintiffs' contention that they are entitled to the property on the basis of adverse possession is untenable. As the court in its opinion in Irby v. Irby, 226 Ark. 969, 295 S.W.2d 634, 637, points out:

'* * * 'Where a vendor, after having executed a deed, remains in possession of the premises conveyed, he is presumed to hold in subordination to the title conveyed unless there is affirmative evidence of a contrary intention; and, where his occupancy and use are not manifestly inconsistent with the right of his grantee, notice of the hostility of his claim must in some way be brought home to his grantee before the statute of limitations will begin to run.' Stuttgart v. John, 85 Ark. 520, 109 S.W. 541, 543. 'The rule is well established that 'retention of the possession of vendors after the execution and delivery of a deed is presumed to be in subordination of the title conveyed and the statute of limitations will not begin to run until notice of the hostility of their claim is actually given to the grantee.'' Franklin v. Hempstead County Hunting Club, 216 Ark. 927, 228 S.W.2d 65, 67.'

This court in Sertic v. Roberts, 171 Or. 121, 136 P.2d 248, 253, in holding that adverse possession depends upon the occupant's intention to claim and hold in opposition to all the world has said:

'* * * If, at the time one enters, or afterward, he does not claim the title himself, but acknowledges title of another, his possession must be taken as an entry or holding in subordination to the title of the person whose right he acknowledges. [Citing cases.]'

Evidence that Clair's possession...