Reifert v. South Cent. Wisconsin Mls Corp.

Decision Date12 June 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-3601.,05-3601.
Citation450 F.3d 312
PartiesJay REIFERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTH CENTRAL WISCONSIN MLS CORPORATION, Realtors Association of South Central Wisconsin, Inc., Robert L. Courter, Susan Matthews, David Stark, Robert Weber, Thomas Bunbury, Maurice W. Hill, Peter Sveum, Marshall Zwygart, and David McGrath, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

David Barry (argued), Barry & Associates, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brady C. Williamson, Godfrey & Kahn, Milwaukee, WI, Jack R. Bierig (argued), Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and KANNE and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Jay Reifert claims that the defendants violated the Sherman Act by tying access to a real estate multi-listing service ("MLS") to membership in a Realtors Association. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants in this case, finding no competition in the tied market and therefore, no anti-trust violation.

For the following reasons, we now affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background

Realtors Association of South Central Wisconsin, Inc. ("RASCW") is a real estate trade association. Its members are real estate agents and appraisers in and around Madison, Wisconsin. RASCW offers a variety of products and services to its members, including lobbying, social functions, courses, referral programs, contract forms, conventions, publications, and legal information.

RASCW is associated with the Wisconsin Realtors Association and the National Association of Realtors ("NAR"). When a person pays membership dues to an association affiliated with NAR, that person becomes a member of NAR. Normally Realtors Association1 memberships are packaged as a group including local, state, and NAR memberships.

RASCW owns 100% of the stock in the South Central Wisconsin MLS Corp. ("SCWMLS"). The MLS or multiple listing service is a computerized database of homes and properties listed for sale by SCWMLS participants in south-central Wisconsin. Access to this multiple listing service is a necessity for real estate agents and appraisers in this area. Virtually all active residential real estate agents in the region subscribe to SCWMLS. Users are charged a quarterly fee to gain access to the full database and must be a member of a Realtors Association affiliated with NAR. The Realtors Association membership requirement has existed for more than fifty years. Generally, any licensed real estate professional who agrees to abide by the NAR Code of Ethics and pays the applicable fees is admitted.

Article 16 of NAR's Code of Ethics contains a "non-solicitation" rule. This article and the related standards of practice prohibit members from inducing sellers to breach listing contracts, advising sellers of superior services or prices during the time they are under contract with another Realtor, and using "information received through a Multiple Listing Service . . . to target clients of other Realtors®."

A member-elected board of directors sets dues for RASCW. Fees for SCWMLS are also set by members elected to a board of directors. Both organizations set their fees solely to cover operational costs, with no profit-making intent. Annual dues to join the NAR, Wisconsin Association of Realtors, and RASCW are approximately $449 a year.

The plaintiff, Jay Reifert, brings three claims against SCWMLS, RASCW, and the directors of SCWMLS. First, he alleges that SCWMLS unlawfully ties its services to RASCW. Second, Reifert alleges that by conditioning access to MLS service on membership in RASCW, an unlawful group boycott has occurred. Finally, Reifert alleges that Article 16 of the NAR Code of Ethics violates the Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by prohibiting competition.

Reifert, is a residential real estate broker, exclusively representing buyers of real estate in south central Wisconsin. Reifert has been a member of RASCW (or its predecessor) and a participant in SCWMLS (or its predecessor) since 1988. Reifert belongs to the National Association of Exclusive Buyer's Agents ("NAEBA") and has no desire to maintain membership in RASCW or the state and national Association of Realtors. Reifert objects to the fees he is forced to pay for unwanted services and the Code of Ethics he must follow to maintain his membership in RASCW and NAR.

Reifert claims that during the four years at issue in this action, he has paid dues in excess of $2000 for an unwanted RASCW membership to maintain his SCWMLS access. During the relevant four-year period, there have been approximately 2,079 annual and 5,600 total SCWMLS participants.

To support an antitrust action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's actions have restrained competition. Section I of the Sherman Act states, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1. The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only "unreasonable restraints," not all contracts in restraint of trade. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (citations omitted). The Clayton Act allows for private suits by individuals injured by violations of antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.

On August 25, 2005, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied summary judgment to the plaintiff. A tying arrangement violates federal antitrust statutes if it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The district court found that "there is insufficient evidence for a fact finder to find that a tie between the defendant's multiple listing service and Realtor membership has had an effect on interstate commerce as that element has been defined by the Supreme Court."

As to Reifert's group boycott claim, the district court again found that the plaintiff had failed to prove any anticompetitive effects resulting from the tying of Realtors Association memberships to MLS services. Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants.

II. Discussion

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, taking all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., McCoy v. Harrison, 341 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir.2003) (citations omitted). An award of summary judgment is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A. Tying Claim

Reifert claims that the defendants have engaged in an unlawful tying arrangement by limiting SCWMLS access to members of a Relators Association. Thus, the alleged "tying product" is SCWMLS and the alleged "tied product" is membership in a Realtors Association.

In determining whether a violation of Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, has occurred as a result of a tie between two products or services, this Court requires the plaintiff to prove four elements. See Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass'n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir.1985) (citing imposition of the "economic interest requirement. . . by courts in the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits").

In order to establish the per se illegality of a tying arrangement, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the tying arrangement is between two distinct products or services, (2) the defendant has sufficient economic power in the tying market to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product, and (3) a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce is affected. [N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958)]; Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir.1977). In addition, this circuit has held that an illegal tying arrangement will not be found where the alleged tying company has absolutely no economic interest in the sales of the tied seller, whose products are favored by the tie-in. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 835 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 1267, 59 L.Ed.2d 486 (1979); Warner Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F.Supp. 956, 967 (N.D.Ill.1982).

Id. at 207-08.

Following this precedent, the district court correctly required Reifert to prove the following four elements of a tying violation: (1) a tie exists between two separate products; (2) the tying seller (SCWMLS) has sufficient economic power in the tying product market to restrain free competition in the tied product market (Realtors Association memberships); (3) the tie affects a not-insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product (Realtors Association memberships); and (4) the tying seller (SCWMLS) has some economic interest in the sales of the tied product (Realtors Association memberships). Id. at 207.2

There is no question that Reifert has satisfied the requirements for the first two elements. First, access to the multi-listing service cannot be obtained without purchasing the tied product, a Realtors Association membership. Second, SCWMLS has sufficient market power to restrain free competition in the tied product market.

SCWMLS is a unique product. Nearly every available home in the relevant geographic area is listed on the service. The near-perfect market information created by SCWMLS is the result of a requirement that members place all listings in the MLS within five days. The MLS allows individuals with access to search and filter properties based upon detailed criteria including compensation offered to buyers' agents, detailed property information, neighborhood information, prior...

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