Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.2000-567 RMU.,CIV.A.2000-567 RMU.
• Citation: 104 F.Supp.2d 48
• Parties: Martin Gardner REIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION and Harold C. Wegner, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

104 F.Supp.2d 48

Martin Gardner REIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION and Harold C. Wegner, Defendants.

No. CIV.A.2000-567 RMU.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 26, 2000.

Martin Gardner Reiffin, Danville, CA, Plaintiff pro se, Mr. Martin G. Reiffin.

Gary M. Zinkgraf, Foley & Lardner, Washington, DC, for defendant Harold C. Wegner.

William D. Dolan, III, Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, LLP, Washington, DC, for defendant Microsoft Corporation.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting the Defendants' Motions for Transfer of Venue; Denying Other Pending Motions Without Prejudice as Moot

URBINA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This patent, antitrust and defamation action comes before the court upon the defendants' motions to dismiss, the defendants' motions for transfer of venue, and the plaintiff's motion to transfer this case to the Calendar Committee for reassignment as a related case. For the reasons which follow, this court will grant the defendants' motions for transfer of venue and will deny the other pending motions without prejudice as moot.

II. BACKGROUND

Martin Reiffin ("the plaintiff") is a resident of California. See Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Defendant Microsoft is incorporated in the state of Washington and also has its principal place of business in that state. The only connection between Microsoft and this district alleged by the plaintiff is that Microsoft has an office here and conducts business here.¹ Id. ¶ 12. Defendant Harold Wegner, an attorney and a professor of law, is a resident of Virginia and is a member of the law firm of Foley and Lardner, which represents Microsoft in the instant matter.² See Am. Compl. ¶ 96. The plaintiff alleges that Mr. Wegner libeled him by making statements to his law-school patent students and by publishing articles which discussed the California litigation and opined that Mr. Reiffin's patents were invalid "submarine patents."³ Id. ¶¶ 92-95. The plaintiff alleges that Mr. Wegner acted in conspiracy with Microsoft, although he does not allege that Mr. Wegner met or communicated with Microsoft as part of the conspiracy.

On December 2, 1997, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") issued patent numbers 5,694,603 and 5,694,604 to Mr. Reiffin. The patents concern an "editor-compiler system" which may speed the writing of certain types of software programs. See Microsoft's Mot. to Dis., Stay or Transfer Venue ("Microsoft's Mot.") at 3. The parties agree that a few days after the PTO issued the '603 and '604 patents⁴ to Mr. Reiffin, he wrote letters to the chief executive officers of eleven major computer manufacturers. See Am. Compl. ¶ 23; Microsoft's Mot. at 3. Mr. Reiffin's letters "invited the manufacturers to bid for the purchase of plaintiff's" patents. Id. Mr. Reiffin's letters also identified "ten major products of Microsoft" and suggested that the CEOs ask their patent counsel whether his patents covered those products. See Am. Compl. ¶ 23; Microsoft's Mot. at 3-4.

In January 1998, Mr. Reiffin filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California ("the Northern District" or "the California court"), Dkt. No. C-98-0266-VRW, alleging that Microsoft had infringed his '603 and '604 patents. Microsoft responded with a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Reiffin's patents were invalid and had not been infringed by Microsoft. Mr. Reiffin opposed the motion and filed a counter-motion for summary judgment of validity and infringement. By Order dated July 10, 1998, the Honorable Vaughn R. Parker ("the California Judge") held that Mr. Reiffin's patents were invalid and granted summary judgment to Microsoft. See Microsoft's Mot. at 5 and Ex. A.

Mr. Reiffin appealed the Northern District's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held oral argument in October 1999. See Am. Compl. ¶ 85. The appeal is pending.

III. LEGAL STANDARD AND DISCUSSION

The defendants seek a transfer of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Section 1404(a) provides that, "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." As the movants, the defendants bear the burden of establishing that the transfer of this action is proper. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n. v. Eastern Air Lines, 672 F.Supp. 525, 526 (D.D.C.1987); International Brotherhood of Painters v. Best Painting & Sandblasting Co., 621 F.Supp. 906, 907 (D.D.C.1985). Section 1404(a), however, vests "discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions to transfer according to individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) (citation omitted); Kafack v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., 934 F.Supp. 3, 5 (D.D.C.1996); accord Mayweathers v. Bunnell, 1994 WL 615708, *2 (9th Cir.1994) ("weighing of factors for and against a transfer involves subtle considerations and is best left to the discretion of the trial judge") (citation omitted).

Statutory Transfer of Venue Contrasted with Forum Non Conveniens.

Because section 1404(a) contemplates transfer rather than dismissal, transfer is available "upon a lesser showing of inconvenience" than that required for a non-statutory forum non conveniens dismissal. See SEC v. Savoy, 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C.Cir.1978) (quoting Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32, 75 S.Ct. 544, 99 L.Ed. 789 (1955)); accord Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360, 362 (4th Cir.1949); Lung v. Yachts International, Ltd., 980 F.Supp. 1362, 1370 (D.Hawai'i 1997); 1A Moore's Federal Practice at 4326 (2d ed.). "This is not to say that the relevant factors have changed or that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be considered, but only that the discretion to be exercised is broader." Savoy, 587 F.2d at 1154.

Could Plaintiff Have Brought this Action in the Northern District of California?

Under section 1404(a), the threshold question is whether this action could have been properly brought in the proposed transferee district, the Northern District of California. The basic venue statute provides that venue is proper in a judicial district "in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred...." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Under this standard, the court finds that venue is proper in the Northern District of California. According to the plaintiff, defendant Wegner participated in a conspiracy directed against the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Mr. Wegner, a law professor, conspired with Microsoft to violate the antitrust laws by publishing papers which made false and misleading statements about Mr. Reiffin's patents. If Mr. Wegner's statements about Mr. Reiffin's patents were indeed intentionally false, Mr. Wegner knew they would adversely affect Mr. Reiffin and damage his reputation in his home state, California. See Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.1998) ("Toeppen [the defendant] knew Panavision [the plaintiff] would likely suffer harm there [in California] because, although at all relevant times Panavision was a Delaware limited partnership, its principal place of business was California. ...."). Thus, at the time Mr. Reiffin filed the instant action, the California court could have properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Mr. Wegner without Mr. Wegner's consent. See Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316 (court may exercise jurisdiction if defendant's conduct "is aimed at or has an effect in the forum state") (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) and Ziegler v. Indian River Cty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995)); see, e.g., Georgia Gulf v. Ward, 701 F.Supp. 1556 (N.D.Ga.1987) (participation in conspiracy to injure Georgia resident supports jurisdiction over non-resident).⁵

In any event, any doubt about Mr. Wegner's amenability to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California has been eliminated by his express written consent to be sued in that district. Mr. Wegner states unequivocally, "Wegner hereby consents to such personal jurisdiction, and waives the right to raise such an objection to the case being heard in the Northern District of California." Wegner's Reply at 6. The court emphasizes that Mr. Wegner will be expected to abide by this representation.⁶

Private- and Public-Interest Factors Considered in Venue Analysis.

In considering whether to transfer this matter to another, purportedly more appropriate venue, this court also considers a number of public- and private-interest factors, including "the convenience of the witnesses of plaintiff and defendant; ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; the amount of expense for willing witnesses; the relative congestion of the calendars of potential transferee and transferor courts; and other practical aspect[s] of expeditiously and conveniently conducting a trial."⁷ See SEC v. Page Airways, 464 F.Supp. 461, 463 (D.D.C.1978) (emphasis added); cf. Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison, 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). These "practical" public-interest factors include the potential transferee court's "familiarity with the governing laws."⁸ See Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram v. Hazard, 24 F.Supp.2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 944 F.Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C.1996)).

Degree of Deference Accorded to Plaintiff's Choice of Forum.

In assessing the convenience to the parties of the two potentially proper venues, the court recognizes that the plaintiff's choice of forum is usually accorded "substantial deference" in the venue analysis. See Shapiro, 24 F.Supp.2d at 71 (citing Gross v. Owen, 221 F.2d 94, 95 (D.C.Cir. 1955)). Deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum is...