Reigart v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co.
Decision Date | 25 November 1908 |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Parties | REIGART v. MANUFACTURERS' COAL & COKE CO. |
In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Adair County; Nat. M. Shelton, Judge.
Action by H. P. Reigart against the Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Company for breach of contract. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
This suit originated in the circuit court of Adair county, and was instituted by plaintiff against the defendant to recover approximately $1,000,000 for the breach of the contract hereinafter set forth. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, and, after taking the proper preliminary steps, he appealed the cause to this court.
The cause was assigned to Division No. 1, and was there argued and submitted for adjudication, which resulted in a divided court, and, in pursuance to the mandate of the Constitution, the cause was transferred to court in banc. The contract sued upon is in words and figures as follows: The petition, in addition to the ordinary allegations of the breach of the contract, stated, in substance, that prior to and independent of the contract mentioned in the petition there was an oral contract by and between plaintiff and defendant to the effect that the former would go out and endeavor to sell this coal and make a market therefor, and that said contract and understanding on his part with the coal company was a moving motive or inducing cause or consideration which induced the coal company to enter into the contract sued upon, and he went out to make a market for the company's coal, and that, in pursuance to same, he did so, and sent to it the orders mentioned in the petition as the result of his efforts. The answer was a general denial, and, among other things, there was a plea of the statutes of frauds, and that the contract sued on was unilateral and not binding on defendant.
It will be unnecessary to set out the pleadings and evidence in full, as the questions presented for determination are questions of law which will sufficiently appear in the opinion for a proper understanding the legal propositions involved.
Higbee & Mills and Harian & Harlan, for appellant. O. M. Spencer and Campbell & Ellison, for respondent.
WOODSON, J. (after stating the facts as above).
It is conceded by counsel for appellant that the contract at its inception was unilateral, a mere option, given to Reigart, and that no consideration for the option is expressed therein. In order to escape the effects of that concession, they contend that the consideration passing from appellant to respondent and supporting the option may rest in parol and may be shown aliunde of the option or the written contract. In pursuance to that contention, counsel for appellant offered to prove by parol evidence that, independent of the option sued on, there was an oral contract entered into between them to the effect that he would go out and endeavor to make a market for, and sell, the coal of respondent, and that the option given by the latter to appellant and the undertaking on his part to create a market and sell the coal was a motive or inducing cause or consideration which induced the coal company to enter into the so-called contract sued on, and that, when he went out and sold the coal in pursuance to the option and his undertaking to create a market for the coal, this changed the contract from a unilateral or an optional contract, without a consideration to support it, into a bilateral contract based upon a valuable consideration, and, when broken, the company was liable for the damages which flowed from that breach. While, upon the other hand, the respondent contends that the option sued on is unilateral and is therefore nudum pactum, because appellant does not thereby bind himself to purchase any of the coal mentioned in the option, nor is there any consideration to support the option expressed therein. The respondent also contends that parol evidence is not admissible to show such a consideration, for the reason that, if such consideration existed in fact, it was one of the terms of the contract, and should have been included in the terms of the written memorandum thereof, otherwise it is void under the statutes of frauds. These various contentions of the appellant and respondent present the main legal proposition we are called upon to decide.
Sections 3418, 3419, Rev. St. 1899 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 1951-1963), are two of the sections of the statutes commonly called the "Statute of Frauds," and they read as follows:
etc.
In order to fully understand these statutes, we should bear in mind that at common law contracts of this character were not required to be in writing, and that, if the contract was...
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