Reilly v. Leonard

Citation459 F. Supp. 291
Decision Date23 October 1978
Docket NumberCiv. No. H-78-43.
PartiesPeter A. REILLY v. Edward P. LEONARD, Individually and as Commissioner of the Connecticut State Police, Thomas J. McDonnell, Individually and as an officer of the Connecticut State Police Department.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Andrew Emery Garson, Fairfield, Conn., for plaintiff.

Albert Zakarian, Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, Conn., for defendants in their individual capacities.

Frank Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Meriden, Conn., Carl Ajello, Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., for defendants in their official capacities.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

CLARIE, Chief Judge.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (6). The plaintiff charges that he was deprived of his constitutional rights by the defendant Connecticut State Police officers through their publication of an investigative report which concluded that he was the sole perpetrator of the murder of his mother. The complaint, which is in four counts, seeks one and one-half million dollars in compensatory damages and one-half million dollars in punitive damages.

The first cause of action, which alleges a conspiracy to deprive Reilly of his civil rights, is deficient in that there is no allegation of a racial or other class-based animus, which is necessary to state a cause of action under either 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) or 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The causes of action which allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are legally insufficient because the complaint fails to allege that the defendants deprived Reilly of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Since the federal claims require dismissal, the Court declines to exercise pendant jurisdiction over the state law tort claims. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.

Statement of Facts

In September, 1973 the plaintiff, Peter Reilly, was found guilty, after a jury trial, of the slaying of his mother, Barbara Gibbons, and was sentenced to a term of six to sixteen years' imprisonment. In March, 1976 Reilly was granted a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence. A substitute information was filed on September 2, 1976 and this was subsequently dismissed on November 24, 1976. On November 29, 1976, the Governor of the State of Connecticut requested a reinvestigation of the case which was conducted by the defendant State Police Captain Thomas J. McDonnell at the direction of the defendant State Police Commissioner Edward P. Leonard. A special one man grand jury was then appointed to investigate allegations that crimes or other wrongful police conduct had been committed in the investigation and trial of the aforesaid case. The one-man grand jury report was released on June 1, 1977; it found that "there is not sufficient evidence to warrant the trial of any person at this time in the homicide of Barbara Gibbons" and that "on the basis of the evidence uncovered to date there is no likelihood that a conviction of Peter A. Reilly could result." On November 22, 1977, the dismissal of the substituted information was judicially declared to be "with prejudice," thereby precluding any further trial of Reilly for the murder.

It is significant to note that the plaintiff is not challenging the propriety of his initial arrest or jury trial. Rather, the subject of his complaint is the state police reinvestigation report, which was issued after the plaintiff had been granted a new trial. The report stated in part, that:

". . . physical evidence incomplete though it may be, points to Peter Reilly as the perpetrator of the Barbara Gibbons homicide and eliminates the possibility that the homicide could have been perpetrated prior to his arrival . . . home . . .
"The exhaustive reinvestigation of this case has led to the inescapable conclusion that the person who was originally accused, tried and found guilty, is, in fact, the sole perpetrator of the Barbara Gibbons homicide."

Defendant Leonard forwarded McDonnell's report to the Connecticut State's Attorney for Litchfield County, who rejected the conclusions contained therein and chose not to make the report public. The plaintiff alleges that the report was prepared by the defendant McDonnell on September 26, 1977 and that it was made public by the defendant, after the rejection of the report by the Connecticut State's Attorney. The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant Leonard at various times stated publicly that, as far as the State Police were concerned, the Barbara Gibbons case was closed, and that Peter Reilly was guilty of the murder. The complaint charges that both McDonnell and Leonard acted with knowledge of the falsity of these statements or with a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity thereof, and with the specific intention of injuring the plaintiff.

Jurisdiction

The complaint charges violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2), (3), and 1983. The Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(1) and (3).

Discussion of the Law
1. The Conspiracy Claims.

On a motion to dismiss the Court must accept as true all factual allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This Court nevertheless finds that the present complaint fails to allege a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and (3). The Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled that the well-pleaded § 1985(3)1 complaint must include an allegation that the motive behind the conspiracy was class-based:

"The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed. 338 (1971).

The present complaint is entirely devoid of any suggestion that the defendants' actions were motivated by a class-based animus, and therefore the § 1985(3) claim must be dismissed.

The plaintiff has also claimed a violation of § 1985(2).2 That statute is in two parts, the first of which is directed at conspiracies whose object is the intimidation of or retaliation against witnesses, parties or jurors in federal court. Since the complaint contains no allegations of any such intimidation or retaliation and since there have been no federal court proceedings, the plaintiff is presumably relying on the second part of § 1985(2). That part of the statute is aimed at conspiracies whose object is to obstruct justice and deny any citizen the equal protection of the law. While the Supreme Court has yet to speak on the issue, the lower federal courts have universally interpreted Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra, as mandating that a claim under this second part of § 1985(2) allege a class-based animus. The rationale is that both §§ 1985(3) and 1985(2) are directed toward "the equal protection of the laws," which is the key phrase in the Griffin Court's analysis. Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 54 (1976). See also Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3rd Cir. 1976); Smith v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 536 F.2d 1320, 1323 (10th Cir. 1976); Bergman v. Stein, 404 F.Supp. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y.1975). Having failed to allege a class-based animus on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under either § 1985(2) or § 1985(3).

2. The § 1983 Claim.

Two elements are required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:3 (1) the defendants acted under color of state law and (2) their action deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Board of State of New York, 327 F.2d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1964); Bergman v. Stein, 404 F.Supp. 287, 295 (S.D.N.Y.1975). Since the defendants in the case sub judice were acting in their official capacities as State Police officers, there is no question that the first element is satisfied. With respect to the second element, the plaintiff has asserted that the defendants' actions have caused the deprivation of a number of interests. However, none of these interests rises to the level of a federally guaranteed right, and therefore the complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The gravamen of the complaint is that the plaintiff's reputation has been harmed as a result of the public disclosure of the police investigation report and the public statements of the defendant Leonard. The plaintiff claims that his interest in reputation is a "liberty" interest within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the defendants' action deprived him of that liberty interest without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), it appeared to be well established that one's interest in his reputation did constitute a "liberty" interest, which could not be infringed by governmental action without due process. In numerous cases the Supreme Court has alluded to a right to notice and hearing prior to governmental action which tarnishes one's good name. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969); Board of Regents...

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    • United States
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    ...defendants' acts caused any direct injury to their exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment. See Reilly v. Leonard, 459 F.Supp. 291, 300-01 (D.Conn.1978) (Clarie, C.J.) (rejecting as too indirect an allegation of injury a plaintiff's claim that false statements made by officials ......
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