Reilly v. W.C.A.B. (General Elec. Co.)

• Decision Date: 31 January 1991
• Citation: Reilly v. W.C.A.B. (General Elec. Co.), 584 A.2d 364, 136 Pa.Cmwlth. 543 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
• Parties: Charles Thomas REILLY, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY), Respondents.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 364

584 A.2d 364

136 Pa.Cmwlth. 543

Charles Thomas REILLY, Petitioner, v.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY), Respondents.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs March 16, 1990.

Decided Dec. 10, 1990.

Reargument Denied Jan. 31, 1991.

Harold I. Goodman, Raynes, McCarty, Binder, Ross & Mundy, Philadelphia, for petitioner.

Martin J. Fallon, Jr., Swartz, Campbell & Detweiler, Philadelphia, for respondent, General Elec. Co.

Before PALLADINO and SMITH, JJ., and BARBIERI, Senior Judge.

BARBIERI, Senior Judge.

Charles Thomas Reilly(Claimant)petitions this Court to review an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board(Board) which affirmed the decision of the referee granting Claimant benefits for the limited period of February 22, 1972 to October 1, 1972 while denying Claimant benefits for his claimed psychiatric disability on the ground that it was not causally connected to his work-related injury.¹

Procedurally, this is the second time this case has been before us.In our previous opinion, Reilly v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (General Electric Company), 98 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 488, 512 A.2d 749(1986)², petition for allowance of appeal denied, 514 Pa. 651, 524 A.2d 496(1987), we reversed an order of the Board which dismissed Claimant's reinstatement petition as well as denied Claimant's appeal nunc pro tunc on the ground that the referee's decision to dismiss Claimant's original claim petition, which was based upon a stipulation submitted by the parties, violated Section 407 of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act ³(Act).Having determined that the referee's decision was null and void and that Claimant was entitled to have his case considered on the merits, we remanded the matter for further proceedings on Claimant's original claim petition.

On remand, the referee ruled that the case was still open and both sides were free to present additional evidence into the record.Based on the additional medical testimony submitted by General Electric Company(Employer), the referee found that, while Claimant had sustained a work-related injury on December 18, 1970 which physically disabled him from February 22, 1972 through October 1, 1972, Claimant's current psychiatric disability was not causally connected to his injury.⁴Accordingly the referee awarded Claimant benefits for the limited period of February 22, 1972 to October 1, 1972, after which time, such benefits were to be suspended.

On appeal by Claimant, the Board modified the referee's decision by awarding interest on compensation due at the rate of 10 percent, instead of 6 percent.The Board then affirmed the referee's decision as modified.This petition for review followed.

Claimant, invoking the "law of the case doctrine," initially argues that the Board in this case erred in affirming the referee's decision as modified, claiming that the referee, on remand, was without power to alter, modify or depart from this Court's previous opinion, Reilly I, with regard to any matter that was at issue and decided therein.While we agree with the general rule of law posited by Claimant, we do not agree that it is applicable to this case.As the Board stated in its opinion:

It is important to note that there was never any decision made on the merits of the case until after the Remand by the Commonwealth Court.The issue before the Court[in Reilly I ] was whether or not the Claimant had the right to overturn the original Referee's decision dismissing his Claim Petition and to proceed on the merits.The actual merits of his claim were not an issue.The Commonwealth Court decision overturned previous Board Opinions and allowed the Claimant to proceed on the merits.Neither the prior Board Opinions nor Referee's Decisions addressed the merits of Claimant's work injury and its alleged sequelae.

Board's Opinion, p. 3.

In Reilly I, the issue before this Court was "whether or not Claimant[was] entitled to a hearing on the merits of his case."Id. at 490, 512 A.2d at 749.To support our conclusion that Claimant was entitled to have his case considered and determined on the merits, we discussed some of the evidence which had already been presented in the case.Our discussion of that evidence was offered as support for our position that the referee's decision, which was based on a stipulation submitted by the parties, constituted an illegal settlement in violation of Section 407 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 731.⁵In no way was our discussion of the evidence in Reilly I intended to resolve disputed factual questions in the case.Only a referee, in worker's compensation cases, may make findings of fact; a reviewing court may not.Williams v. Spaulding Bakeries, Inc., 464 Pa. 29, 346 A.2d 3(1975).

Next, Claimant argues that the Board erred in affirming the referee's decision as modified because the referee exceeded the scope of this Court's order in Reilly I when he allowed additional evidence to be presented on remand.Concurrently, Claimant asserts that because the referee allegedly exceeded the scope of our remand order, Dr. Rieger's testimony should be disregarded.⁶

In Reilly I, our remand order stated, inter alia, "this case is remanded for proceedings on the original claim petition filed October 13, 1971, such proceedings to be not inconsistent with this opinion."Id.98 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 505, 512 A.2d at 756.As support for our decision to remand, we cited Leaseway Systems, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Beccerra), 53 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 520, 418 A.2d 796(1980).

In Leaseway Systems, Inc., the claimant filed a claim petition alleging that he had suffered a work-related injury while employed by Leaseway.Subsequently, the claimant and Leaseway entered into a compensation agreement in which Leaseway agreed to pay benefits to the claimant from December 6, 1972 through January 1, 1974.In exchange, the claimant agreed not to claim interest or penalties on the payments made by Leaseway.Additionally, both parties agreed to leave open the question of continuing disability beyond January 1, 1974.

Thereafter, four hearings were held before a referee to determine whether the claimant continued to be disabled after January 1, 1974.At the conclusion of the hearings, the referee found that the claimant had not sustained his burden of proving that he was disabled after January 1, 1974 and, consequently, the referee denied him benefits.The claimant appealed the referee's decision to the Board.

The Board, in reviewing the referee's decision, determined sua sponte that the initial compensation agreement entered into by the parties violated Section 407 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 731 and, therefore, was null and void.Accordingly, the Board reversed the order of the referee and ordered Leaseway to pay the claimant total disability benefits from December 6, 1972 into the indefinite future.

Upon further appeal to this Court, we agreed with the Board's conclusion that the compensation agreement violated Section 407 of the Act; however, we disagreed with that part of the Board's order which ordered Leaseway to pay total disability benefits to the claimant indefinitely from December 6, 1972.We reasoned that the Board erred as a matter of law in basing its decision that Leaseway must pay benefits to the claimant on the parties' compensation agreement when that agreement was held to be null and void.

The agreement, as required by Section 407, is wholly null and void and unenforceable as to all provisions of the agreement and as to all parties.In other words, we must treat it as if it never existed.The result of a Decision such as this, of course, is that the parties are returned to the status as it was before they entered into the agreement.Claimant's Petition for Compensation will be regarded as still pending before the Referee and Claimant will bear the burden of proving his right to compensation and all the elements necessary to support an award.(Citations omitted and emphasis in original.)

Id. at 526-527, 418 A.2d at 799.Thus, we remanded the case for further proceedings on the original claim petition.

In the instant case, neither party disputes the fact that their stipulation, having been determined to be null and void, and the decision based thereon, must give way to a proceeding on the original claim petition.The parties disagree, however, as to the proper interpretation of this Court's remand order in Reilly I regarding the taking of additional evidence on Claimant's original claim petition.

It is Claimant's contention that the referee exceeded the scope of our order when he allowed additional evidence to be placed on the record after remand since the record on the merits of Claimant's claim petition was previously declared closed.⁷Specifically, Claimant contends that, on remand, all the referee should have done was make findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the then existing record, rather than declare the record still open and admit additional evidence on the merits of Claimant's claim.

Initially, we wish to note that we do not interpret Leaseway Systems, Inc. as standing for the proposition that previous sworn testimony, properly placed in the record during prior proceedings, must be replaced by new testimony or must be denigrated in some fashion on remand.On the contrary, we interpret Leaseway Systems, Inc. as standing for the proposition that a void agreement returns the parties to the same status as they were before they entered into the agreement; that being, the claimant must still prove all the elements necessary to support an award of compensation on his original claim petition.As such, the testimony placed in the record during prior proceedings on the original claim petition still remains part of the record when the case is remanded for further proceedings on that claim petition.

To make a determination as to whether a referee exceeded...