Reimer v. Delisio
| Decision Date | 19 February 1982 |
| Citation | 296 Pa.Super. 205,442 A.2d 731 |
| Parties | Bertha E. REIMER, Appellant, v. James K. DELISIO, Jr. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Argued March 4, 1980.
David S. Shrager, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Donald H. Yost, York, for appellee.
Before CERCONE, President Judge, and WATKINS and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
The instant appeal arises from a jury verdict in the amount of $23,230 in favor of plaintiff appellant, Bertha Reimer, for personal injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. For reasons which she attributes to the trial judge's rulings, Mrs Reimer contends the jury's verdict was inadequate. In particular Mrs. Reimer contends the trial court erred in withholding the question of punitive damages from the jury's consideration, and erred in refusing to permit the jury to view a motion picture of her daily activities as hampered by her injuries. She further contends the court abused its discretion in excluding certain evidence of the need for future surgery and her future economic loss, as well as reacting improperly and prejudicially to her attempts to fortify her case when the court ruled on defendants' objections. The relevant facts are as follows:
On July 22 1977 the automobile defendant-appellee, James Delisio was operating collided with Mrs. Reimer's automobile, when the Delisio vehicle crossed the center line while travelling in excess of fifty miles per hour on a public street adjacent to a playground. At the time of the accident Mrs. Reimer, a widow, was in reasonably good health and was employed at a clothing factory fulltime. The damage from the force of the collision pinned Mrs. Reimer in her automobile, smashed both her knees, and caused her sundry other injuries. As a consequence her left knee cap was surgically removed as was part of her right knee cap. In addition she suffered an immobilized left shoulder, bursitis of the hip, and permanent scarring.
Mrs Reimer's rehabilitation therapy was lengthy, undoubtedly painful, and will never be wholly restorative. While she previously had worked forty-hour weeks with frequent overtime, she now is able to work no more than five hours a day, and her condition is only likely to worsen. Her leisure time and homemaking activities are similarly restricted.
Laying aside for the moment appellant's contentions concerning allegedly restrictive rulings on evidence she wished to introduce to substantiate her compensatory damages, we turn to appellant's claim that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the jury to consider punitive damages based upon the arguably reckless conduct of Mr. Delisio. In so doing the court determined that punitive damages for reckless or willful conduct were not recoverable pursuant to Pennsylvania's No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.101 et seq (Supp.1981). With this conclusion, we reluctantly agree.
From the outset it should be kept in mind that the sine qua non for adoption of the No-Fault Act was the legislature's determination that the traditional tort system for determining liability and compensating victims of motor vehicle accidents was a failure. The widespread use of Motor Vehicle liability insurance had undercut the deterrent effect which requiring a negligent party to compensate the victim of his negligence was supposed to have. On the other hand, the existence of potential liability for such negligence, and the litigation entailed, begat lengthy delays in compensating victims for their economic losses at a time when, due to their incapacitation, they were least able to afford such delays. Interwoven in the fabric of the fault system, of course, were the threads of punitive liability for conduct more egregious than negligence-gross negligence, recklessness, and willful disregard for the safety of others. We agree with appellant's argument that the fault system for compensating victims could have been abolished without eliminating entirely its punitive aspects. Indeed, that may have been preferable. However, we disagree with appellant that punitive liability for gross negligence or recklessness could only be abolished by use of language specifically referring to punitive damages rather than, as was done, by use of a clause abolishing all tort liability for accidents involving motor vehicles.
We are persuaded that the initial clause of Section 1009.301 of our No-Fault Act explicitly abolished all causes of action falling within the ambit of the Act; and, consequently abolished punitive damages for gross negligence, reckless disregard, and the like. Subsection (a) of that Section provides:
Partial Abolition.-Tort liability is abolished with respect to any injury that takes place in this State in accordance with the provisions of this act if such injury arises out of the maintenance and use of a motor vehicle, except that....
There follow exceptions which do not specifically refer to liability for gross negligence, although intentional conduct is so excepted. [1]
We are not persuaded, either, that punitive damages for recklessness or gross negligence are implicitly preserved in subsections (a)(4) or (a)(5) of Section 301 of the Act. Subsection (a)(4) provides:
A person remains liable for loss which is not compensated because of any limitation in accordance with section 202(a), (b), (c) or (d) of this act...." (Emphasis added.)
"Loss" is defined in the Act as "accrued economic detriment ... consisting of, and limited to, allowable expense, work loss, replacement services loss, and survivor's loss." Section 103. Those types of expenses and losses are also defined in Section 103 of the Act and cannot rationally be interpreted as including punitive damages. Since "loss" is defined in the Act in a way which excludes punitive damages, it cannot be said that such damages are includable as "loss which is not compensated because of any limitation in accordance with Section 202(a), (b), (c) or (d) of his act...." Consequently, under Section 301(a)(4) a person does not remain liable for punitive damages for reckless or gross negligence.
The next subsection, 301(a)(5), is equally clear in not preserving punitive liability for recklessness or gross negligence. Section 301(a)(5) provides that a "person remains liable for damage for non-economic detriment" on the conditions there following. However, Section 103 of the Act specifically defines non-economic detriment to exclude "punitive or exemplary damages." Consequently, according to this language, a person does not remain liable for punitive damages under the provisions of subsection (a)(5) of Section 301. See D. Shrager, The Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Act § 2.7 (1979).
Appellant valiantly raises the argument that Section 301(b) has preserved the right of a victim to recover punitive damages for reckless or grossly negligent conduct. Section 301(b) provides:
Nonreimbursable tort fine.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to immunize an individual from liability to pay a fine on the basis of fault in any proceeding based upon any act or omission arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle: Provided, That such fine may not be paid or reimbursed by an insurer or other restoration obligor.
There is little doubt that, on its face, this provision admits of no ready interpretation, especially since the term "tort fine" appears to have been coined. In that regard we emphathize with the trial judge when he stated he did not know what a tort fine was. On the other hand there is nothing promiscuous about appellant's contention that the term "tort fine" includes punitive or exemplary damages. Punitive damages are, in a manner of speaking, a penalty or fine imposed upon a person for engaging in particularly egregious conduct, payable to the victim as a kind of windfall, at least in the sense that the punitive damages are paid in addition to damages necessary to make the victim whole. See C. McCormick, Damages § 77 (1935); D. Dobbs, Remedies § 3.9 (1973); Restatement of Torts, 2d § 908, Comment a. However, the terms punitive damages or exemplary damages are so commonly understood that it is unlikely the legislature would invent a new term to use in Section 301(b) if it sought to preserve punitive damages for recklessness or gross negligence. In fact, our research has revealed no such legislative purpose.
It is well known that our General Assembly borrowed generously from the National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. See D. Shrager, The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, § 2.7 (1977). Indeed, in Section 102(a)(5) the General Assembly states that it relied on the exhaustive federal studies concerning the desirability of enacting a national no-fault act. It is from the various drafts of such proposed federal legislation that our Section 301(b) was taken, and it is in the congressional study committees' reports that the meaning of "tort fine" is discussed. Furthermore, the committee reports shed much light on the question of whether the no-fault act was drafted with the intention of eliminating punitive damages in actions arising under the Act. The National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Act, Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, No. 93-382, Calendar No. 358 (August 15, 1973) at pp. 73-74 describes the purpose and meaning of the term "tort fine":
The development of liability insurance, to offset the fact that a tort system is a most inadequate mechanism for compensation served to vitiate the deterrent function of tort law as applied to the enforcement of safe driving requirements. A large tort judgment may be entered against a drunken or reckless driver, but to the extent that judgment is paid by his insurance company, the driver himself is neither punished nor deterred from...
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