Reindl v. City of Leavenworth
| Citation | 361 F.Supp.2d 1294 |
| Decision Date | 22 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 04-2584-GTV.,CIV.A. 04-2584-GTV. |
| Parties | Kim REINDL and Mary Joan Reindl, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LEAVENWORTH, Kansas, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Allen A. Ternent, Atchison, KS, for Plaintiffs.
David S. Baker, Michael K. Seck, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, LLP, Overland Park, KS, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Kim and Mary Joan Reindl filed this action against Defendants City of Leavenworth, Kansas and six officers of the Leavenworth, Kansas police department, in both their individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the alleged beating Lewis Kelly Reindl received from Leavenworth, Kansas, police officers on December 6, 2002, which Plaintiffs contend caused his death. Plaintiff Kim Reindl is the official representative of the estate of the decedent, Lewis Kelly Reindl, and Plaintiff Mary Joan Reindl is Lewis Kelly Reindl's mother.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges constitutional rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as separate state law claims grounded in assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, outrageous conduct, libel, slander, right of privacy, discrimination, malicious prosecution, excessive force, and wrongful death.1
This action is before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 7). Defendants argue that several of Plaintiffs' state law claims are barred by applicable statutes of limitation. Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege compliance with the notice provisions contained in K.S.A. § 12-105b, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The following facts are taken from the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' complaint.
On the evening of December 6, 2002, Officer James Bridges of the Leavenworth police department pulled over Lewis Kelly Reindl as he was driving out of the parking lot of the Ten Penny Restaurant in Leavenworth, Kansas, because he failed to activate the headlights on his vehicle. Mr. Reindl exited his car and walked around to the passenger side so that he could remove the vehicle registration and insurance documents from the glove box. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Reindl was an "exceedingly heavy man," and therefore, he could not physically reach across the front seat of the car to remove the documents. Officer Bridges repeatedly instructed Mr. Reindl to get back into his car. At some point, Mr. Reindl started to approach Officer Bridges. In response, Officer Bridges pepper sprayed Mr. Reindl because he felt threatened. Officer Bridges also struck Mr. Reindl several times with his baton.
Officers Wayne Flewelling, Sean Goecke, Nicholas Nordmann, and David O'Brien eventually arrived on the scene. Officer Flewelling's police report states that Mr. Reindl informed the police officers present that he could not breathe, that he needed nitroglycerin, and that he could not place his hands behind his back. Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") personnel arrived approximately fifteen minutes after initiation of the contact. EMS personnel decontaminated Mr. Reindl by applying water to his face, and he was subsequently transported to a local hospital.
Within a week of the incident, Mr. Reindl allegedly suffered from an infection in the leg that bore the brunt of the assault. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Reindl's recovery from that infection was only partial. Plaintiffs allege that several months after the incident, Mr. Reindl suffered a second infection to his leg which ultimately caused his death. While Plaintiffs' complaint does not provide the date of Mr. Reindl's death, Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion to dismiss asserts that Mr. Reindl died on August 25, 2003.2 Plaintiffs filed this action on December 6, 2004.
A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will be granted only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is unable to prove any set of facts entitling her to relief under her theory of recovery. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). "All well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true." Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). The court must view all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and the pleadings must be liberally construed. Id. (citation omitted). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support her claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, and malicious prosecution claims are barred under the one-year statute of limitations provided by K.S.A. § 60-514 because Plaintiffs did not file their case until December 6, 2004. Except for the malicious prosecution claim, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' complaint indicates that these state law claims accrued on December 6, 2002, the date when Mr. Reindl was allegedly stopped, detained, beaten, and processed by Leavenworth police officers.
Plaintiffs respond with several arguments. They initially contend that their claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, and malicious prosecution did not accrue on the date of Mr. Reindl's beating, but on the date of his death. Specifically, Plaintiffs believe that the "lesser torts" at issue "dovetail[ed]" together with their wrongful death claim. With regard to the assault and battery claims, Plaintiffs maintain that the extent of damages sustained by Mr. Reindl were not fully ascertainable until he died, which in turn created a cause of action for wrongful death. Plaintiffs argue that the interests of judicial economy would not be served for an individual, such as Mr. Reindl, to file an action for battery and associated torts within the one-year statute of limitations, before the full extent of the individual's injuries could be assessed, and then to have the individual's estate later file a second cause of action for wrongful death under the same set of facts. Next, as to the libel and slander claims, Plaintiffs concede that much of the allegations concerning their libel and slander claims occurred during the booking process, but "upon information and belief," they contend that the alleged libel and slander continued to occur for a period of months after Mr. Reindl's beating. Plaintiffs state that through discovery they will ascertain the exact date when the alleged libel and slander ceased. Finally, Plaintiffs submit that K.S.A. § 12-105b(d) and K.S.A. § 60-515 each provide a basis for tolling the statute of limitations. The court will address each argument in turn.
The court rejects Plaintiffs' argument that their assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel and slander claims accrued on August 25, 2003, the date Mr. Reindl died, i.e. the date their wrongful death claim accrued. "Where a suit invokes several causes of action, each is subject to a distinct statute of limitations; thus, distinct accrual periods should apply as to each cause of action." Tiberi v. Cigna Corp., 89 F.3d 1423, 1428 (10th Cir.1996) (citing King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir.1988)). "This is true even if the causes of action are derived from a single event." Id. "Generally, a cause of action accrues as soon as the right to maintain an action arises, i.e. when the plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted the action to a successful completion." Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan.App.2d 569, 662 P.2d 1301, 1304 (1983) (citation omitted).
The court determines that Plaintiffs' assault and battery claims accrued on December 6, 2002, the date Defendants allegedly beat Mr. Reindl. The court also concludes that Plaintiffs' false imprisonment claim accrued on December 6, 2002, because Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Defendants committed that tort by unlawfully arresting Mr. Reindl and subsequently confining him. As to the libel and slander claims, Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that "various defendant police officers" committed those torts "[i]n the course of `processing' Mr. Reindl" "on the scene." Only now do Plaintiffs argue in response to Defendants' motion to dismiss that the alleged libel and slander continued for months after Mr. Reindl's beating. The court concludes that the libel and slander claims alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint accrued on December 6, 2002. If through discovery Plaintiffs learn of facts subsequent to Mr. Reindl's processing sufficient to state a claim for libel or slander, then they may seek to amend their complaint. See Wright v. Bachmurski, 29 Kan.App.2d 595, 29 P.3d 979, 984 (2001) (citation omitted) ("Each communication of a defamatory statement to a third person generally constitutes a new publication and gives rise to a separate cause of action against the publisher."). Finally, the court is unable to determine from Plaintiffs' complaint when the malicious prosecution claim accrued. Plaintiffs' complaint generally alleges that "Defendants caused, or attempted to cause, charges to be filed against Mr. Reindl constituting malicious prosecution." Defendants, however, may move to dismiss this claim on a later motion after they discover the time frame of this alleged conduct.
Accordingly, unless Plaintiffs' tolling arguments have merit, Plaintiffs' claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, and slander are barred under the one-year statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs argue that ...
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Town of Cumberland v. Vella-Wilkinson, C.A. PC 10-2096
...to be part of the municipal corporation [in Hervieux v. Papineau, 611 A.2d 838, 841 (R.I. 1992)]"); Reindl v. City of Leavenworth, 361 F.Supp.2d 1294 (D. Kan. 2005) (holding that a suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are......
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Town of Cumberland v. Vella-Wilkinson, C.A. PC 10-2096
...to be part of the municipal corporation [in Hervieux v. Papineau, 611 A.2d 838, 841 (R.I. 1992)]"); Reindl v. City of Leavenworth, 361 F.Supp.2d 1294 (D. Kan. 2005) (holding that a suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are......
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Town of Cumberland v. Vella-Wilkinson, C.A. PC 10-2096
...to be part of the municipal corporation [in Hervieux v. Papineau, 611 A.2d 838, 841 (R.I. 1992)]"); Reindl v. City of Leavenworth, 361 F.Supp.2d 1294 (D. Kan. 2005) (holding that a suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are......
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