Reinecke v. the People

• Decision Date: 31 August 1884
• Citation: 15 Ill.App. 241,15 Bradw. 241
• Parties: CONRAD REINECKEv.THE PEOPLE, ETC.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

15 Ill.App. 241

15 Bradw. 241

CONRAD REINECKE

v.THE PEOPLE, ETC.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

August Term, 1884.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. AMOS WATTS, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed October 10, 1884.

Messrs. WILDERMAN & HAMILL, for appellant; that penal statutes must be strictly construed and never extended by implication, cited Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 245; Edwards v. Hill, 11 Ill. 22; Waddle v. Duncan, 63 Ill. 223; Raplee v. Morgan, 2 Scam. 561; People v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172.

Statutes must be interpreted according to the intent and meaning, and not always according to the letter: Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 144, 175; People v. Canal Commissioners, 3 Scam. 153; Hamilton v. State, 102 Ill. 367; Zarresseller v. People, 17 Ill. 101; Stribling v. Prettyman, 57 Ill. 372; Castner v. Walrod, 83 Ill. 178; Perry County v. Jefferson County, 94 Ill. 220; People v. Hoffman, 97 Ill. 236; Holmes v. Carley, 31 New York, 290; People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 380, 381.

Mr. R. D. W. HOLDER, for appellee; that the operation of a coal mine is a business affected with a public interest and may be regulated by statute, cited Daniels v. Hilgard, 77 Ill. 642; Cooley's Const. Lim. 714; Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 121.

CASEY, P. J.

Appellant was indicted in the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; there are eight counts in the indictment.

The material averments are that appellant was on the 2d day of July, 1883, the operator of a certain coal mine situate in that county and that there was a railroad switch and track adjacent to and connected with said mine. That appellant unlawfully failed, neglected to furnish, procure and place upon the said railroad track, adjacent to said mine, a track scale, of standard manufacture, upon which to weigh the coal hoisted from said mine. The indictment charges a failure on the part of appellant to conform with the provisions of an act of the general assembly of this State, entitled “An act to provide for the weighing coal at the mines,” approved June 14, 1883, in force July 1, 1884. Laws of 1883, 113. The cause was heard before the court and a jury, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty against appellant. A motion for a new trial was made and refused by the court and appellant was fined $25.

Exceptions were taken to the ruling of the court and the case is brought into this court by an appeal. Upon the trial of the cause the defendant was sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and in answer to a question, stated that he operated the mine in question for over two years, and for the last year had been mining the coal with machinery. Objection was made to this testimony by the State's attorney, because it was immaterial. The objection was sustained and appellant excepted to the ruling of the court.

Appellant's counsel then “offered to prove by the witness that at the time the law went into effect, July 1, 1883, the defendant had no coal miners employed in his mine; that he was mining coal solely by machinery. That men were employed exclusively to operate the machinery, and that he paid the men operating said machinery in said mine since the first day of July, 1883, and for a year prior to that time, two dollars and fifty cents a day, and that their wages had no relation to the quantity or weight of the coal taken out of the mine. That there have been no persons employed in this mine since July 1, 1883, whose business it is to dig or mine coal, and whose wages can be or are fixed by the quantity or weight of coal taken out of said mine. That a pair of track scales would cost from eight hundred to one thousand dollars, and that they would be of no use whatever at this mine, as at present operated, as there are no coal miners, or coal miners whose business it is to mine coal, employed in said mine.” Objection to this testimony was made by the State's attorney. The objection was sustained by the court, and the defendant excepted to the ruling of the court.

A proper decision of this question involves a construction of the intent and meaning of the act of the general assembly above referred to, which is substantially as follows:

The first section of that act provides “that the owner, agent or operator of each and every coal mine or colliery in this State shall furnish or cause to be furnished and placed upon the switch or railroad track adjacent to said coal mine or colliery, a ‘track scale’ of standard manufacture, and shall weigh all coal hoisted from said mine or colliery, before or at the time of being loaded on cars, wagons or other vehicles of transportation,” etc.

By section 2, “all coal produced in this State shall be weighed on the scales as above provided; and the weight so determined shall be considered the basis upon which the wages of persons mining coal shall be computed.”

Section 3 provides, “it shall be lawful for the miners employed in any coal mine or colliery in this State to furnish a check weigher, at their own expense, whose duty it shall be to balance said scales and see that the coal is properly weighed, and keep a correct account of same, and for this purpose he shall have access at all times to the ‘beam box’ of said scales, while such weighing is being performed,” etc.

The provisions of the act are made to apply only to coal mines doing business on and shipping coal by railroad or by water.

This enactment of the legislature has already received a construction by the Supreme Court, in the case of Jones v. The People, etc. In that case the miners were paid “forty cents a box for each box of coal mined or taken from said mine.”

The case now under consideration is, in principle, similar to the one referred to. This is a penal statute, and it is a well recognized principle that penal statutes are to be construed strictly and are never to be extended by mere implication to either persons or things not brought within their terms, within their clear meaning and intent. Waddle et al. v. Duncan, etc., 63 Ill. 223; Edwards v. Hill, 11 Ill. 22; The People, ex rel., v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172.

As to the construction of statutes in Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, page 144, it is said statutes must be interpreted according to the intent and meaning and not always according to the letter. A thing within the intention is within the statute though not within the letter, and a thing within the letter is not within the statute unless within the intention. In the case of The County...