Reiner v. Family Ford, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-2719CIV-T-26.,99-2719CIV-T-26.
• Citation: 146 F.Supp.2d 1279
• Parties: Tina M. REINER, Plaintiff, v. FAMILY FORD, INCORPORATED, a Florida Corporation, d/b/a Brandon Ford Incorporated, a Florida Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

146 F.Supp.2d 1279

Tina M. REINER, Plaintiff, v. FAMILY FORD, INCORPORATED, a Florida Corporation, d/b/a Brandon Ford Incorporated, a Florida Corporation, Defendant.

No. 99-2719CIV-T-26.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

May 15, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

B. Elaine Jones & Associates (Elaine Jones, Mary B. Corn, of counsel), Bandon, FL, for Plaintiff.

Fisher & Phillips LLP (James C. Polkinghorn, Kristen L. Sampo, of counsel), Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

McCURN, Senior District Judge (Visiting).

Introduction

Following a five day trial, on March 23, 2001, the jury rendered a verdict in this case brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. Chs. 760.01-760.11.¹ In particular, the jury found that the plaintiff, Tina M. Reiner, had been retaliated against by defendant Family Ford, Inc., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Brandon Ford Inc., a Florida corporation ("Brandon Ford" or "Brandon"), for "engag[ing] in statutorily protected activity, that is, that she in good faith asserted claims or complaints of sexual harassment prohibited by federal and/or state law[,]" and that she sustained an adverse employment action, i.e., termination, as a result of engaging in such activity. See Doc. # 95 (Verdict Form at 4, ¶¶ 9 and 11). Thus, the jury awarded plaintiff $28,000.00 as compensation in back pay for her "net loss of wages and benefits to the date of trial[.]" See id. at 5, ¶ 12.

Among other things, plaintiff also sought front pay, but not reinstatement. See Complaint at 18, ¶ E. "[P]revailing Title VII plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to either reinstatement or front pay." United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 619 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In contrast to back pay, issues of front pay and reinstatement are "for the trial judge, and not the jury to decide." Id. at 618 (emphasis in original) (and cases cited therein). In accordance with this well-established legal principle, after the jury rendered its verdict, the court directed the plaintiff, if she chose to do so, to file a motion for front pay and it gave the defendant an opportunity to respond. After considering plaintiff Reiner's motion for said relief and Brandon Ford's opposition thereto, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the front pay issue.

Background

I. Evidence

After graduating from high school, plaintiff received an A.A.S. degree in automotive technology and she also received an automotive mechanic certificate. See Def. exh. 29A at 3. Pursuing a career in the automotive field, in September 1997, plaintiff Reiner became employed as a service advisor with Brandon Ford. As a service advisor, plaintiff's responsibilities consisted primarily of writing repair orders for customers' vehicles; answering questions and making recommendations regarding such repairs; at times making repair appointments; and arranging for client transportation during the time of repair. Her remuneration was in the form of weekly commissions based upon the amount of parts and labor she placed on customer repair orders.

Based upon her sales from January 1, 1999, until her termination for "insubordination" nearly midway through that year, on May 24, 1999, plaintiff testified that she was "on track" to earn approximately $56,000.00 in 1999. As her 1999 Brandon Ford W-2 reflects, however, plaintiff's earnings during the first five months of that year were only $18,007.14, thus seriously undermining her contention that her total earnings for that year from Brandon Ford would have be nearly $56,000.00. See Def. exh. 31.² In the preceding year, plaintiff's W-2 form indicates "wages, tips, [and] other compensation" from Brandon Ford in the amount of $41,254.21. See Def. exh. 32. In the first four months of her employment with Brandon Ford, in 1997, plaintiff's W-2 form states that she earned $12,295.69. See Def. exh. 33.³ Besides salary, while at Brandon Ford plaintiff received benefits in the form of being enrolled in a 401(k) plan, and having medical coverage for herself and her children.

After her termination from Brandon Ford, plaintiff Reiner testified that she held several jobs. Plaintiff first became employed by Freedom Ford, where she worked in a position similar to that which she held at Brandon Ford. Plaintiff testified that Freedom Ford guaranteed her a salary of $4,000.00 per month during her first 90 days; thereafter she was to be paid on a commission basis. Unlike Brandon Ford, Freedom Ford had no fleet accounts. Fleet accounts are corporate accounts where a business has a contract with a particular dealership to have its entire fleet of vehicles serviced by that dealership. Evidently such accounts are relatively lucrative to service advisors such as Ms. Reiner.

Plaintiff stayed at Freedom Ford for only six weeks, candidly testifying that she voluntarily quit that job without notice when she was asked to work a weekend. She refused to work that weekend, because, as a single, divorced mother of two young children, she was unable to work then because the children were to be with her that weekend. Furthermore, plaintiff also refused to find a replacement for that weekend assignment, despite Freedom Ford's request that she do so.

After that short stint at Freedom Ford, plaintiff took a position as a service advisor with Lexus of Tampa Bay. There, plaintiff earned $50.00 per day, plus compensation based upon the number of technician or mechanic labor hours which she billed. Ms. Reiner was terminated during her 90 day probationary period at Lexus, however, because of "Absenteeism/Lateness[.]" See Def. exh. 29C. On her "Termination Report" from Lexus, another reason given for plaintiff's "separation" was that her "performance was below standard[.]" Id. Plaintiff did not dispute those reasons as is evidenced by her signature upon that report without comment. See id.

Next, plaintiff worked for Indian Motorcycles where she stayed for nearly six months, until August, 2000. While at Indian Motorcycles, she was paid on a strictly salary basis of $25,000.00 per year. Describing her departure from Indian Motorcycles as "pretty mutual," plaintiff explained that she left that job when her salary was capped at $30,000.00. Prior to that, plaintiff testified that she had been making between $40,000.00 and $50,000.00 annually. The court observes that plaintiff's W-2 forms, as earlier described, belie this assertion. In only one of those years, 1998, did plaintiff earn more than $40,000.00; and there is nothing in the record showing that she ever earned over that $41,254.21 amount annually.

In any event, on cross-examination plaintiff was forced to concede that part of her decision to resign came from a disagreement she had with Indian Motorcycle's general manager. Plaintiff challenged the fact that he was reassigning some of her job responsibilities to one of her subordinates. Regardless of her motivation, what is clear from the record evidence is that for the second time after her termination from Brandon Ford, plaintiff voluntarily quit a job in her field where she was being compensated relatively well.

In September 2000, plaintiff took a job as a service advisor with Precision Toyota where she is still employed. At Precision Ford, plaintiff's base salary is $400.00 per week, plus a percentage of the service department profits. Although Precision Ford has a 401(k) program, plaintiff is not yet eligible to participate in it. Furthermore, unlike Brandon Ford, plaintiff must now pay for her own medical insurance. According to plaintiff, her current income level at Precision does not begin to approach what she was making at Brandon Ford, and she believes that she cannot achieve that level of income at Precision because of the difference in pay structures between the two dealerships. As another reason for the difference in earning capacity between Brandon Ford and Precision Toyota, plaintiff points to the fact that Precision has no fleet accounts. There was no concrete evidence, however, as to how these differences between the two dealerships directly impacted plaintiff in terms of her claimed discrepancy in earning potential.

In addition to plaintiff Reiner's testimony regarding her subsequent employment, an economic consultant, Joyce Eastridge, testified, inter alia, as to the amount of front pay to which she believes plaintiff is entitled. Relying on a number of source documents, including plaintiff's W-2 forms and her check stubs from 1997 forward, and making several assumptions, which will be set forth below, Ms. Eastridge offered two possible, alternative front pay scenarios. Under the first, Ms. Eastridge assumed that it would take five years for plaintiff to "close the gap," that is, for plaintiff to make as much at her current service advisor position at Precision Ford as she was making at the time of her termination from Brandon Ford. Assuming the following: (1) that plaintiff was unlawfully terminated from Brandon Ford and that she would have continued in Brandon's employ for five years from her termination date, and that she would have continued to earn $56,000.00 annually and to receive 401(k) contributions; (2) that she mitigated her damages by obtaining substantially similar alternative employment after her termination from Brandon; and (3) a 13% growth rate in plaintiff's earnings during the next five years, Ms. Eastridge opined that plaintiff sustained a cumulative total of $86,981 in front pay damages for that time frame. See Motion for Award of Front Pay ("Pl.Mtn.") and Memorandum of Law In Support ("Pl. Memo."), exh. "A" thereto. Alternatively, assuming that it would take plaintiff Reiner three years to...