Reinfeld v. Hutcheson

• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SEVERSON
• Citation: Reinfeld v. Hutcheson, 2010 SD 42, 783 N.W.2d 284 (S.D. 2010)
• Decision Date: 26 May 2010
• Docket Number: 25297.,No. 25281,25281
• Parties: Falyn REINFELD, Plaintiff and Appellee,v.H.L. HUTCHESON, Defendant and Appellant.

783 N.W.2d 284

2010 S.D. 42

Falyn REINFELD, Plaintiff and Appellee,v.H.L. HUTCHESON, Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. 25281, 25297.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued March 23, 2010.

Decided May 26, 2010.

Clint L. Sargent, William E. Blewett of Meierhenry & Sargent, LLP, Nichole Carper, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.

Jennifer L. Wollman of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, PC, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellant.

SEVERSON, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Falyn Reinfeld (Reinfeld) brought this lawsuit against H.L. Hutcheson (Hutcheson) for negligence in connection with an automobile accident. The trial court granted Reinfeld's motion for a new trial on the basis that the jury's award of damages for past and future medical expenses, but not pain and suffering, was inadequate and insufficient under the evidence presented at trial. Hutcheson appeals. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

[¶ 2.] On December 9, 2004, Reinfeld and Hutcheson were involved in an automobile accident at the intersection of Dakota Avenue and 26th Street in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Hutcheson stopped at a stop sign on Dakota Avenue, waited to cross 26th Street, and proceeded south through the intersection when another motorist waved him through. Hutcheson's view of eastbound traffic on 26th Street was obstructed by vehicles in the westbound lane. Reinfeld was traveling east on 26th Street. Hutcheson struck Reinfeld's vehicle as Reinfeld entered the intersection. Reinfeld gripped her steering wheel to brace for impact and hit her head on the driver's side window. Neither driver reported any injuries to the officer who responded to the scene of the accident.

[¶ 3.] Reinfeld began experiencing headaches and pain in her neck and shoulders within hours of the accident. Reinfeld saw Dr. Richard Plummer the day after the accident. Dr. Plummer imposed work and lifting restrictions and prescribed physical therapy and pain medications. An MRI conducted on January 7, 2005, revealed disk bulging at C5-C6 with no significant nerve impingement. Reinfeld's condition failed to improve, and Dr. Plummer referred Reinfeld to Drs. Jerry Blow and Steven Guse. Drs. Blow and Guse treated Reinfeld using pain medications, physical therapy, trigger point injections, and neuromuscular electrical stimulation. On March 30, 2005, Dr. Guse determined that Reinfeld had reached maximum medical improvement. Dr. Guse assigned Reinfeld a 5% permanent whole-person impairment rating and imposed a permanent overhead lifting restriction of no more than 40 pounds. Despite having reached maximum medical improvement, Reinfeld continued to receive medical treatments from Dr. Guse and chiropractic care from Dr. Bruce Johnson.

[¶ 4.] In September 2007, Reinfeld brought this lawsuit against Hutcheson for negligence in connection with the accident. Prior to trial, Hutcheson admitted that he was negligent, but disputed the cause, nature, and extent of Reinfeld's injuries. The case proceeded to trial to determine causation and damages. By special verdict, the jury found that Hutcheson's negligence was the legal cause of Reinfeld's injuries and awarded Reinfeld $18,791.63 in past medical expenses and $11,054.30 in future chiropractic care expenses. The jury awarded no damages for past disability, future disability, past pain and suffering, future pain and suffering, lost wages, or lost earning capacity. Reinfeld moved for a new trial on the basis that the jury's award of damages for past and future medical expenses, but not pain and suffering, was inadequate and insufficient under the evidence presented at trial. The trial court granted Reinfeld's motion for a new trial. Hutcheson appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 5.] “If the trial court finds an injustice has been done by the jury's verdict the remedy lies in granting a new trial.” Waldner v. Berglund, 2008 SD 75, ¶ 11, 754 N.W.2d 832, 835 (citations omitted). “A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; we will not overturn the court's ruling unless it appears affirmatively from the record [that] there has been an abuse of discretion.” Morrison v. Mineral Palace Ltd. P'ship, 1998 SD 33, ¶ 7, 576 N.W.2d 869, 870 (citations omitted). “Additionally, this [C]ourt has consistently stated that more deference is given to the trial court's grant of a new trial than its denial of one.” Id. (quoting Tunender v. Minnaert, 1997 SD 62, ¶ 9, 563 N.W.2d 849, 851). “This is because orders allowing new trials ‘are not conclusive or decisive of any rights or issues. They merely open the way for a reinvestigation of the entire case upon its facts and merits.’ ” Id. (quoting Jensen v. Miller, 80 S.D. 384, 389, 124 N.W.2d 394, 396 (1963)).

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

Appeal # 25281

[¶ 6.] 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Reinfeld's motion for a new trial.

[¶ 7.] The trial court relied upon SDCL 15-6-59(a) in granting Reinfeld's motion for a new trial. That statute provides in relevant part:

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes:

...

(5) Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice;

(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision or that is against law.

SDCL 15-6-59(a).

[¶ 8.] A new trial should not be granted merely because the trial court believes the verdict is smaller than it should be. Stoltz v. Stonecypher, 336 N.W.2d 654, 657 (S.D.1983). “The jury's verdict should not be set aside except in those extreme cases where it is the result of passion or prejudice or where the jury has palpably mistaken the rules of law by which damages in a particular case are to be measured.” Waldner, 2008 SD 75, ¶ 14, 754 N.W.2d at 836 (quoting Itzen v. Wilsey, 440 N.W.2d 312, 313-14 (S.D.1989) (citing Stoltz, 336 N.W.2d at 657; SDCL 15-6-59(a)(5))). If the jury's verdict “can be explained with reference to the evidence,” it should be affirmed. Id. (quoting Itzen, 440 N.W.2d at 314).

[¶ 9.] This Court first considered the validity of an award of damages for medical expenses, but not pain and suffering, in Gould v. Mans, 82 S.D. 574, 152 N.W.2d 92 (1967). In that case, after hearing all the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict for the precise amount of Gould's alleged medical, hospital, physical therapy, and transportation expenses. Gould moved for a new trial on the basis that the jury's verdict was inadequate and insufficient under the evidence presented at trial because it awarded no damages for pain and suffering. The trial court granted Gould's motion for a new trial. This Court affirmed, holding that “[i]n view of the evidence regarding the extent, nature, and causation of plaintiff's injuries and mental condition, the trial court could do no wrong in either granting or refusing a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages.” Id. at 578, 152 N.W.2d at 94. “It was a matter resting within [the trial judge's] broad discretion[.]” Id.

[¶ 10.] In Gould, this Court recognized that “the apparent weight of authority [ ] regards a verdict in a personal injury action for the amount of medical expenses to be inadequate and invalid without an additional award for pain and suffering.” Id. at 576, 152 N.W.2d at 93 (citation omitted). “[A] jury cannot award recovery for medical expenses and without reason deny recovery for the very injuries necessitating the medical expenses.” Id. Yet, this Court was “not willing to adopt an inflexible rule [that] would in effect render every verdict approximating a plaintiff's medical expenses inadequate and invalid as a matter of law.” Id. at 577, 152 N.W.2d 92. This Court left open the possibility that such verdicts could be sustained on various grounds. Id.

[¶ 11.] In Morrison v. Mineral Palace Ltd. P'ship, this Court again considered the validity of an award of damages for medical expenses but not pain and suffering. 1998 SD 33, 576 N.W.2d 869. By special verdict, the jury awarded Morrison the exact amounts she claimed for medical expenses and lost wages, but awarded nothing for pain and suffering or permanent impairment. In affirming the trial court's grant of a new trial, this Court held that “there [was] no construction that [could] properly sustain the verdict” and that “[e]vidence of uncontested damages was ignored by the jury.” Id. ¶ 12, 576 N.W.2d at 872. Because Morrison received 100% of her claimed damages for medical expenses and lost earnings, this Court rejected Mineral Palace's argument that the jury reduced its award of damages due to Morrison's contributory negligence. Id. Had the jury done so, the awards for pain and suffering and permanent impairment would have been reduced, not completely eliminated. Id.

[¶ 12.] Waldner v. Berglund is the most recent case to consider the issue. 2008 SD 75, 754 N.W.2d 832. Waldner moved for a new trial when the jury returned a general verdict awarding her the precise amount of medical expenses she incurred within days after the automobile accident. The trial court denied Waldner's motion for a new trial. This Court affirmed, holding that the case turned on witness credibility. Id. ¶ 19, 754 N.W.2d at 836. “Waldner's reasons for seeking treatment following the accident were based in large part on her subjective descriptions of pain.” Id. ¶ 15. The jury apparently felt that Waldner's subsequent medical treatments and any pain she experienced were not related to the accident, did not exist, or were not necessary. Id. ¶ 13, 754 N.W.2d at 835. It is important to note that the verdict in Waldner was general, and therefore, this Court could not say conclusively what it represented. Id. ¶ 15 n*, 754 N.W.2d at 836 n* (citing Andreson v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 1997 SD 12, ¶ 14, 559 N.W.2d 886, 889-90).

[¶ 13.] Hutcheson argues that “[t]he issue of damages in a personal injury action is peculiarly a question for the jury.” Itzen, 440...