Reinhardt v. City of New Haven
| Decision Date | 18 October 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 91042,91042 |
| Citation | 182 A.2d 925,23 Conn.Supp. 321 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Betty L. REINHARDT v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al. |
Jacobs, Jacobs, Jacobs & Jacobs, New Haven, for plaintiff.
Howard F. Zoarski, New Haven, for defendant Katherine G. Mauro, administratrix.
George W. Crawford, Thomas F. Keyes, Jr., A. Fred Mignone and Harold M. Mulvey, New Haven, for named defendant.
The amended complaint is in two courts. The first is against the administratrix of the estate of the deceased fireman-operator of the fire truck involved in the alleged collision with the plaintiff's vehicle. The second count is against the city of New Haven on the claim that the decedent was acting in the scope of his employment as a fireman of the city and that his acts were not wilful or wanton. The claim for damages is singular in that it appears only at the end of the second count without particular reference to either defendant; it states that 'the plaintiff claims $60,000 damages.' The fireman-operator whose claimed negligence is the basis for this action died at the time of the accident.
The action against the city is predicated on General Statutes § 7-308, entitled 'Assumption of liability for damage caused by firemen.' The action against the estate is based on the claimed negligent conduct of the decedent fireman. The administratrix has demurred on the ground that § 7-308 requires notice of intention to sue to be filed personally with the now deceased fireman and that there is no provision in said statute for the survival of an action against the estate of a deceased fireman. The city's demurrer alleges that the complaint fails to allege that notice of intention to sue was 'filed upon the fireman, Charles V. Mauro, himself, * * * as required by * * * section 7-308 * * *'; that service was made on the administratrix of the fireman's estate; that this statute imposes an obligation upon the city to save harmless 'a fireman in life, who could be served personally with notice * * *'; that the city is not a proper party here and cannot be liable; that the defense of governmental immunity precludes liability on the city; that this statute only applies where the fireman personally and not his estate is given notice and sued; and finally that the claim for damages is 'not specific against whom it is claimed.'
The real argument of both defendants is that since this is a statutory cause of action, it must be so strictly construed as to require notice to be given directly and personally to the fireman himself and not to the legal representative of his estate. It is true that § 7-308, supra, contains no provision for service except upon the fireman himself. However, the plaintiff contends that § 52-599, entitled 'Survival of actions and causes of actions,' must be read in conjunction with § 7-308 in order that the purpose of the latter not be defeated.
The statute, § 7-308, provides an indemnity to a paid or volunteer fireman of a municipality for all sums which he becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law for damage to person or property occurring while he is acting in the performance of his fire duties. The statute does not, however, provide any indemnity if the occurrence was the result of a wilful or wanton act of the employee. In order for the plaintiff in this case to establish the liability of the city under § 7-308, she must prove compliance with the requirements of the statute as to demand and notice and that the conduct of the employee of which she complains was not wilful or wanton.
In the interpretation of statutes in general, a literal construction has but a prima facie preference. To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to take a broad view of the act and to get an exact conception of its scope and purpose. It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that the construction must, if possible, be such as will effect the real purpose for which the statute was enacted. Merchants...
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Keogh v. City of Bridgeport
...General Statutes §§ 52-555 and 52-599. Cf. Stavola v. Palmer, 136 Conn. 670, 676-77, 73 A.2d 831 (1950); Reinhardt v. New Haven, 23 Conn.Sup. 321, 324-25, 182 A.2d 925 (1961). Accordingly, § 7-308 applies to the present case. The plaintiff contends that the inaccurate reference to the cause......
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Flynn v. Lucas County Memorial Hospital
... ... See Gruener v. City of Cedar Falls, 189 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 1971). Defendant Brunner was at all material times a hospital ... And in Dobrovolny v. Reinhardt, 173 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Iowa 1970) is this apt statement: ... 'In construing a statute, it is ... Sprague, 209 Cal.App.2d 101, 25 Cal.Rptr. 603 (1962); Reinhardt ... v. City of New Haven, 23 Conn.Sup. 321, 182 A.2d 925 (1961) ... In Huffaker, supra, the court was ... ...
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Wendelin v. Russell
...78 N.W.2d 509, and Wood v. Wood, 136 Iowa 128, 132, 113 N.W. 492, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 891. See also Reinhardt v. City of New Haven, 23 Conn.Supp. 321, 182 A.2d 925, 926--927. Our survival statutes have also been said by us to preserve to the legal representative the original cause of action, e......
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Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Fielding
...states is that every cause survives until the contrary is made to appear by way of exception to the rule. Eg. Reinhardt v. New Haven, 23 Conn.Sup. 321, 182 A.2d 925 (1961). Since it is the federal and not the state rule which governs here, whether or not the law of one state, Nevada, allows......