Reinhardt v. State
| Decision Date | 19 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. S93A0124,S93A0124 |
| Citation | 428 S.E.2d 333,263 Ga. 113 |
| Parties | REINHARDT v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Ronnie K. Batchelor, Lawrenceville, for William Charles Reinhardt.
Thomas C. Lawler, III, Dist. Atty., Lawrenceville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Rachelle L. Strausner, Staff Atty., Atlanta, for the State.
Debra K. Turner, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lawrenceville. HUNT, Presiding Justice.
William Charles Reinhardt was convicted of felony murder and arson, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals and we reverse. 1
On the evening of June 18, 1991, the defendant and his girlfriend, who were sharing a room at the Lawrenceville Motor Inn, smoked crack cocaine with another man. After the three had smoked all of the crack cocaine, the defendant's girlfriend and the other man left, and the defendant remained in the motel room drinking. At 1:15 a.m. authorities responded to a fire call at the motel; the building in which the defendant was staying was on fire, and another guest in a room down the hall from the defendant was killed in the fire. Although at trial the defendant testified that the fire had started accidentally while he was smoking, the jury heard evidence sufficient to authorize a conclusion that the defendant intentionally set a fire in his motel room.
1. After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's determination of guilt, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing his request to charge on involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct.
A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.
OCGA § 16-5-3(a). A person is guilty of reckless conduct, a misdemeanor, when he
causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial danger and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation....
OCGA § 16-5-60(b). In the present case, there is evidence to support such charges. Since "a written request to charge a lesser included offense must always be given if there is any evidence that the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense," State v. Alvarado, 260 Ga. 563, 564, 397 S.E.2d 550 (1990), the trial court's failure to give the charge requested by the defendant constitutes reversible error. The state argues the charge is not warranted because the evidence shows the defendant intentionally set fire to his bed. However, the crime of arson requires an intent, not only to set a fire, but also to damage a dwelling, building or other structure. Here, even though there was evidence that the defendant intentionally set the fire, there was also evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant set the fire without intending to damage the motel structure. In addition, there was evidence that the setting of the fire, though unintentional, was the result of reckless conduct. Accordingly, Reinhardt was entitled to the requested charges. 2
3. The defendant next argues that the court erred in admitting into evidence his statement made at the hospital to police investigators, contending the statement was made as the result of a custodial interrogation and prior to Miranda warnings. Defendant also contends that the statement was involuntary.
(a) Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), persons must be advised of their rights with respect to interrogation after being taken into custody or otherwise deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The Miranda court was particularly concerned about situations in which the defendant was questioned by police "in a room in which [the defendant] was cut off from the outside world," because such incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere can result in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. Id.
In the present case, the record shows that police began the interrogation of Reinhardt as he sat on a stretcher breathing from an oxygen mask but that when the doctor told Reinhardt he was free to leave, the police officers asked him to come with them to a room from which others were excluded. After isolating him in his room, the police also asked Reinhardt to remove his pants and shoes. The police then questioned Reinhardt specifically about the origin of the fire, cf. Lamb v. United States, 414 F.2d 250 (9th Cir.1969); when a police officer disputed his version of how the fire had started, Reinhardt confessed to the officers that he had started the fire intentionally. Only...
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Bishop v. State
...Whether there was a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115(3)(b), 428 S.E.2d 333 (1993). The record shows that Bishop read the Miranda warnings at the beginning of his statement and signed a waiver of right......
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State v. Springer
......It points out that under Georgia law, involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct are both lesser included offenses of felony murder, and reckless conduct is also a lesser included offense of aggravated assault by attempting to injure. See Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 113–114(2), 428 S.E.2d 333 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 177, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008) ; Shaw v. State, 238 Ga.App. 757, 758–759, 519 S.E.2d 486 (1999). See also OCGA § 16–1–6 (defining included crime). It argues, therefore, ......
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Smith v. State
...(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Wintker, 223 Ga.App. at 69, 476 S.E.2d 835. See also Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 114-115(3)(a), 428 S.E.2d 333 (1993). Accordingly, the officer's actions triggered Smith's right to the protections of Miranda during the course of her interrog......
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Vergara v. State
...571, 572(1), 591 S.E.2d 459 (2003) hold otherwise, they are overruled. Applying the nine factors found in Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115(3)(b), 428 S.E.2d 333 (1993), the State also argues that Vergara's statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. We note that t......
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Death Penalty Law - Therese M. Day
...(1995). 121. Vergara, 283 Ga. at 177, 657 S.E.2d at 866 (citing Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770, 772, 48 S.E.2d 522, 523 (1948)). 122. 263 Ga. 113, 428 S.E.2d 333 (1993), overruled by Vergara, 283 Ga. at 178, 428 S.E.2d at 866. 123. Vergara, 283 Ga. at 177-78, 657 S.E.2d at 866. 124. Id. 125. ......