Reinhart v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours

Decision Date16 December 1996
Citation147 N.J. 156,685 A.2d 1301
PartiesToby Easton REINHART, Petitioner-Respondent, v. E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS, Respondent-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Sheldon Schiffman, Watchung, for respondent-appellant (Michals, Wahl, Silver & Leitner, attorneys).

Fred Hopke, Woodbridge, for petitioner-respondent (Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

COLEMAN, J.

The narrow issue raised in this workers' compensation case is whether an improper use of a transcript of a prior workers' compensation proceeding was so prejudicial that a redetermination of the merits of the claims should be required. The Appellate Division concluded that a reversal and remand are required. We granted certification, 144 N.J. 585, 677 A.2d 758 (1996). We now reverse and hold that the error was harmless.

I

In June 1990, petitioner Toby Easton Reinhart filed a workers' compensation petition alleging that a work-related accident occurred on December 8, 1989, and that a reinjury occurred on December 12, 1989. E.I. Dupont De Nemours (Dupont), the employer, disputed both the occurrence and notice of the accident. Therefore, petitioner bore the burden of proof on those issues. A description of her work at Dupont is essential to understanding the mechanics of the alleged accident.

-A-

Reinhart worked at Dupont as a machinist for nine years before the alleged accident. Her position as a machine operator involved assemblyline-style packaging of different types of film. There were two distinct job assignments, stacker and boxer, and the machine operators rotated assignments daily. While working the stacker, Reinhart was responsible for removing and bagging sheets of film. The film came out in twenty-nine by forty inch sheets from a machine approximately shoulder height. Once the machine emitted fifty sheets, Reinhart removed the bundle of sheets, placed it on a table, and bagged it before sending it to the next operator. In order to perform the job, Reinhart had to lift the bundles above shoulder height, turn and place the bundles on the table approximately five feet from the stacker, and then lift the bundle approximately one inch off the table in order to slide it manually into the bag.

When working the boxer rotation, Reinhart was responsible for receiving the bagged bundles of film, placing them in boxes, and labeling and taping the boxes. In that capacity, she took empty boxes of widths ranging from ten to fifty inches, placed them on a table, labeled them in sequence, and placed the bundle of bagged film inside. The labeling and boxing were performed at waist level, although the empty boxes were sometimes located overhead. Reinhart testified that the empty boxes were not heavy, the largest weighing no more than five pounds.

Reinhart testified that on Friday, December 8, 1989, she sustained an injury to her neck and shoulder while operating the stacker on the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift. She claims that at approximately 1:30 p.m., she removed a forty to fifty pound stack of film, turned to place the film on the table, and felt a twinge in her neck and left shoulder that radiated into her left leg and foot. Reinhart described the feeling as a "spring action" that was not actually painful, but felt like a clicking in her neck and shoulder area. She testified that she had only a few bundles left to complete before she had to shut down the machine at 2:00 p.m. and clean up. She therefore completed her work and went home. She did not report the alleged accident to anyone at work, but mentioned the injury to her husband. She did not feel any pain at that time and thought the "clicking" feeling would go away. Reinhart claims that on Saturday morning, December 9, she awoke with a stiff neck and had difficulty moving her upper body. She spent that day in bed and did not return to work until the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift on Tuesday, December 12, 1989, when her stiff neck had somewhat subsided. She did not seek medical attention or report the alleged accident at that time.

When Reinhart returned to work on Tuesday, December 12, she was assigned to boxing. Approximately four hours into her shift, she claims she picked up a stack of seven or eight empty boxes and felt the same twinge running from her back through her left leg. She said that she lost feeling in her leg and foot and could not walk for several minutes. She stated that when the feeling returned, she went to the office and sat for a few minutes until the pain diminished. Reinhart testified that because no foreman was working the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift, she sent a letter through the computer system to the day-shift foreman. She claims that in the letter she explained what had happened and stated that she planned to see a doctor the following morning. She believed the foreman would receive the letter the next day. After writing the letter, Reinhart returned to work and finished her shift with the assistance of co-workers. She testified that she mentioned her injury to the chief operator on duty, who is now deceased. The computerized letter was never received by a foreman or supervisor.

Reinhart admitted on cross-examination that she was aware of the procedure for reporting accidents and injuries, that she had received training in utilizing Dupont's notification procedure, and that she had used the procedure on several occasions in the past. She admitted that she did not follow the standard reporting procedure for the alleged December 1989 episodes.

The morning after the alleged reinjury, Reinhart saw Dr. Luciano, her primary care physician at the Rutgers Community Health Plan, and received a light duty slip. Reinhart testified that when she returned to work that afternoon she presented Dr. Luciano's slip to the plant hospital. It was her impression that the hospital forwarded the slip to her supervisor who assigned her to light office work. She eventually had surgery on her upper back in November 1990. She was out of work until February 1991.

-B-

In denying that petitioner sustained a compensable accident in December 1989, Dupont relies heavily on the facts and circumstances surrounding petitioner's 1986 workers' compensation hearing that involved a 1984 accident. That information was presented in this case through cross-examination and the admission of a transcript of the 1986 proceeding.

In the present litigation, counsel for Dupont cross-examined petitioner in an effort to show that the complaints she gave in the present case were almost identical to those she had given in the 1986 hearing. During cross-examination petitioner testified that the injuries she had sustained in the 1984 accident had cleared up prior to the December 8, 1989 alleged accident and then had reappeared after the 1989 episodes.

To enable the judge to compare her complaints at the 1986 hearing with the complaints at the trial regarding the 1989 episodes, Dupont's counsel offered into evidence the transcript of the 1986 hearing. The judge concluded that the transcript was admissible to attack petitioner's credibility.

When the judge rendered his decision, he pointed out several inconsistencies in petitioner's testimony. He concluded that petitioner had the tendency to be untruthful:

The [c]ourt concludes that Petitioner has a proclivity to be untruthful which has a direct bearing on her credibility. These "fibs" caused people to rely upon and take certain actions based on her statements. To her, they may have had no dire consequences; to the [c]ourt, it reveals a complete lack of understanding and propensity to be untruthful.

Thus, the judge concluded that Reinhart had not reported her injury and had not established a compensable injury:

I'm satisfied that the petitioner was well aware of the reporting requirements of the respondent, that she did not report the alleged accidents, and as a result, the respondent was severely prejudiced.... Beyond that, it is this [c]ourt's opinion that the petitioner has failed to sustain the burden of proving an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment with the respondent.

Based on those findings, Reinhart's claims were dismissed.

The Appellate Division reversed in an unpublished opinion. Although the court recognized that the Rules of Evidence do not apply to workers' compensation proceedings, it asserted that a judge relying on those rules must apply them consistently with their general application. The court noted that the Rules of Evidence limit the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove character or a trait of character by allowing only evidence of reputation, evidence of opinion, or evidence of conviction of a crime. N.J.R.E. 405. The court also noted that evidence of a person's character or a trait of the person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion except under circumstances that are not pertinent to this case. N.J.R.E. 404(b).

The court concluded that the admission of the 1986 transcript was error, noting that the judge specifically relied on the instances of untruthfulness contained therein. The court held that the admission of the transcript directly violated the Rules of Evidence. It reversed the decision below and remanded for redetermination by a new judge.

II

Dupont argues that the Appellate Division erred in holding that the 1986 transcript was inadmissible. It also argues that the court below violated its scope of review in overturning the judge of compensation's finding that petitioner failed to establish liability by a preponderance of the evidence.

It is clear that the Rules of Evidence do not apply to workers' compensation proceedings. N.J.S.A. 34:15-56 provides that when deciding a contested case, a judge of compensation "shall not be bound by the rules of evidence." Case law has consistently reiterated that proposition. Andricsak...

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    ...34:15-56, "it is well-settled that a judge of compensation's determination must be based on competent evidence," Reinhart v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 147 N.J. 156, 163 (1996); see also Andricsak v. Nat'l Fireproofing Corp., 3 N.J. 466, 471 (1950) (finding a judge of compensation is required ......
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    ...evidence that plaintiff obtained workers' compensation because it supported defense of limited remedy); see also Reinhart v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, 147 N.J. 156 (1996) (discussing the admissibility of workers' compensation hearing transcript to impeach credibility). Defendant discusses the......

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