Reinig v. RBS Citizens
| Docket Number | 2:15-CV-01541-CCW |
| Decision Date | 25 August 2023 |
| Parties | ALEX REINIG, KEN GRITZ, BOB SODA, MARY LOU GRAMESKY, PETER WILDER SMITH, WILLIAM KINSELLA, DANIEL KOLENDA, VALERIE DAL PINO, AHMAD NAJI, ROBERT PEDERSON, TERESA FRAGALE, DAVID HOWARD, DANIEL JENKINS, MARK ROSS, Plaintiffs, v. RBS CITIZENS, N.A., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' and Defendant's Motions for Reconsideration. See ECF Nos. 435, 436. Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court's decision granting summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiffs' “recapture” claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and “regularrate” claims under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act. ECF No. 438. Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Court's order finally certifying an FLSA collective action. ECF No. 437. For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Plaintiffs' Motion and GRANT Defendant's Motion.
Because of the extensive litigation in this case to date, the Court will only recount the necessary procedural and factual background related to the Motions for Reconsideration.
Plaintiffs a group of current and former Mortgage Loan Officers (“MLOs”) employed by Defendant RBS Citizens, N.A. (“Citizens”), allege that, notwithstanding Citizens' official timekeeping policy, which requires MLOs to report all hours worked, Citizens maintained an unofficial policy of discouraging MLOs from reporting overtime, thereby resulting in MLOs working off the clock. Plaintiffs' claims for unpaid overtime resulting from the alleged unofficial policy span from November 24, 2013 to the present. Plaintiffs seek damages for unpaid overtime wages.
In a two-volume report, which addressed motions for summary judgment and motions for class and collective certification, the Special Master recommended that (1) summary judgment be granted in Citizens' favor for Plaintiffs' “recapture” claims under the FLSA; (2) summary judgment be granted in Citizens' favor for Plaintiffs' claims under the PMWA; and (3) Plaintiffs' conditionally certified FLSA collective action be finally certified pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See ECF Nos. 179, 180. On August 22, 2017, United States District Judge Arthur Schwab, then presiding, adopted the Special Master's Report and Recommendation, dismissed the recapture claims under the FLSA, dismissed the claims under the PMWA, and finally certified an FLSA collective action pursuant to § 216(b). ECF No. 216.
Simultaneously, Judge Schwab certified a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which allowed Citizens to appeal the order under Rule 23(f). See ECF No. 261 (notice of appeal); see also ECF No. 258 (). On appeal, the Third Circuit found that, based on the record as it then existed, it could not “make a definitive determination as to whether Plaintiffs' representative evidence is sufficient to satisfy Rule 23's commonality and preponderance requirements.” Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 912 F.3d 115, 129 (3d Cir. 2018). The Court of Appeals therefore vacated the class certification order and remanded “with instructions that the District Court conduct a ‘rigorous' examination of the factual and legal allegations underpinning Plaintiffs' claims before deciding if class certification is appropriate.” Id. at 130. On remand to the District Court, Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification. See ECF No. 281. After another appeal to the Third Circuit for reasons not directly related to the pending Motions, the case was later reassigned to the undersigned.
Following transfer, in December 2021 the Court held a three-day evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. See ECF Nos. 371, 372, 374. In addition to the briefing and exhibits related to class certification that the parties had submitted in 2019, the parties submitted voluminous exhibits for the Court's consideration ahead of the December 2021 evidentiary hearing, as well as post-hearing briefing. See ECF Nos. 379, 381, 387-389, 393, 39698, 401, 404, 407. During the evidentiary hearing, over 20 witnesses testified, including numerous current and former MLOs, Producing Sales Managers (“PSM”) (the position within Citizens that directly supervises MLOs), and other current and former Citizens' managers. See ECF No. 378. After considering the evidence presented at the hearing and in the parties' voluminous pre-and post-hearing submissions, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, highlighting significant differences between MLOs. See ECF No. 409.
After the Court's denial of Rule 23 class certification, the case progressed, but only as a finally certified FLSA collective action. As best this Court can determine from the record, the definition of the collective finally certified by Judge Schwab in 2017 is “Citizens' mortgage loan officers who, during at least one (1) work week since November 23, 2012, worked more than 40 hours and earned commissions, non-discretionary bonuses, or other premiums.” ECF No. 57 at 1- 2.[1]The FLSA collective consists of 351 opt-in Plaintiffs, who are current or former MLOs. ECF No. 179 at 6. These MLOs worked in 18 different states, with many different managers, and at different times in the past decade. ECF No. 122-7; ECF No. 381, Ex. D-7 (the small sample of opt-ins who identified their managers listed about 60 different managers).
In light of the development of the record since the Court's 2017 decision finally certifying the FLSA collective, Citizens has now filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking the Court to decertify the FLSA collective action. See ECF No. 435. Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion for Reconsideration, seeking reconsideration of the summary judgment dismissal of the recapture claims under the FLSA and the “regular-rate” claims under the PMWA. See ECF No. 436.
A motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Qazizadeh v. Pinnacle Health Sys., 214 F.Supp.3d 292, 295 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Here, the orders that the parties are asking the Court to reconsider are interlocutory orders. Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 912 F.3d 115, 121, 133 (3d Cir. 2018) (); Zurn Indus., LLC v. Allstate Ins., 75 F.4th 321, 326-27 (3d Cir. 2023) (). Rule 54(b) provides that interlocutory orders “may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.”
Unlike final orders, which are governed by Rule 59(e), a court may reconsider an interlocutory order “even if the movant cannot show an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court issued the underlying order, or ‘the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.'” See Qazizadeh, 214 F.Supp.3d at 295 (quoting Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). Rather, a district court may reconsider an interlocutory order whenever it is “consonant with justice” to do so. In re Anthanassious, 418 Fed.Appx. 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Cir. 1973)). This discretion must be exercised “in a responsible way, both procedurally and substantively” with “a presumption against reconsideration of interlocutory decisions.” Id. at 95-96. Although a court “has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own,” it “should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.” In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 439 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988)).
A party seeking reconsideration of an interlocutory order must establish good cause for doing so. Qazizadeh, 214 F.Supp.3d at 295. Good cause will not exist when such a motion is “used as a means to reargue matters already argued,” is merely “an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and the litigant,” is nothing more than a “second bite at the apple,” or raises “new arguments or evidence that could have been proffered prior to the issuance of the order in question.” Qazizadeh, 214 F.Supp.3d at 295-96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Citizens asks the Court to reconsider its decision to finally certify an FLSA collective action in light of the new evidence from the evidentiary hearing regarding Rule 23 class certification. Citizens asserts that the opt-in MLOs are not similarly situated, as required for final certification of a collective, because significant differences exist between the opt-ins including “(1) disparate factual and employment settings, (2) potential defenses, and (3) fairness and procedural considerations.” ECF No. 435-1 at 7. Citizens notes that evidence from the evidentiary hearing undermines the position that managers consistently applied a common employer practice of discouraging MLOs from recording their overtime.
In light of the new evidence cited by Citizens, the Court finds that there is good cause for reconsidering whether final certification of the FLSA collective action was appropriate. See Qazizadeh, 214 F.Supp.3d at 295. The Court may reconsider its certification decision based on new evidence and developments in the record. See Thiessen v. Gen Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1108 (10th Cir. 2001) (“A district court considering a motion to certify [or decertify] is entitled to look...
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