Reinstatement of Leaf, In re, 94-2181

• Decision Date: 23 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-2181,94-2181
• Citation: 41 F.3d 281
• Parties: In re the Matter of REINSTATEMENT of Linda A. LEAF, Petitioner-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 281

41 F.3d 281

In re the Matter of REINSTATEMENT of Linda A. LEAF Petitioner-Appellant.

No. 94-2181.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Oct. 24, 1994.

Decided Nov. 23, 1994.

Charles L. Ollivier, Waukegan, IL (argued), for Linda A. Leaf.

Warren D. Weinstein, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Wisconsin Dept. of Justice, Madison, WI, for Wisconsin Bd. of Attys. Professional Responsibility.

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and BAUER, Circuit Judge, and WILL, District Judge. ^*

WILL, District Judge.

On November 18, 1991, Linda A. Leaf's license to practice law in Wisconsin was suspended for six months. As a result, Leaf also was suspended from practice before the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Two years later Leaf filed a petition for reinstatement to practice before the federal bar, which the district court denied. She appeals this decision. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 1991, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Leaf's license for six months, finding that Leaf had engaged in professional misconduct. ¹ In addition to the six month suspension, the court also issued an order assessing costs in the amount of $31,396.16. Pursuant to this order, Leaf was directed to pay the costs within sixty days or demonstrate her inability to pay. Leaf did not comply with this order. Instead, approximately six months later, Leaf filed a petition for reinstatement with the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In the petition, she noted that she had complied with all of the terms of the suspension, except she had not paid the costs "due to her inability to acquire (earn or borrow) the required amount." Thereafter, the court ordered that Leaf demonstrate her inability to pay costs. After Leaf failed to provide information about her financial situation, the court ordered that the petition for reinstatement be held in abeyance until Leaf complied with the terms of the suspension order.

Although Leaf eventually submitted a financial statement to the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility ("BAPR"), the BAPR considered the information incomplete and requested additional information. Leaf submitted a response, but after finding the answers incomplete, the BAPR sent a letter to Leaf requesting more information. Leaf never responded to that letter. As a result, her petition for reinstatement has not been considered further by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and she remains suspended from the Wisconsin bar. As of oral argument, Leaf had not paid the costs, nor had she demonstrated her inability to pay.

When Leaf was suspended from the Wisconsin bar, she was also suspended from the Eastern District of Wisconsin pursuant to Local Rule 2.05(b). Local Rule 2.05(b) provides in relevant part:

Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (a), upon learning that any attorney admitted to practice in this court has been disbarred or suspended from practice (other than for the nonpayment of dues) by the highest court of any state in which the attorney is licensed, the court shall suspend the attorney from practice before this court. The attorney shall thereupon be afforded a hearing as to reinstatement within thirty (30) days from the date of mailing of a notice of suspension and of the provisions of this rule.

In November 1993, Leaf brought a petition for reinstatement to practice before the Eastern District of Wisconsin. In her petition, she stated that she had complied with the terms of her state suspension, except for paying the costs, and did not owe any costs to the federal bar. Therefore, she asserted that "[n]o just cause exists for her continued suspension" from the federal bar.

After holding a hearing, the district court denied Leaf's petition. The court recognized that ordinarily it was required to give great deference to the disciplinary proceedings of a state. However, the court also noted that the Supreme Court in Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917), listed three conditions under which a federal court could admit an attorney to practice despite a state court judgment to the contrary. These conditions are present when: 1) the state procedure is wanting in due process due to a lack of notice or opportunity to be heard; 2) the facts found suffer from an infirmity of proof; or 3) "some other grave reason" exists to allow admission of the attorney to the federal bar. Id. at 51, 37 S.Ct. at 379.

Leaf argued that because her failure to pay the costs did not bear a relation to her fitness to practice law, there was no serious reason why she remained suspended from the Wisconsin bar, and thus a grave reason existed for her readmission into the federal bar. The district court rejected this argument, finding that Leaf's non-compliance with an order of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was not the type of "non-serious, non-grave matter, which does not cast doubt upon her fitness to practice before this Court."

Leaf then filed a petition for reconsideration. Apparently, Leaf had expressly reserved any due process or infirmity of proof arguments pending the court's determination of the cost issue. She presented these arguments in her petition for reconsideration. In this petition, she also claimed that, based on the Court's decision in Selling, the court was required to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on the issues of due process and infirmity of proof before denying her petition.

The district court denied the motion for reconsideration and the request for a hearing. The court stated that Leaf had misconstrued Selling because that decision does not automatically require an evidentiary hearing. In addition, the court noted that Leaf had presented essentially the same arguments to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit in prior cases. See Leaf, 164 Wis.2d at 458, 476 N.W.2d 13; Leaf v. Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, 979 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2417, 124 L.Ed.2d 639 (1993). The court concluded that

[r]eview of these proceedings, the proceedings in related cases, and the parties' submissions, including Leaf's objections, do not lead the Court to the "clear conviction"--or even a slight suspicion--that the state court proceedings were so devoid of due process, or so devoid of sufficient proof, that this Court cannot "accept as final the [state court's] conclusion" on Leaf's fitness to practice. The Court's review has reached that point where it is confident in the outcome and satisfied that Leaf's suspension was consistent with "principles of right and justice."

In re The Matter of Reinstatement of Leaf, 849 F.Supp. 1284, 1287 (E.D.Wis.1994). Leaf then brought this appeal.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Leaf first argues that the district court erred by violating the terms of Local Rule 2.05. Leaf agrees that the Eastern District of Wisconsin's Local Rule 2.05(b) requires the Eastern District to suspend an attorney from practicing before it upon learning that the attorney has been suspended from practice by the highest court of any state in which the attorney is licensed. Leaf contends, however, that she has served her six month suspension in state court and the only reason she remains suspended is because of her failure to pay costs. She states that "[t]he order for her federal bar suspension was specifically for six months and no conditions for reinstatement were imposed. The six months having past two years ago, she has met the requirements of the federal suspension."

In making this argument, Leaf...