Reintsma v. Lawson
| Decision Date | 09 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-155,86-155 |
| Parties | Kenneth REINTSMA, Ronald Haverlandt, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Albert LAWSON and Dana Yatsko, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Cotter & Cotter, Patricia O'Brien Cotter, Great Falls, for defendants and appellants.
Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, K Dale Schwanke, Great Falls, for plaintiffs and respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District in and for the County of Cascade, Montana, granting plaintiffs injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
The plaintiffs and defendant Albert Lawson are all property owners in the Cooper Valley Estate subdivision located in Cascade County. This subdivision is a residential development, apparently comprised only of multi-acre lots designed to afford a convenient, rustic environment in which to live. To this end, each lot is subject to a number of restrictive covenants designed to maintain, as much as possible, the area's pristine state. The covenants expressly prohibit comprehensive logging operations.
In June, 1984, Lawson sought and obtained a consent certificate from the Cooper Valley Owners Association allowing him to remove from his property diseased and over-aged timber.
Plaintiffs, however, ultimately concluded that Lawson was removing far more than simply diseased and over-mature timber and so eventually filed this action in District Court. They sought as relief a permanent injunction enjoining defendant from conducting further logging operations within the development, compensatory damages for the diminution in value of their property, punitive damages and costs.
Lawson counterclaimed, alleging generally that in pursuing this litigation, plaintiffs were converting for their own use the assets of Cooper Valley Estates, Incorporated, a corporation mostly comprised of the subdivision's property owners. Lawson also claimed that plaintiffs' suit was frivolous and sought punitive damages.
The District Court held a bench trial in March, 1985. Though the record is incomplete, plaintiffs evidently withdrew their prayer for compensatory damages at the conclusion of trial.
On November 7, 1985, the court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therein, the court found that Lawson's activities went beyond the scope of the consent certificate and had violated the restrictive covenants. The court concluded that Lawson was permanently enjoined from conducting any further logging operations within the development. The court further found that Lawson was responsible for rehabilitating his property, the cost of which was at a minimum $30,000, and that the counterclaims brought by Lawson were without merit. Finally, the court directed that the plaintiffs should recover an award of costs and attorney's fees and instructed plaintiffs to submit an affidavit detailing these fees.
Believing the court's entry of its findings and conclusions constituted entry of judgment, Lawson filed, on November 21, a motion to amend the court's findings or for a new trial. In support of his motion, Lawson filed his own affidavit which indicated that between the time the trial was held in March and the time the court entered its findings and conclusions in November, he had spent over $43,000 on the rehabilitation of his own property.
Before any action was taken on this motion, however, the court issued on November 27, 1985, a "Judgment Entered Pursuant to Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of November 7, 1985." Here, the court, in addition to awarding plaintiffs' injunctive relief, awarded plaintiffs $30,000 in compensatory damages and stated that a hearing would be held to determine any rights to attorney's fees.
Both parties filed motions to amend this judgment. On December 6, 1985, plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to Lawson's motion to amend or for a new trial which he had earlier filed on November 21. Plaintiffs further filed their own motion to amend the court's findings, requesting both that the court award plaintiffs punitive damages and that it award plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiffs additionally filed a motion to strike Lawson's affidavit filed November 21 and, finally, filed affidavits detailing their attorney's fees and costs.
On December 9, Lawson filed a supplementary motion for new trial.
On December 13, 1985, the District Court held a hearing on the various motions and pleadings filed by the parties. Six days later it issued its order. The court, reiterating its earlier finding that Lawson's counterclaims were without merit, held that plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages and awarded such damages "by way of compensating the plaintiffs for their attorney's fees and costs incurred in the proceedings." The court, however, awarded only one-half of plaintiffs' requested $25,000 attorney's fees, so that the punitive damage award was limited to $12,500, plus plaintiffs' costs.
Finally, on January 6, 1986, the District Court entered its "Final Judgment." In this judgment, the court first restated that Lawson was enjoined from any further logging operations within the Cooper Valley Estates subdivision. The court then awarded plaintiffs' damages totalling over $46,000: $30,000 in compensatory damages; $12,500 attorney's fees; and $4,190.49 in costs.
Lawson now appeals the court's entry of its November 27 judgment and its award of compensatory and punitive damages; he does not appeal the adequacy of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law entered November 7.
Plaintiffs cross-appeal the court's award of only one-half of the attorney's fees sought.
Appellant first argues that the District Court abused its discretion by substituting its initial November 7 judgment with its subsequent, altered judgment of November 27. This argument is of course based upon the premise that entry of the November 7 findings and conclusions constituted entry of a judgment. We disagree.
As noted, in its November 7 findings and conclusions, the court found that Lawson was responsible for the rehabilitation of his property, the cost of which was at least $30,000. The court further concluded as a matter of law that Lawson was permanently enjoined from conducting any further logging within the area. The findings and conclusions ended with the sentence, "Let judgment be entered accordingly." On November 8, the clerk of court entered in the judgment docket the court's findings and conclusions.
Then on November 27, the court issued its judgment entered pursuant to its findings and conclusions. There, the court, in addition to enjoining defendant's further logging operations, awarded plaintiffs $30,000 compensatory...
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Tillett v. Lippert
...is not linked to the exemplary punishment of the defendant as is the purpose of deterrence. This Court, in Reintsma v. Lawson (1986), 223 Mont. 520, 525, 727 P.2d 1323, 1326, refused to award attorney fees and costs under the guise of punitive damages even though the Court determined that a......
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