Reisborph v. Division of Employment

• Decision Date: 30 November 1999
• Citation: Reisborph v. Division of Employment, 8 S.W.3d 169 (Mo. App. 1999)
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 1999) Kathleen Reisdorph, Appellant, v. Division of Employment Security, Respondent. WD56629
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

8 S.W.3d 169 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999)

Kathleen Reisdorph, Appellant, v. Division of Employment Security, Respondent.

WD56629

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

11/30/99

Appeal From: Labor and Industrial Relations Commission

Counsel for Appellant: Mark A. Buchanan

Counsel for Respondent: Sharon A. Willis

Opinion Summary: Kathleen Reisdorph appeals a decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying her request to backdate her claim for unemployment benefits.

Because the concept of "good cause" is rooted in equity and justice, the Division of Employment Security may exercise its discretion to backdate a claim in order to prevent an unjust hardship or forfeiture. Here, however, Reisdorph delayed filing during her negotiations with her former employer for an enhanced severance package and purposely chose not to file until after those negotiations ended. The Commission did not err in finding that Reisdorph did not have good cause for delaying her registration for unemployment compensation where the delay was voluntary and purposeful. It was not necessary to backdate Reisdorph's claim in order to avoid an injustice or grave hardship. Thus, the Commission did not abuse its discretion by refusing to backdate the claim.

Riederer, P.J., Smart and Ellis, JJ., concur.

PER CURIAM

Kathleen Reisdorph appeals a decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") denying her request to backdate her claim for unemployment benefits. Reisdorph claims that, as a matter of law, she had good cause to delay filing for unemployment benefits, and therefore it was error to deny her request to backdate her claim.

The decision of the Commission is affirmed.

Factual Background

Kathleen Reisdorph was employed as a practice administrator for Columbia Physician Services at Columbia Independence Regional Medical Center ("Columbia") until September 5, 1997. Reisdorph was laid off as the result of a reduction in the work force. After her termination, a dispute arose with Columbia regarding the amount of Reisdorph's severance pay and bonus.

On September 5, 1997, the date of her termination, Reisdorph received a proposed written release and severance agreement from Columbia. The proposed severance agreement offered her severance pay, and required her to acknowledge that she was voluntarily resigning her employment and would not claim unemployment compensation.

On September 19, 1997, Reisdorph wrote to Columbia, demanding a $10,500.00 bonus, six months' severance pay and other compensation for her termination totaling $57,918.90. Columbia responded on October 13, 1997. Columbia stated that if Reisdorph would sign the severance agreement and a general release, she would receive three months' severance pay. If Reisdorph elected not to sign the severance agreement and a general release, she would be paid for two months. Columbia notified Reisdorph that the offer to pay her three months' severance pay would remain open for three weeks from the date of the letter.

Reisdorph continued attempts to negotiate further, but was unable to change Columbia's posture. On December 10, 1997, Reisdorph accepted the severance payment of two months' salary, and declined to sign the proposed release agreement.

Reisdorph received two months of severance pay from Columbia on December 12, 1997. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Division of Employment Security ("Division"), effective December 14, 1997, and requested that her benefit year be backdated to September 28, 1997.¹ On December 18, 1997, a deputy determined that Reisdorph's benefit year began on December 14, 1997. Reisdorph appealed this determination, and on January 23, 1998, a hearing was held before the Appeals Referee. The Appeals Referee affirmed the deputy's decision, and on April 23, 1998, the Commission issued an order affirming the decision of the Appeals Tribunal.

In a prior appeal, Reisdorph appealed the Commission's order to this court. This court ordered that the Commission's decision be set aside on the ground that the Division had applied an improper definition of "good cause" in making its determination because it had not applied common law principles of "good cause" in accordance with PharmFlex, Inc. v. Division of Employment Sec., 964 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. App. 1998). We remanded the matter with directions to enter a new decision applying the common law principles of "good cause" in accordance with the decision in PharmFlex, 964 S.W.2d 825, and King v. Division of Employment Sec., 964 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. App. 1998). On remand, the Commission again concluded that Reisdorph's benefit year began on December 14, 1997, finding that she lacked "good cause" for delaying her filing for unemployment benefits. Reisdorph appeals.

In her sole point on appeal, Reisdorph argues that the Commission erred in finding that she did not have "good cause" for delaying her registration for unemployment compensation benefits until December 14, 1997. Reisdorph claims that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, in that she was negotiating an enhanced severance package with Columbia and believed, in good faith, that it would be counter-productive and unethical for her to file for unemployment benefits during the negotiations.

Standard of Review

Reisdorph's appeal assumes that the decision whether to allow backdating of a claim leaves no room for agency discretion. She views the matter as being purely one of law. If that were true, we would have had no need to remand this case for consideration in light of Pharmflex, because there are no factual issues in this case. Our review of the Commission's determination that Reisdorph did not have good cause to delay filing for unemployment benefits is only for an abuse of discretion. "The determination of good cause is addressed in the first instance to the sound discretion of the administrative agency, it depends on the evaluation of many subtle factors, and that determination is subject to judicial review only for abuse of discretion." Bishop v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 567 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Mo. App. 1978). See also PharmFlex, 964 S.W.2d at 832; Mosca v. Missouri Dept. of Labor & Indus. Relations, 924 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Mo. App. 1996). An abuse of discretion occurs only where the outcome is "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." State ex rel. Webster v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Mo. banc 1988). Where it is possible for reasonable minds to differ as to the propriety of the Commission's decision, there is not an abuse of discretion. Id.

"Good Cause"

The Appeals Referee found that Reisdorph did not show good cause for postponing filing her claim for benefits. The Commission affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee. The filing of an initial claim for unemployment benefits establishes a "benefit year." Section 288.030.1(3), RSMo Supp. 1998, defines a benefit year as:

the one-year period beginning with the first day of the first week with respect to...