Reisch v. McGuigan

Decision Date10 August 1990
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 85-3735-WF.
Citation745 F. Supp. 56
PartiesAlbert REISCH, et al. v. James D. McGUIGAN, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

David G. Hanrahan, Gilman, McLaughlin & Hanrahan, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Paul J. Gillespie, Driscoll, Gillespie & Stanton, Lynnfield, Mass., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WOLF, District Judge.

This case arises out of an automobile accident occurring October 4, 1984 in Quebec, Canada. Defendants, who are a Massachusetts resident and corporation, have moved for summary judgment on grounds that the Quebec Automobile Insurance Act (the "Act") provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs' injury. For the reasons stated below, the court holds that Massachusetts law applies to this suit and that the Act does not bar plaintiffs' action in this court.

I. FACTS

The following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs Scott Reisch and his parents Albert and Pamela Reisch are all residents of New Jersey. Defendant James McGuigan is a resident of Massachusetts. Defendant W.P. Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Substitute Rent-A-Car ("Substitute"), is a Massachusetts corporation doing business in Massachusetts. Complaint at ¶¶ 1-5 (October 4, 1985).

On October 6, 1984, Scott Reisch was picked up by McGuigan at Logan Airport in a car owned and rented by Substitute. Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 1 (September 11, 1986) (hereinafter "Stip."). Reisch and McGuigan had previously met when doubledating with their girlfriends, who were roommates at a college in Massachusetts. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at Ex. 2, p. 10 (Deposition of Scott Reisch) (November 26, 1986) (hereinafter "Def. Mem."). Reisch was not a resident of or student in Massachusetts. Id. at pp. 10-11. Reisch and McGuigan proceeded to drive to Canada, where McGuigan was going to visit his relatives. While in the province of Quebec and while McGuigan was driving, the vehicle left the road and rolled down an embankment. Stip. at ¶ 2-4. Reisch was thrown from the vehicle and seriously injured. Reisch has incurred over $60,000 in medical expenses as a result of the accident, suffers permanent partial paralysis of his left shoulder and arm, and has sustained some memory loss. Id. at ¶ 6.

On October 4, 1985, plaintiffs filed the instant action in this court, alleging negligence and loss of affection. On October 28, 1986, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs were restricted to recovery under the Quebec Automobile Insurance Act. Plaintiffs opposed. On October 7, 1987, Reisch filed a claim for compensation under the Quebec Automobile Insurance Act, a comprehensive no-fault scheme whose provisions will be described in greater detail infra. Affidavit of David Hanrahan at ¶ 2(a) (November 1, 1989). Reisch has received $30,323.44 (US) in compensation for lost earnings, travel expenses and permanent injuries under the Act. Id.

This court subsequently instructed the parties to brief whether plaintiffs' recovery under the Act stripped them of standing to maintain this action. Memorandum and Order (September 2, 1988). The court expressed its belief in that order that Massachusetts law governs this action. Id. (citing O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13, 22-26 (1986); Thomas v. Hanmer, 109 A.D.2d 80, 489 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803-07 (1985)). As explained at the hearing on June 7, 1990, the court has decided to reaffirm that belief and to conclude that plaintiffs' recovery under the Act does not preclude them from maintaining the instant action.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard

In diversity actions such as this, federal courts must look to the forum state's choice of law rules to determine the governing law. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). Because there are no material facts in dispute on this question, the choice of law issue can be decided on defendants' summary judgment motion, as can any questions of Quebec law presented under Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1. See, e.g., Freeman v. World Airways, Inc., 596 F.Supp. 841, 843 (D.Mass.1984) (determining choice of law on motion for partial summary judgment); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (determining questions of foreign law in summary judgment proceeding).

B. The Quebec Automobile Insurance Act

The Act, which went into force in 1978, provides a no-fault, comprehensive plan of compensation for Quebec residents injured in automobile accidents in any location and nonresidents injured in automobile accidents in Quebec. R.S.Q. Ch. A-25. Indemnities are distributed by the Regie de l'assurance automobile du Quebec (the "Regie") and cover lost income, medical expenses, injury, disfigurement, suffering and loss of enjoyment. Id. at §§ 19, 44, 45. Compensation for the last four categories is subject to a $20,000 (Can.) statutory cap. Id. at § 44.

Section 4 of the Act eliminates common law actions for compensation, subject to certain exceptions which will be discussed below. It provides, in relevant part:

The indemnities provided for in this title are in place and stead of all rights, recourses, and rights of action of any one by reason of bodily injury caused by an automobile and no action in that respect shall be admitted before any court of justice.

Section 7, however, provides that a Quebec resident who is injured outside of Quebec retains any rights to recovery he has under the law of the place of injury, and that the Regie is subrogated to such rights to the extent it has paid his claim:

The victim of an accident that occurred outside Quebec who is entitled to the compensation provided for in this title may benefit by it while retaining his rights of action with regard to the excess under the law of the place where the accident occurred.
Notwithstanding section 4, the Regie, where it compensates a victim under this section, is subrogated in the victim's rights and is entitled to recover the compensation and the capital representing the pensions that the Regie is thereby required to pay from any person not resident in Quebec who, under the law of the place where the accident occurred, is responsible, and from any person liable for compensation for bodily injury caused in the accident by such non-resident.

Section 8 authorizes the compensation of a nonresident injured in Quebec, provided that he was not responsible for the accident and that his native government does not have an agreement with the Regie barring such indemnity.

Section 9 empowers the Regie to seek recovery from any nonresident who causes an accident in Quebec for any compensation the Regie has paid to victims of the accident. This subrogation clause provides in relevant part:

Notwithstanding section 4, the Regie, where it compensates a victim by reason of an accident that occurred in Quebec, is subrogated in the victim's rights and is entitled to recover the indemnities and the capital representing the pensions that the Regie is thereby required to pay from any person not resident in Quebec who is responsible for such accident to the extent that he is responsible therefor and from any person liable for compensation of bodily injury caused in the said accident by such non-resident.
C. Choice of Law

The first question presented to the court is whether Massachusetts or Quebec substantive law governs this action.1 The court holds that Massachusetts law governs the creation and maintenance of plaintiffs' right of action in the instant case.

In Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976), which arose out of an automobile accident in New York, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court abandoned the state's strict adherence to the traditional doctrine of lex loci delicti. 371 Mass. at 360, 358 N.E.2d 416. While noting that this rule "will continue to provide a rational and just procedure for selecting the law governing the vast majority of issues in multi-State tort suits," Id. at 359, 358 N.E.2d 416, the SJC relied heavily on the landmark New York case of Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963), in determining that the lex loci delicti may not govern all issues in a tort case. "Where the issue involves standards of conduct, it is more than likely that it is the law of the place of the tort which will be controlling but the disposition of other issues must turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the law of the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented." Id. at 360, 358 N.E.2d 416 (quoting Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 484, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279). Thus, different laws could apply to different aspects of a case, depending on which state has the dominant interest in their resolution. See Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983).

Following the above reasoning, the Pevoski Court determined that Massachusetts law should govern the issue of interspousal immunity in that case, because the Commonwealth was the domicile of the parties and "the economic and social impact of the litigation will fall on Massachusetts domiciliaries and a Massachusetts insurer." 371 Mass. at 360, 358 N.E.2d 416. According to the Court, the rights and liabilities of the parties stemming from their spousal relationship should not change due to "the fortuitous occurrence of the accident" in New York. Id. (quoting Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279).

Since Pevoski, the SJC has refused to bind itself to a single choice of law doctrine. See, e.g., Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 541, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979). "As with our tort cases, we decide here not to tie Massachusetts conflicts law to any specific choice-of-law doctrine, but seek instead a functional choice-of-law approach that responds to the interests of the parties, the States involved, and the interstate system as a whole.... We,...

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