Reisdorff v. County of Yellowstone, 99-037.

• Decision Date: 23 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-037.,99-037.
• Citation: 1999 MT 280,989 P.2d 850
• Parties: Linda K. REISDORFF, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF YELLOWSTONE, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

989 P.2d 850

1999 MT 280

Linda K. REISDORFF, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF YELLOWSTONE, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. 99-037.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs July 22, 1999.

Decided November 23, 1999.

Timothy J. Whalen, Whalen & Whalen; Billings, Montana, for Appellant.

Richard J. Carstensen, Attorney at Law; Billings, Montana, Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; Casey Heitz, Deputy County Attorney; Billings, Montana, Robert K. Baldwin, Goetz, Gallik, Baldwin & Dolan, P.C.; Bozeman, Montana, for Respondents.

Justice TERRY N. TRIEWEILER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Plaintiff, Linda Reisdorff, filed this action in the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District in Yellowstone County to recover damages from the Defendants for conversion, trespass, and violation of her constitutional rights. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Defendants. Reisdorff appeals from the judgment of the District Court. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

¶ 2 Although the Appellant raises a number of issues, we limit our consideration to the following two:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err when it awarded summary judgment pursuant to 41(e), M.R.Civ.P. to those Defendants who were not served with a summons issued within one year from the commencement of the action?

¶ 4 2. Did the District Court err when it awarded summary judgment to governmental Defendants and the employees of those governmental entities based on quasi-judicial immunity?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The events which form the basis for this case began in 1992 when Yellowstone County Animal Control Officer, John Fleming, investigated Reisdorff's treatment of her animals. In his affidavit, Fleming stated that on July 24, 1992, in response to complaints of animal cruelty, he searched Reisdorff's property. Assisting Fleming was Darlene Larson from the Billings Animal Shelter (BAS) and David Pauli of the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS). According to Fleming's affidavit, he, Larson, and Pauli found 300 animals on Reisdorff's property, including 90 dogs. Fleming impounded, examined, and returned six of Reisdorff's dogs. Fleming searched Reisdorff's property again on August 7, 1992. Fleming stated in his affidavit that during that search, Reisdorff asked him to take three of her dogs. He stated that he took the dogs to a veterinarian who recommended that they be destroyed because of their poor physical condition.

¶ 6 According to Reisdorff's affidavit, she did not consent to either of Fleming's searches of her property. She stated that if Fleming was granted permission at all it was from her husband, who she believed instigated the State's investigation to punish her for seeking a divorce.

¶ 7 In his affidavit, Fleming stated that each time he searched the property it was with the consent of either Reisdorff, the justice of the peace, or Reisdorff's husband.

¶ 8 After Fleming's two searches of Reisdorff's property, the State charged Reisdorff with one count of cruelty to animals on August 24, 1992.

¶ 9 Three days later on August 27, 1992, the justice of the peace issued an order impounding nearly 300 animals located on Reisdorff's property. The order required Reisdorff to feed, water, and care for the animals; to permit Animal Control reasonable access to ensure that the animals were properly cared for; and to obtain the consent of Fleming before disposing of any animals.

¶ 10 Subsequently, the State and Reisdorff agreed that the State would reduce its charge to a "warning" if Reisdorff met certain conditions. Pursuant to this agreement, on March 12, 1993, the Justice of the Peace ordered Reisdorff to reduce the number of animals on her property to: 15 dogs, 4 horses, and 2 cows. The order also required Reisdorff to find adequate homes for those animals she was unable to keep; to improve the "housing" for those she kept; and to obtain a kennel permit through the BAS.

¶ 11 After the Court ordered Reisdorff to reduce the number of her animals, according to Fleming's affidavit, he made several attempts to inspect Reisdorff's property, but Reisdorff refused to admit him. The reason, according to Reisdorff's affidavit, was that when Fleming inspected her property in August 1992, he introduced Parvo, an infectious disease, which resulted in the death of 28 of her dogs. Reisdorff stated that she would allow county officials to inspect her property when they made an appointment and she was present.

¶ 12 Fleming stated in his affidavit that because Reisdorff refused to allow them on her property, he and Jeffrey Michael, a deputy county attorney, met with the justice of the peace to discuss the difficulty of enforcing the Court's order. Michael stated in his affidavit that he proposed an order to the justice of the peace because Reisdorff would not permit inspection of her property. The justice of the peace signed the proposed order on June 3, 1993. Reisdorff stated in her affidavit that she was not notified of the meeting and was not present.

¶ 13 The June 3, 1993 order contained the same provisions as the previous order but added that upon the Animal Control's request, Reisdorff was to grant inspection of her property immediately; that if she unreasonably refused inspection, the requesting officer was authorized to arrest her for contempt; and that if violations of the original Court order were found on Reisdorff's property, Animal Control officials "may take steps it deems necessary to bring the defendant into compliance." According to Michael's affidavit, Fleming asked the justice of the peace if it was permissible, based on the order, to seize some or all of the remaining animals. Michael stated that the justice of the peace gave both Fleming and him full permission to seize, remove, retain, and treat any or all of the remaining animals on Reisdorff's property at the discretion of the animal control officer pursuant to Michael's proposed order.

¶ 14 Reisdorff stated in her affidavit that she had scheduled an appointment with Fleming to inspect her property on June 7, 1993. However, according to Reisdorff, before the meeting took place and while Reisdorff was not present, Fleming entered Reisdorff's property without notice on June 4, 1993. Fleming stated in his affidavit that on June 4, 1993, he and other interested individuals inspected Reisdorff's property. He stated that he inventoried 169 animals. Of those he impounded 108. He stated that he then moved the impounded animals to the Billings Animal Shelter (BAS)

¶ 15 On June 7, 1993, the justice of the peace held a meeting in his chambers to discuss the impounded animals. According to Fleming's affidavit the meeting was attended by Fleming, Michael, Pauli, and Chris Thimsen, who was Reisdorff's lawyer at the time. Fleming stated that those in attendance discussed the disposition of Reisdorff's animals, including the possibility of private adoption and euthanasia. According to Fleming, the justice of the peace stated that Reisdorff was allowed no more than 15 dogs.

¶ 16 After June 4, 1993, Fleming stated in his affidavit, that he inspected Reisdorff's property several times and found no violations. On December 6, 1993, the justice of the peace quashed the conditions of the March 12, 1993 order and dismissed the State's charge against Reisdorff with prejudice.

¶ 17 Reisdorff filed a complaint on September 20, 1994 against: Yellowstone County; the City of Billings; the Yellowstone County Sheriff's Office of Animal Control; the Billings Animal Shelter; John Fleming; Darlene Larson; Scott Lance of the BAS; and Does 1 through 10. Reisdorff claimed that the Defendants exceeded the scope of their authority and unlawfully impounded and euthanized her animals. In her complaint, Reisdorff alleged two counts:(1) that the Defendants trespassed and converted her property, and (2) that the Defendants violated her rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, which entitles her to recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, -85, -86, and -88. On September 20, 1994, the clerk issued a summons for each of the named Defendants.

¶ 18 On February 13, 1995, the District Court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to Fleming, Larson, and Lance but denied the motion with respect to the City of Billings and Yellowstone County.

¶ 19 On April 14, 1997, with leave of the District Court, Reisdorff amended her complaint to substitute named Defendants for the Doe Defendants. Her amended complaint listed the same Defendants as her original complaint and it replaced the Doe Defendants with the Animal Welfare League (AWL) and its representative, Vicki Brewster; and the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) and its representative, David Pauli. Reisdorff alleged that Pauli and Brewster acted in concert with the original Defendants. She also alleged that all of the Defendants had defamed her. On December 22, 1997, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the substituted Defendants concluding that summonses for the Doe Defendants had not been issued within one year as required by 41(e), M.R.Civ.P. Subsequently, on October 21, 1998, the District Court granted the original Defendants' motion for summary judgement concluding that each was entitled to judicial immunity.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 20 We review appeals from summary judgment de novo. Motarie v. Northern Montana Joint Refuse Disposal Dist. (1995), 274 Mont. 239, 242, 907 P.2d 154, 156; Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782, 785. When we review a district court's order which grants summary judgment, we apply the same standards as the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903. In Bruner, we set forth the following procedure for deciding and reviewing summary judgment issues:

The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists.

...