Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC
Decision Date | 20 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 2000-306-Appeal.,2000-306-Appeal. |
Citation | 774 A.2d 826 |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Parties | Jan REITSMA et al. v. PASCOAG RESERVOIR & DAM, LLC. |
Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Michael L. Rubin, Alan Shoer, Providence, Joseph S. Larisa, Jr., for Plaintiff.
Barry J. Kusinitz, John B. Webster, Warwick, for Defendant.
Can the state government involuntarily divest owners of private property other than by eminent domain or by condemnation? Yes, we hold, because, like private parties, the government itself can acquire an easement by prescription or title by adverse possession over property that was otherwise privately owned during the period of the taking. To do so, it must establish actual, open, notorious, hostile, and continuous use of the property under a claim of right for ten years, as required by G.L.1956 § 34-7-1. See, e.g., Talbot v. Town of Little Compton, 52 R.I. 280, 286, 160 A. 466, 469 (1932) ( ).
In this case, acting through an executive department now known as the Department of Environmental Management, the state1 built a boat ramp in 1965 on a waterfront lot that it acquired in1964. The property and the boat ramp abutted an artificially created body of water called Echo Lake in Glocester. Although the record does not reveal exactly when it did so, the state also erected and maintained signs near the boat ramp that purported to regulate the public's use of the lot, the ramp, and the lake. At all times material to this case, the defendant corporation, Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC (corporation) — or one of its predecessors in title — has been Echo Lake's owner of record. For thirty-two years, from 1965 through 1997, the state maintained and operated its lakeside property so that members of the public could park their vehicles there and then use the ramp as a point of access to the lake for various recreational activities, including boating and fishing. Over that period, innumerable members of the public and other lakeside property owners have used the ramp as a means of access to the lake for such purposes — without interruption, objection, or interference by the corporation or by any of its predecessors in title. Not until 1997 — when it posted a "NO TRESPASSING" sign — did the corporation — or, for that matter, any of the lake's previous owners — communicate any objection to the state's or to the public's use of this boat ramp as a means for boats to access the lake for recreational purposes.
Nevertheless, a Superior Court trial justice — after reviewing the evidence in a nonjury trial — rejected the state's claim to having adversely possessed the lake-bottom property beneath the boat ramp and to having acquired, on behalf of the public, a prescriptive easement to the use of the ramp for lake access. The court concluded that the state's placement of a substantial portion of the ramp on the bottom of the lake and the public's use thereof had been merely permissive. More specifically, the trial justice found that the state had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the collective or individual use of the ramp for access to the lake had been pursued under a claim of right or that it was inany way hostile, open, notorious, or adverse to the interests of the lake owners. For the reasons prescribed below, these conclusions, we hold, were clearly erroneous and, therefore, must be reversed.
We reproduce, in pertinent part, the facts and travel of the case, as found by the trial justice and included in his decision of the case:
"Other issues arose during this time frame which caused a justice of this Court to issue an order temporarily restraining the Corporation from altering the water levels of the lake without permission from the State's Department of Environmental Management." In addition, the trial court found as follows:
After the corporation posted its no-trespassing sign in 1997, the state filed a complaint and petition for injunctive relief against the defendant corporation. The state alleged violations of the Freshwater Wetlands Act, G.L.1956 §§ 2-1-18 through 2-1-24, and asserted that it had acquired an easement to the lake by virtue of, inter alia, the doctrines of easement by prescription and adverse possession. The corporation soon answered and filed a counterclaim alleging inverse condemnation, trespass, and violations of its substantive due process rights pursuant to the federal and state constitutions and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Over the corporation's objection and in response to the state's motion to do so, the court severed the state's allegations pertaining to the violations of the Freshwater Wetlands Act from the rest of this case. The trial justice also voluntarily dismissed the corporation's inverse condemnation claim, without prejudice. Thereafter, at the conclusion of the trial, it entered apartial final judgment in favor of the corporation under Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The state has appealed from this judgment.
We have long recognized that "one who claims an easement by prescription has the burden of establishing actual, open, notorious, hostile and continuous use under a claim of right for ten years as required by...
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