Relford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County

Decision Date24 November 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-5600.,03-5600.
PartiesRobert RELFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

James M. Morris, Morris & Morris, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Robert L. Roark, Walther, Roark, Gay & Todd, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Robert L. Roark, Beth A. Bowell, Walther, Roark, Gay & Todd, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

Before: KEITH, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

On August 12, 1998, the Plaintiff-Appellant, Robert Relford, filed a civil complaint in which he charged the Defendant-Appellee, the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government ("County"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with having violated his constitutional rights in the administration of its employee drug testing policies and programs. Relford complains that the County subjected him to an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment by failing to abide by its written procedures and by requiring him to undergo random drug testing. He also claims the County deprived him of due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when, according to him, it constructively discharged him from employment.

Following discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On July 17, 2002, the district court dismissed Relford's due process claims because it determined that he had resigned from his employment voluntarily, had not been constructively discharged, and had received all of the process he was due inasmuch as he was given notice of and an opportunity to respond to the County's petition for his termination. On the same day, the district court granted a period of leave to the parties and called upon them to file additional pleadings addressing whether an arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia constituted reasonable grounds for randomly drug testing a government employee. On March 21, 2003, subsequent to the submission of additional briefing papers by each of the parties, the district court entered a summary judgment as a matter of law in favor of the County after finding that, under the circumstances of this case, the County had reasonable suspicion to support its order requiring Relford to undergo random drug testing.

In this appeal, Relford asserts that the district court erred in awarding summary judgment to the County. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Relford began work as an electrician with the County in July 1993. He, however, was arrested and imprisoned on May 29, 1997, on charges of criminal trespass and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a result of his incarceration, Relford was unable to report to work on the following day, and he commissioned a friend to help him devise an excuse that would innocently explain his absence from work. Shortly thereafter, this friend apparently contacted the County and falsely reported that Relford's absence was due to sickness. Unfortunately for Relford, his supervisor subsequently learned of his arrest and his improper use of sick leave. He suspended Relford for a period of five (5) days and issued him a notification of Reasonable Cause Testing ("RCT").

The issuance of a RCT notice is governed by the County's Alcohol and Drug Free Workplace Guidelines and Procedure Handbook, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Alcohol and Drug Screening shall be conducted under the following circumstances:

...

E. Reasonable Cause Testing (RCT) — Employees will be tested for drugs or alcohol when reasonable suspicion exists to support a belief that the employee is under the influence of drugs or alcohol or that the employee's behavior or work performance has been affected by drugs or alcohol. The basis for the decision shall be documented, in writing, by at least two (2) trained supervisors or by professional law enforcement or medical personnel. A determination will be based upon observation and documentation of:

1. Detection of an alcoholic substance emitting from the employee's breath. This shall include a detection of a "hang-over" odor.

2. Observation(s) of the employee's speech being unusually slurred, or noticeably different without a proper medical reason being given.

3. Observation(s) of the employee's actions or conduct as being noticeably different or impaired and not consistent with normal conduct and without proper explanation.

4. Observation(s) that the employee's appearance, in conjunction with the above, indicates that the employee is impaired.

At the request of the Division Director or the Director of Human Resources, the observed employee may be required to submit to an independent blood/breath/urine test to determine if the employee is impaired. The requested testing is to be done within two (2) hours but no later than eight (8) hours after the observation. All results of such testing will be delivered immediately to the Director of Human Resources.

Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 39. The RCT notice that was issued to Relford directed him to proceed immediately to an urgent treatment center where he would be given a drug and alcohol test. The RCT notice indicated that it was being issued on the basis of his "recent police arrest for `possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia.'" Id. at 45. Inasmuch as his arrest did not include a charge for possession, the RCT notice was technically inaccurate.

Relford refused to submit to the RCT. Claiming that his refusal constituted grounds for dismissal, the County filed charges with the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") requesting that Relford's employment be terminated. On October 15, 1997, the Commission held a hearing, during which it gave the parties an opportunity to present evidence in favor of their respective positions. On the same day, the Commission issued an Order finding that the five-day suspension which had been levied against Relford was justified because his actions constituted an "abuse of sick leave and falsification of a report." Id. at 46. The Commission further found that under the County's drug testing policies and guidelines "reasonable grounds existed for requesting Mr. Relford to submit to a drug test." Id. The Commission, however, opined that the County (1) "failed to adequately advise Mr. Relford of the grounds for which he was requested to take the drug test;" (2) "may have ... misled Mr. Relford as to those grounds and the consequences of his failure to take the test, by and through the obviously inaccurate or defective" notice; and (3) used "guidelines in regard to `reasonable cause testing' [that] are confusing." Id. Thus, the Commission ordered that Relford's discipline "be reduced from dismissal to an additional 30 days suspension," and that he "submit forthwith to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for evaluation for drug dependency." Id.

Relford returned to work and participated in the EAP. The County's EAP is directed exclusively to the "earliest possible diagnosis and treatment for substance or alcohol abuse." Id. at 32. Through the EAP, Relford was subjected to drug dependency counseling and evaluation. More importantly, all EAP participants undergo drug-testing in random order. Contemporaneously with his return to work and participation in the EAP, Relford appealed the Commission's order to the Fayette Circuit Court. On December 1, 1997, while his appeal was pending, Relford was randomly selected for drug testing from among the pool of EAP participants. He submitted to the screening and tested positive for the use of illegal narcotics. On the basis of this test result, the County filed a second petition for Relford's termination with the Commission.

On January 21, 1998, prior to the Commission holding a hearing on the second petition, Relford resigned from his employment with the County, indicating that he had found another job. Nearly six months later (on July 15, 1998), the Fayette Circuit Court reversed the Commission's October 15 order because it determined that the County acted arbitrarily and had not complied with its own drug testing procedures. Relford subsequently filed the present cause of action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.

DISCUSSION

Relford contends that the district court erred in resolving the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment on cross-motions for summary judgment, we apply the same legal standards as the district court. Benefits Comm. of Saint-Gobain Corp. v. Key Trust Co. of Ohio, N.A., 313 F.3d 919, 925 (6th Cir.2002). A request for summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings and evidence "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In evaluating each party's motion, the court must view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir.2001). Because we consider only questions of law, our standard of review is de novo. Benefits Comm. of Saint-Gobain, 313 F.3d at 925.

Relford contends the district court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the County because, according to him, the evidence and applicable law establishes that the County violated (1) his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, as protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and (2) his right to due process of law, as protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

I.

With regard to his claim of a Fourth Amendment violation, Relford asserts that the district court failed to adhere to the determinations of the Fayette...

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