Rembrandt Enters. v. Tecno Poultry Equip., SpA
| Docket Number | 21-CV-4007-CJW-MAR |
| Decision Date | 28 December 2023 |
| Parties | REMBRANDT ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiff, v. TECNO POULTRY EQUIPMENT, SpA, f/k/a TECNO POULTRY EQUIPMENT, SRL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. Reference to Insurance ............................................................10
B. Conditions of the Barns and Belts in Other Barns ............................12
C. Cumulative Evidence of Amount of Manure in Barn 17 ....................16
D. Evidence or Lay Person Opinion as to Depth and
Weight of Manure ..................................................................18
E. Evidence or Expert Testimony About Samples of Manure From Barn 17 ..........................................................20
F. OSHA Investigation Evidence ...................................................22
G. Conditions in the Barns and Mistreatment of Birds ..........................24
H. Evidence About Whether Self-Tapping Screws Were Necessary ..........26
I. Photos and Depictions of Collapse ..............................................28
J. Evidence/Argument that Plaintiff was General Contractor ..................30
K. Evidence Not Produced During Discovery ....................................31
A. Injury or Death .....................................................................39
B. Other Lawsuits or Claims .........................................................40
C. Stanley's Status as Non-Party and Non-Appearance .........................40
D. Non-Appearance of Potential Witnesses........................................42
E. Evidence Inconsistent With Court's Summary Judgment Ruling ..........42
F. Testimony About Court's Prior Rulings........................................44
G. Argument About Court's Prior Rulings ........................................45
H. Evidence of Cost of Repair and Replacement .................................46
I. Evidence of Pre-incident Value of Property ...................................47
J. Argument as to Replacement of Lost Poultry and Lost Profits .............48
K. Lay Opinion .........................................................................50
L. OSHA Citations ....................................................................53
M. Argument About Enforceability of Contracts .................................54
N. Argument that Defendant Should be Punished ................................56
O. Evidence of Defendant's Financial Condition .................................56
P. Direct Appeals to Jurors ..........................................................56
Q. Evidence of Settlement Offers ...................................................56
R. Evidence of Defendant's Insurance .............................................57
This matter is before the Court on the parties' multiple motions in limine.
Defendant filed its First Motion in Limine seeking to bar evidence that plaintiff suffered economic injury. (Doc. 119). Plaintiff filed a resistance. (Doc. 122). Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 125). Defendant also filed an amendment to its first motion in limine. (Doc. 161).
Plaintiff then filed a motion in limine, seeking to bar a dozen categories of evidence. (Doc. 126). Defendant resisted the motion. (Doc. 131). Plaintiff filed a reply. (Doc. 135).
Next, defendant filed a motion in limine to limit testimony by plaintiff's expert Tony Childress (“Childress”). (Doc. 136). Plaintiff filed a resistance. (Doc. 150). Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 136-5).
Defendant then filed a motion in limine to exclude or limit testimony by plaintiff's expert Daniel Powell (“Powell”). (Doc. 138). Plaintiff filed a resistance. (Doc. 151). Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 138-2).
Finally, defendant filed a Second Motion in Limine seeking to bar a score of categories of evidence. (Doc. 139). Plaintiff filed a resistance. (Doc. 153). Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. 139-2).
For each of the motions and resistances above, the parties filed appendices consisting of many hundreds of pages.
On December 14, 2023, the Court held a hearing on the motions at the parties' requests.
For the following reasons, the Court grants-in-part, denies-in-part, and holds in abeyance-in-part the parties' motions.
Defendant seeks a pretrial order barring evidence that plaintiff suffered an economic injury, namely business interruption damages and damages for demolition and cleanup, as a result of defendant's conduct. (Doc. 119). Defendant argues that plaintiff's negligence claim is premised on a common law duty under Restatement (Second) Torts § 323 (“Restatement § 323”), which limits recovery to “physical harm” to persons or property only. (Id., at 2). Thus, defendant argues, plaintiff cannot seek economic damages as a matter of law. (Id.). Because it cannot seek those damages, defendant argues that any reference to the economic losses plaintiff allegedly suffered are irrelevant and should be barred to avoid undue delay and unfair prejudice under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403. (Id., at 3).[1]
In its addendum to its first motion in limine, defendant concedes that Iowa case law supports recovery for demolition and clean-up of the building and equipment as direct property damage, and thus withdraws that portion of its first motion in limine. (Doc. 161). Defendant continues to assert, though, that demolition and clean-up of the system itself, as opposed to the building in which it was housed, are not recoverable. (Id., at 2).
Plaintiff resists and argues that the duty defendant owed to plaintiff to supervise the installation of the poultry cage system arose under a theory of agency, not Restatement § 323. (Doc. 122, at 3). Regardless, plaintiff argues that under Iowa law any party who has been physically damaged by the negligence of another is entitled to recover for the economic damages related to that injury. (Id.). Plaintiff argues that defendant's motion is an attempt to relitigate the economic loss doctrine argument this Court previously rejected. (Id.). At oral argument, plaintiff also emphasized that the product that it purchased from defendant under the contract was the cage system itself, not as built. In other words, defendant asserts that it paid a separate company to install the cage system and make it operational, which was value added to the uninstalled cage system defendant delivered to plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that it should be able to recover the costs of demolition and clean-up of the cage system as installed.
Here, the Court found that defendant owed a duty to plaintiff, independent of their contract, to exercise due care in inspecting and supervising the third-party installer of the poultry cage system to prevent harm to people and property. (Doc. 96, at 8). In its ruling denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant was negligent in its supervision of its employee charged with overseeing the installation of the poultry cage system. (Doc. 88, at 30-33). The Court found this duty arose from the agency relationship defendant had with its technician employee. (Id.). In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not cite or rely on Restatement § 323. (Id.).
Only after defendant filed a motion to reconsider did the Court address Restatement § 323. The Court noted that plaintiff resisted defendant's motion for summary judgment relying on Restatement § 323. (Doc. 96, at 8). The Court agreed with plaintiff that “it would have found” a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether defendant would be liable under Restatement § 323. (Id., at 8-9). Restatement § 323 provides that when one undertakes to render services-as defendant did here when it agreed to provide a supervisor to oversee the installation of its poultry cage system- they must exercise reasonable care in doing so to avoid “physical harm” to persons and property. Id. The Court found there was a genuine issue of material fact requiring resolution by a jury whether defendant complied with this duty.
In both its original order, and in its order denying defendant's motion to reconsider, the Court rejected defendant's theory that the economic loss doctrine bars recovery for losses beyond the value of the cage system. (Docs. 88, at 24, 96, at 13). The cage system itself, uninstalled, was the property plaintiff purchased from defendant under the contract. The economic loss doctrine bars economic loss recovery when there is no physical harm to other property present and the only claim is breach of contract. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., v. Ford Motor Co., 588 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 1999). Here, there is physical harm to other property.[2] If plaintiff can prove economic losses caused by the physical harm, it may recover those losses.
Even if plaintiff's theory of recovery was limited to Restatement § 323, the Court would not limit its loss claims here. By its plain terms, Restatement § 323 limits recovery to “physical harm” to persons and property. Although Restatement § 323 is silent as to whether a plaintiff may also recover economic losses as well, courts have found economic losses are not...
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