Remer v. Czaja, Civ. No. 917.

• Decision Date: 25 January 1941
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 917.
• Citation: 36 F. Supp. 629
• Parties: REMER v. CZAJA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

36 F. Supp. 629

REMER v. CZAJA.

Civ. No. 917.

District Court, D. Maryland.

January 25, 1941.

I. Duke Avnet, of Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Jacob S. New and John O. Herrmann, both of Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

WILLIAM C. COLEMAN, District Judge.

This is a case arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219. The action is brought under Section 18 to recover unpaid minimum wages and liquidated damages as provided in Section 16 (b), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 216 (b) and 218. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. The case is before the court on this motion, the effect of which is to admit as true the allegations of the complaint.

Briefly summarized, these allegations are that the defendant, an individual trading as Easton Hosiery Mills, at Easton, Maryland, was engaged in the manufacture of hosiery which he shipped in interstate commerce. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a hosiery knitter and had, prior to October 24, 1938, the date when the Fair Labor Standards Act went into effect, received as a pieceworker, wages at the rate of 55¢ per dozen of hosiery made by him or an average weekly wage of $40, but beginning on October 25, 1938 and until April 26, 1940 when the plaintiff ceased to be employed by the defendant, the latter reduced plaintiff's wages to 50¢ per dozen, thus reducing his weekly wage accordingly. Prior to the effective date of the Act, defendant paid helpers less than the minimum wage provided by the Act, but when the Act went into effect, increased the wages of these helpers to meet the minimum requirements and in order to do this, reduced plaintiff's wages. There has been no reduction, however, of the plaintiff's wages below the minimum requirements of the Act, nor have its overtime provisions been violated. Plaintiff claims $1,800,—namely $900 as additional wages due and a like amount as liquidated damages; also, an attorney's fee.

Section 16 (b) provides as follows: "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this chapter prescribing minimum wages and maximum hours shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action." The last sentence of Section 18 of the Act, upon which plaintiff relies, is as follows: "No provision of this chapter shall justify any employer in reducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of the applicable minimum wage under this chapter, or justify any employer in increasing hours of employment maintained by him which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this chapter."

Jurisdiction to entertain the present suit results from Section 24, paragraph (8) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S.C.A. § 41 (8), which gives to the District Courts original jurisdiction "Of all suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce." The asserted basis for the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act is the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Whether this power has, in fact, been constitutionally exercised is a question we need not consider in the present suit because we conclude, for the reasons we are about to state, that the Act affords the plaintiff no right of action.

Provisions covering both civil and criminal liability under the Act are embraced exclusively in Section 16 which has two parts, — paragraph (a) which prescribes the penalties for violation of the preceding section (15) and with which we are not here concerned; and paragraph (b) already quoted, which prescribes the character and extent of civil liability. This liability, it is to be noted, is predicated solely upon a violation of Section 206 or Section 207, namely, the sections prescribing minimum wages and maximum hours, no violation of which is charged in the present suit. Indeed, the entire criminal liability defined in Section 16 (a) is likewise predicated largely upon a violation of these same sections, but relates also to violations of a supplementary section (14) relating to learners, apprentices and handicapped workers, with which we are not here concerned; and of other sections relating to child labor and the maintenance of records, etc., with which, likewise, we are not here concerned.

In support of defendant's motion to dismiss, three major grounds are urged: First, that the Act provides no relief for violations of its Section 18; second, that Congress did not intend to "freeze" or otherwise to regulate wage scales above the minimum standard set by the Act; and lastly, that if Congress did intend to establish wage scales in excess of the minimums set by the Act, it has no power so to do.

While all three of these grounds appear to be tenable, the correctness of the first one is so patent that we prefer to rest our decision upon it. As already indicated, there is no provision made in the Act to cover violations of Section 18. The last sentence of that section upon which plaintiff relies is obviously very broad. If it be taken literally, its potentiality to destroy freedom of contract would be very great. It is conceded by counsel for both sides that little light with respect to this clause is to be gathered from a study of the Congressional Reports or debates at the time the Act was under consideration. The original bill authorized administrative action to prevent the possibility of a reduction of wages of employees presently paid more than the established minimum, in order to offset any required increase in the wages of those employed at sub-standard rates. But this provision was eliminated in the House and apparently an amendment which sought to meet such a situation failed of adoption after only cursory consideration; and the conference committee...