Remington Paper Co v. Watson

• Decision Date: 13 March 1899
• Docket Number: No. 146,146
• Citation: 19 S.Ct. 456,173 U.S. 443,43 L.Ed. 762
• Parties: REMINGTON PAPER CO. v. WATSON et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

173 U.S. 443

19 S.Ct. 456

43 L.Ed. 762

REMINGTON PAPER CO.

v WATSON et al.

No. 146.

March 13, 1899.

E. T. Merrick, for plaintiff in error.

Alex. Porter Morse, for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice McKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.

It is objected that the record presents no federal question.

In an action brought in the civil district court for the parish of Orleans, state of Louisiant, John Watson, one of the defendants in error, was appointed on the 17th day of May, 1893, receiver of the property and assets of the Louisiana Printing & Publishing Company, a corporation created under the laws of the state of Louisiana. As such receiver, he took possession of such assets and property. There was no appeal taken from the order of appointment.

The plaintiff in error (a corporation created under the laws of New York, and having its residence in that state) brought an action in the United States circuit court for the district of Louisiana against the Louisiana Printing & Publishing Company to recover $3,863.55, for paper furnished the company, and sued out writs of sequestration and attachment, by authority of which, on the 29th day of May, 1893, the United States marshal seized certain property of the company, and took the same from the possession of Watson.

On May 30, 1893, Watson, as receiver, filed a motion in said circuit court to quash the attachment and sequestration sued out, 'and said rule or motion concluded with an order which the mover in the rule desired the court to adopt'; and thereupon the judge of the court made the following order:

'Let this rule be filed, and let the Remington Paper Company, through their attorneys, Merrick & Merrick, show cause on Thursday, June 1, at 11 a. m., why the above motion should not be granted.'

To which motion the Remington Paper Company filed the following:

'The plaintiff in this case, for the purpose only of objection to the regularity of the rule taken by John W. Watson, calling himself receiver, by way of exception, says:

'That said mover, as a pretended receiver, cannot interfere in the progress of this suit in the informal and summary manner attempted by him in his said rule; nor has he any right to be heard to demand by the judgment of this court anything of this court, without coming into court by regular process and proceedings, and in the mode allowed by law, wherein the plaintiff will be entitled to a trial of questions of law and fact in the mode and manner guarantied by the constitution and prescribed by law.

'Wherefore this plaintiff says that this rule taken by said John W. Watson should and ought to be dismissed at the cost of said mover.

Merrick & Merrick, Attys.

'And in the event the foregoing exception to said rule is overruled, and this plaintiff is required by your honorable court to answer the same, and not otherwise, this plaintiff denies the allegations contained in said rule, and denies that said John W. Watson, the pretended receiver, has any legal right or authority, under the ex parte proceeding on which he relies, to take possession of the property attached in this case, nor to hinder or delay your petitioner from collecting its just debt against said defendant.

'Merrick & Merrick, Attys.'

The plaintiff prayed the court to decide the exception to said rule before proceeding further, or hearing any testimony on the rule taken.

The court, however, decided to hear the testimony on the allegations of said rule, and after hea ing the same, on the 6th day of June, 1893, made the following order:

'This cause having been heard and submitted upon a rule taken by john W. Watson, appointed a receiver of the defendant by the civil district court for the parish of Orleans, to set aside the writs of attachment and sequestration issued in this cause, and upon the exception thereto filed by the plaintiff, and the same having been considered by the court, it is now ordered, for the reasons assigned in the written opinion on file, that the marshal restore the property seized in this cause under the writs of attachment and sequestration to John W. Watson, receiver, unless within five days the plaintiff applies for and ultimately receives authority from the civil district court which appointed Watson, or from the appellate court, to hold same under said writs.'

The opinion of the court referred to in the order recites that Watson had been 'appointed receiver upon a petition of a creditor, and in the intervention of the attorney general, which original and intervening petitions averred that all the officers of the defendant corporation had resigned, and that in fact it was a vacant corporation.' It was further said:

'I do not think this court can deal at all with the alleged irregularity in the appointment of the receiver, such as the alleged want of an execution, etc., preceding the appointment. It appearing to this court that a court of concurrent jurisdiction has appointed a receiver, who was in actual possession, this court has no right to attempt to dispossess him. All the matter as to irregularity of the appointment must be dealt with by the court that appointed. I understand the doctrine of the comity of courts to be this: that where a court has jurisdiction of a cause and property, and through its proper officer is in possession, it is the duty of all other courts to refrain altogether from the attempt to take that property into possession, except by permission of the court in possession. It is not a question of the validity of process, but a question of public order, and the rule of comity is based upon the duty of courts to abstain from anything that might lead to violence. There having been a receiver appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, and he being in possession of the property attempted to be seized by the marshal, and which kwas in fact seized, I think the duty of this court is to restore the property practically to the situation in which it was when the property was interfered with by the marshal.'

The bill of exceptions signed by the circuit judge shows that Watson was in possession of the property, engaged in making an inventory of it, when it was seized by the marshal, and had taken the oath of office, but had filed no bond.

On the 9th day of June, 1893, three days after the order of the circuit court, the Remington Company filed in the civil district court for the parish of Orleans a petition and action of nullity, and for damages, under the laws of the state, against Watson, receiver, Pope, petitioning creditor, and the Louisiana Printing & Publishing Company.

The petition alleged the indebtedness of the latter company to petitioner, the action by the latter in the United States circuit court, the attachment of property, the motion of Watson, as hereinbefore stated, and the ruling and order of the court thereon; that the effect thereof will be to prevent the execution of any judgment rendered, and that 'Watson was without right to stand in the way of a just debt, because he had given no bond at the date of the seizure of property under the attachment, nor complied with the order of the court, nor had proceedings been had to perfect his appointment, or to give him the right to control the property, or to prevent any suit from being brought, or any court from subjecting the property of said defendant by due course of law to the payment of its debts, and the conduct of the said Watson, Frank H. Pope, and those confederating with them in attempting to screen the pro erty from payment of debts, was collusive, and a constructive fraud upon petitioner, and a violation of its rights under the laws and constitution of the United States of America'; that the order appointing him was null and void, because obtained 'upon the collusive petition of Frank J. Pope, without citation to any one, without oath or affidavit, or any proof, and without contest.' It was further alleged that the so-called intervention of the attorney general did not cure the nullity of the proceedings of Pope and Watson, and that the state was without authority to intrude itself in that manner into the controversies of private persons. There was a prayer for citation, and that the order appointing Watson...