Remington v. Louttit Laundry Co.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1950
• Docket Number: No. 1986,1986
• Citation: 77 R.I. 185,74 A.2d 442
• Parties: REMINGTON v. LOUTTIT LAUNDRY CO. Equity
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 442

74 A.2d 442

77 R.I. 185

REMINGTON v. LOUTTIT LAUNDRY CO.

Equity No. 1986.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 30, 1950.

Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, Providence, for petitioner.

Donald A. Kingsley, Providence, for respondent.

BAKER, Justice.

This is an original petition brought under the provisions of General Laws 1938, chapter 300, by an employee against his employer to obtain compensation for injuries allegedly caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. In the superior court after a hearing a decree was entered denying and dismissing the petition and from the entry of that decree petitioner has duly prosecuted his appeal to this court.

Many of the facts herein are not seriously in dispute. The evidence shows that petitioner, who was about seventy years of age when he was injured August 29, 1947, had been employed steadily by respondent at the same job for approximately seven years. His work was in the assembly room in respondent's laundry and it was his duty to remove from trucks five feet long, three and one-half feet wide and four feet deep clothes which had been washed and which were in net bags. At that time these clothes would be still hot and damp and it was part of petitioner's duty after taking them from the truck to sort them and hang them in different places to dry. In carrying out his work he was required to bend over and reach into the truck. On the day he was injured he went to work about 7 a. m. He had removed all the clothes from the first of the trucks and had stepped away from it a short distance when he suddenly fell backward striking his head on the cement floor. There was no evidence that the floor was not in its ordinary and normal condition or that he slipped on any substance or fell over anything which was on the floor. He became unconscious and was removed to a hospital where he remained until November 18, 1947. His injury was diagnosed as a compound basal skull fracture and brain contusion. Thereafter he convalesced at his home for about a year and while he has largely recovered from his injury he is unable to work. Respondent does not dispute that he is totally disabled.

Petitioner contends in substance that just before he was injured his head ached and he felt dizzy and that he fell because he had been overexerting himself to keep up with his work, because the clothes he had to handle and bend over were steaming and the assembly room was excessively hot. In support of his contention he introduced evidence to the effect that at the time of the injury in his opinion the temperature in the room was close to 90 degrees; that there were pipes therein carrying steam; that there were several machines in the room such as rollers, pressers and ironers which were operated by steam and threw off heat; that no fans were being operated that the room was steamy and foggy; and that when he fell he was going to a window to get fresh air.

Respondent, however, submitted evidence from which it appeared that the temperature in the assembly room was about 10 or 12 degrees warmer than the outside temperature, it being agreed by the parties that at the time of the injury this was 67 degrees. The respondent's evidence also showed that all the windows, of which there were a considerable number, were wide open; that the machines in the room gave off no appreciable heat; that all the steam pipes were covered and permitted no steam to escape; that the air in the room was not steamy or foggy; and that it was not excessively hot therein. There was also evidence which tended to show that the working conditions on the morning of August 29 were the same as they had been since petitioner had been employed, and that when injured he was merely doing his usual work.

As bearing on the question of what caused the petitioner to become dizzy and faint the medical testimony was in conflict. There was evidence presented by respondent through a doctor which, on the assumption that the history of petitioner's previous physical condition was correct, was to the effect that his fainting and consequent fall were caused by some form of circulatory disease or disorder. His history showed that the petitioner prior to his injury on August 29 had for some time frequently suffered from dizziness and fainting spells.

In the decree appealed from the trial justice made the following findings of fact:

'1. That the working conditions in the room where the petitioner was working on the morning of August 29, 1947, were the normal working conditions; that the room was not 'extra' or excessively hot; that the room was not so full of steam as to be foggy; that the clothes did not throw off steam.

'2. That the petitioner had been working about a half hour and had not overexerted himself.

'3. That the dizziness and subsequent fainting of the petitioner was not due to excessive heat, working conditions, or overexertion.

'4. That the petitioner had a pre-existing physical condition which had manifested itself on previous occasions by dizziness and unconsciousness; that neither his work activities or the conditions under which he worked aggravated, activated, or in any way affected that condition; that the dizziness and fainting were caused by the pre-existing condition and are not causally connected with his employment.

'5. That the petitioner's fall and injury was not the result of a risk involved in his employment or incident to it, or to the conditions under which it was required to be performed.

'6. That there was no causal connection between the fall and injury and the employment or the conditions under which it was required to be performed.

'7. That the petitioner did not sustain personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.'

Upon consideration we are of the opinion that there is legal evidence which supports those findings which are properly findings of fact. In such circumstances and in the absence of fraud, they become conclusive and we have no power to review them. G.L.1938, chap. 300, art. III, § 6. Baccari v. W. T. Grant Co., 73 R.I. 376, 56 A.2d 552. Petitioner is not questioning that there is legal evidence to support the findings of fact of the trial justice but contends that the decree as entered is...