Renaud v. Renaud, 75-336-A

• Decision Date: 08 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 75-336-A,75-336-A
• Citation: 373 A.2d 1198,118 R.I. 365
• Parties: Shirley Ann RENAUD v. Errol R. RENAUD. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1198

373 A.2d 1198

118 R.I. 365

Shirley Ann RENAUD v. Errol R. RENAUD.

No. 75-336-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 8, 1977.

[118 R.I. 369] James Cardono, Pawtucket, for petitioner.

Kirshenbaum Law Offices, Inc., Allen M. Kirshenbaum, Providence, for respondent.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Family Court which denied the appellant's motion to reduce child support payments. For the reader's ease, we shall refer to the parties by their first names.

On May 24, 1974 the Family Court entered a final decree in a divorce action brought by Shirley against Errol (appellant herein). Shirley was awarded custody of their infant, Charlotte, and Errol was ordered to pay $75 per week child support. On November 25 of that year, Errol once again assumed familial responsibilities. At the time of the marriage, his new wife, Ann, was already the mother of a child whom Errol admits is his. Apparently, Errol was dissatisfied with his $75 duty towards Charlotte because he moved for a reduction of payments, and approximately 2 weeks after Errol's second marrigage the Family Court entered a consent decree between Errol and Shirley, reducing Errol's obligation to $40 per week. Thereafter Errol once again moved for a reduction of payments, and it is the denial of this motion which is the subject of our review.

At the Family Court hearing, both Errol and Shirley testified. The thrust of Errol's argument was that since November 25, 1974, the day of his second wedding, his expenses had markedly increased, while his take-home pay had decreased, and that this constituted a change in circumstances. The specifics were that prior to November 25 his total weekly needs were $115.68 and his take-home pay was approximately $140, whereas at the time of this hearing his weekly expenses were $183.83 and his net pay was about $130. However, during the hearing Errol conceded that at least part of the increase in costs was attributable to his increased payments on a bank loan taken to finance a new motorcycle costing $2,900. Errol also testified, over his counsel's objection, that Ann's weekly take-home pay was $127. Her weekly expenses were $51.87.

In his decision the trial justice took note of Errol's and Ann's combined income; rejected Errol's expense claim of $183.83, noting with particular disapproval the motorcycle purchase; and found no change in circumstances warranting a reduction in payments from $40 a week.

Errol has claimed several errors, the first of which is that the trial justice should not have admitted and considered evidence concerning Ann's income. He concedes, though, that if this testimony was properly admitted, we need proceed no further. The question is one of first impression in this state. ¹

General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 15-5-16 gives the Family Court power to regulate the custody of children and provide for their education, maintenance and support. We have previously observed that the Legislature intended to confer by this section 'wide latitude to consider every factor that would serve to reveal in totality the circumstances and conditions * * *' pertaining to a child's welfare. Cambra v. Cambra, 114 R.I. 553, 560, 336 A.2d 842, 846 (1975). We are confronted now with the not uncommon situation of a parent's remarriage and the concomitant incurrence of greater financial responsibility. The court is well-aware that not only can two not live as cheaply as one, but also two families cost more than one. We also recognize, however, and counsel agreed, that at least in principle one's remarriage can ease financial straits and enable a parent to meet more easily those preexisting obligations. Consequently, as one court has noted, 'as a practical matter, it seems obvious that all of the funds available should be considered as a whole in any effort to make a proper and equitable adjustment of * * * income * * *' between the first and second family. Hanson v. Hanson, 47 Wash.2d 439, 444, 287 A.2d 879, 882 (1955).

The argument presented to us against admitting evidence of Ann's income is that such testimony is irrelevant because she has no duty to support Charlotte. Presumably, if such a duty did exist, the argument would not be raised. See Cooper v. Cooper, 132 Vt. 619, 326 A.2d 145 (1974). We do not think, however, that the question turns on a stepparent's support duty or lack thereof. The evidence of the second income is relevant in considering reduction of support payments because it shows more fully the father's ability to meet...