Renaud v. State Court of Mediation and Arbitration

• Decision Date: 18 September 1900
• Citation: 83 N.W. 620,124 Mich. 648
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: RENAUD et al. v. STATE COURT OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION.

83 N.W. 620

124 Mich. 648

RENAUD et al. v. STATE COURT OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION.

Supreme Court of Michigan

September 18, 1900

Mandamus by George A. Renaud and others against the state court of mediation and arbitration to restrain a rehearing by the court. Granted.

Bowen Douglass & Whiting, for respondent.

MOORE J.

Pingree & Smith are engaged in the business of manufacturing boots and shoes in the city of Detroit, and have a good many men and women in their employ. Prior to December 16, 1899, differences arose between the employers and employed over the scale of wages. December 16, 1899, an agreement was signed by Pingree & Smith, on the one side, and Timothy O'Connor and Earnest A. Allen, on the other side representing the employed, reading in its material part as follows: 'Being unable to agree on prices of the following work, we hereby jointly request an arbitration of the same by your honorable board, agreeing to abide by your decision. Prices to remain in force until May 1st, 1900.' A hearing was had before the court. The taking of testimony was completed March 9, 1900, and the case was argued by the counsel for the respective parties. On March 31st the court made a decision in writing, and filed the same in the office of the county clerk of Wayne county April 19, 1900. Pingree &amp Smith were dissatisfied with the decision of the court, and on April 6th moved for a rehearing of the case. June 23, 1900, the court granted a motion for a rehearing. The relators ask for a writ of prohibition or a writ of mandamus, or other appropriate writ, to prevent the respondent from rehearing the controversy. It is the claim of the relators that when the court rendered its decision it exhausted its powers, and had no authority to grant a rehearing. Three questions are involved in this proceeding: First, the existence of the court of mediation and arbitration; second, its power to grant a rehearing after it has once decided a controversy submitted to it; third, have the relators sought a proper remedy?

The existence of the court is attacked by the attorneys who argue the case and submit briefs in the interest of Pingree & Smith upon constitutional grounds. We cannot state their position more clearly than by quoting from brief of counsel: 'The act under which this court of mediation and arbitration was organized is unconstitutional. By section 1 of [124 Mich. 650] article 6 of the constitution , the judicial power is vested in one supreme court, in circuit courts, in probate courts, and in justices of the peace. Municipal courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction may be established by the legislature in cities. By section 23 of article 6, the legislature may establish courts of conciliation, with such powers and duties as shall be prescribed by law. The general scheme of the constitution, as far as it relates to judicial officers, is for their election, and not for their appointment, as shown by article 12, which provides for impeachments and removals from office. Section 4 of that article provides that no judicial officer shall exercise his office, after an impeachment is directed, until he is acquitted; and section 5 of that article provides that the governor may make a provisional apppointment to fill a vacancy occasioned by the suspension of an officer, until he shall be acquitted, or until after the election and qualification of his successor. Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409. Section 23, art. 6, of the constitution provides for the establishment of courts of conciliation; and by 'courts,' here, as well as elsewhere in the constitution, is meant a permanent organization for the administration of justice, and not a special tribunal provided for by law, that is occasionally called into existence by particular exigencies, and that ceases to exist with such exigency. Streeter v. Paton, 7 Mich. 341; Shurbun v. Hooper, 40 Mich. 503; Risser v. Hoyt, 53 Mich. 185, 18 N.W. 611. If the administration of justice embraces the enforcement of the orders or decrees of courts, the court of mediation and arbitration, being deficient in authority given by the legislature to do this, is not such a court as is meant by section 23 of article 6; for, by the act of its creation, it can do nothing but render a decision on subjects submitted to it in a particular way, and file its decision with the county clerk. The constitution provides for the formation of a court of conciliation, while the act provides for the establishment of courts of mediation and arbitration, which are not courts of conciliation. Under the act there is no authority given to the judges or members of the court to compel the appearance of either party, nor is there any method of composing the differences or questions in dispute by turning over the parties to a court with aughority to enforce its decrees. From the terms of the act, it is clear that whoever drafted it had in mind the definition given above of 'arbitration,' which, as that definition says, usually implies a tribunal without power to compel attendance.' It is true that as to the members of the supreme court, the circuit judges, judges of probate, and justices of the peace, the constitution provides that they shall be elected; but we think it is not open to question that, if the constitution did not require these judicial officers to be elected, but authorized the legislature to establish these courts and prescribe their powers and duties, it would be entirely competent for the legislature to do so. This is just what is done by section 23, art. 6, of the constitution. The act does not fail because the legislature, in creating the court, did not provide its members should be elected. We are, then, confronted with the question, is the court of mediation and arbitration a court of conciliation? When the constitutional convention met which framed our present constitution, in 1850, courts of conciliation had been in practical operation in Norway for more than 50 years. They had accomplished most excellent results in the way of harmonizing differences between parties who were otherwise likely to resort to litigation. The purpose of these courts was to create an inexpensive and speedy tribunal, before whom parties between whom differences had arisen in civil cases must go before resorting to the courts of law for relief. The parties were required to appear personally and without counsel, and state their differences, and present such proofs as they could in support of their respective claims. It was the duty of the court to advise with the parties, and, if possible, to bring about an amicable settlement of their differences, and have them depart as friends, and not enemies. If an amicable settlement was agreed upon, a judgment was entered which would have the same effect as a judgment in any court. As these courts were first constituted, if the parties did not agree upon an amicable settlement they were left to their remedy in the courts of law; but, as we shall see later, further powers were afterwards conferred upon them.

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