Rende v. Kay
| Decision Date | 04 June 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 22110.,22110. |
| Citation | 415 F.2d 983 |
| Parties | Denis RENDE et al., Appellants, v. Alfred S. KAY, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Arthur M. Wagman, Washington, D.C., for appellants.
Mr. Edward J. Gorman, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Arthur V. Butler, Wheaton, Md., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and BURGER and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges.
The District Court held that Rule 25(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required dismissal of the plaintiffs' tort action because defendant's counsel had filed a suggestion of death of the defendant yet plaintiff had not made any substitution of parties within 90 days. We reverse on the ground that the suggestion of death, which was neither filed by nor identified a successor or representative of the deceased, such as an executor or administrator, was ineffective to trigger the running of the 90-day period provided by the Rule.
Mr. and Mrs. John Rende filed an action in the District Court individually and on behalf of their infant son who had been struck and injured by Alfred S. Kay while driving his car. On August 27, 1967, defendant Kay died. On September 1, 1967, the defendant's attorney, a term used here to identify the lawyer who had been retained by deceased to defend the action, and who had duly entered an appearance as attorney for defendant, filed a suggestion of death in the District Court, giving notice to plaintiffs' attorney. That same day there was filed in the Orphans Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, residence of the deceased, his will naming his widow as executrix, but the will had not been probated, nor any legal representative appointed for the estate at the time of the filing of this appeal.
Plaintiffs' attorney was injured on October 14, 1967. On returning to practice early in 1968, he learned that no successor to defendant Kay had yet been appointed, and he moved to certify the case to the ready calendar. The defendant's attorney opposed this on grounds that discovery procedures had not been completed. The case was delayed and placed on the ready calendar as of June 7, 1968.
However, in April 1968, the defendant's attorney moved in his own name to dismiss the action on the ground that Rule 25(a) (1) required plaintiffs to move to substitute a proper party for the deceased within 90 days of the suggestion of death. Plaintiffs filed an opposition and motion for substitution of the proper party, and sought an extension of the time for substitution as allowed by Rule 6(b). At argument, plaintiffs' counsel asserted the "suggestion of death was defective in that it did not list the name of the proper party; that is the legal representative of the defendant." The court responded: "That would not be his burden." The court dismissed the action with prejudice.
Prior to its amendment in 1963, Rule 25(a) (1) required the court to dismiss a case if no motion for substitution was filed within two years after date of death, and no extensions of this period were allowed under Rule 6(b). The rule was rigorously applied, often with harsh results,1 and was called "easily the poorest rule of all the Federal Rules."2 In 1955 the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure recommended that the two-year period be changed to a "reasonable time" standard. In 1961 the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules again suggested the Rule be made more flexible. In 1963 the Supreme Court made changes in Rule 25(a) (1) and in Rule 6(b) so as to provide a 90-day time limit from the filing of a suggestion of death, and to give the court discretion to extend that time.3
The Committee Notes explaining the amendments state:
Present Rule 25(a) (1), together with present Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible requirement that an action be dismissed as to a deceased party if substitution is not carried out within a fixed period measured from the time of death. The hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement plainly appear from the cases. * * * The amended rule establishes a time limit for the motion to substitute based not upon the time of the death, but rather upon the time information of the death is provided by means of a suggestion of death upon the record. * * * A motion to substitute may be made by any party or by the representative of the deceased party without awaiting the suggestion of death. Indeed, the motion will usually be so made. If a party or the representative of the deceased party desires to limit the time within which another may make the motion, he may do so by suggesting the death upon the record. (Emphasis added.)
Under the amended Rule either a party or "the successors or representatives of the deceased party" may avoid delay in effecting substitution for the deceased party either by filing a motion for substitution or by suggesting death on the record and thus triggering the 90-day period which begins with suggestion of death.
The Advisory Committee, in outlining that suggestion of death could be made by "the representative of the deceased party" plainly contemplated that the suggestion emanating from the side of the deceased would identify a representative of the estate, such as an executor or administrator, who could be substituted for the deceased as a party, with the action continued in the name of the representative. The addition of "successor" in the Rule would take care of the case of, say, the distributee of an estate that had been distributed, but would not make a material difference in the aspect under consideration. Form 30, for suggestion of death, which was provided in order to expedite and facilitate implementation of the amendment, provides:
A.B. described as a party, or as executor, administrator, or other representative or successor of C.D., the deceased party suggests upon the record, pursuant to Rule 25(a) (1), the death of C.D. describe as party during the pendency of this action. Added Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963. Emphasis added.
Although the attorney for the defendant was retained to "represent" the deceased as his counsel, he is not a person who could be made a party, and is not a "representative of the deceased party" in the sense contemplated by Rule 25(a) (1).
In our opinion the Rule, as amended, cannot fairly be construed, as the defendant's attorney argues, to...
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Yonofsky v. Wernick
...that the suggestion of death was defective for failure to identify plaintiff's representative — the executor cites Rende v. Kay, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 415 F.2d 983 (1969). In that case a suggestion of death was filed by the defendant's counsel indicating for the record that the defendant ha......
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United States v. Estate of Schoenfeld
...v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ; McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ; Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; Petre, 2015 WL 6667770, at *2 ; Sequoia Prop., 2002 WL 32388132, at *3 (applying Section 2404 and extending the time fo......
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89 Hawai'i 91, Roxas v. Marcos
...amended Rule 25(a)(1) 'to dispel unwarranted rigidity and allow more flexibility in substitution.' " Id. at 98 (quoting Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C.Cir.1969)). However, in McSurely, the estates of the deceased parties had been distributed to the respective widows prior to their sub......
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