Render v. FCA U.S. LLC
| Decision Date | 20 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-12984 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
| Parties | EDWARD RENDER, Plaintiff, v. FCA U.S. LLC, Defendant. |
Plaintiff Edward Render sues Defendant FCA U.S. LLC (“FCA”) under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) alleging interference and retaliation claims. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully fired from his employment as an autoworker at FCA's Trenton Engine Plant in January 2018 after attempting to take FMLA leave. Defendant now moves for summary judgment against both of Plaintiff's FMLA claims. (ECF No. 22.) The court finds a hearing unnecessary. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons provided below, the court will grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
1
Plaintiff first began working as an hourly worker in FCA's Trenton Engine Plant in 2013. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2; ECF No. 22 PageID.95.) Plaintiff was employed as a unionized worker represented by the United Auto Workers (“UAW”) and was subject to a collectively bargained progressive attendance policy. In 2015, Plaintiff was terminated by FCA for exceeding the number of unexcused absences and tardies permitted under the attendance policy. After Plaintiff successfully pursued a grievance through the UAW, he was reinstated by FCA in April 2017 subject to a “Conditional Reinstatement Letter.” (ECF No. 22 PageID.96.) The letter stated that Plaintiff would be subject to immediate discharge after one unexcused absence or two unexcused tardies in the first 12 months following his reinstatement. (Id.) As part of the reinstatement process, Plaintiff submitted a letter to FCA pledging that he would leave for work earlier to avoid additional attendance issues while commuting to Trenton, Michigan from his Detroit home. (ECF No. 24, PageID.221-22.)
Plaintiff had applied for and utilized FMLA leave during his first stint at FCA before his 2015 termination. (ECF No. 22-2, PageID.138-40.) A month after he was reinstated in 2017, Plaintiff called Sedgwick (FCA's third-party FMLA administrator) to inquire if he qualified for FMLA leave. (ECF No. 22-11, PageID.178.) Because Plaintiff had only worked 188.5 hours so far that year, he was told he did not yet qualify. (Id.) After accruing an unexcused tardy on September 6, 2017, Plaintiff called Sedgwick in October 2017, and a representative informed him that he had now worked enough hours to potentially qualify for FMLA. (Id.; ECF No. 24, PageID.223.) Plaintiff promptly submitted a medical certification showing that he suffered from depression and generalized anxiety disorder, and based on this documentation, Sedgwick sent Plaintiff a letter indicating that he was “conditionally approved” for intermittent FMLA leave. (ECF No. 24-12, PageID.372-73.)
Because FMLA eligibility is officially determined on the first day of leave, Sedgwick's letter stated that Plaintiff must “Contact Sedgwick at the number listed below on the date of your first FMLA-related absence or tardy” before calling FCA's main attendance hotline to receive final approval. (Id.) The letter lists both FCA's main attendance call-in hotline and the number for Sedgwick's “FCA Service Center.” (Id.)
On December 6, 2017, Plaintiff called the main FCA attendance hotline to report that he would be absent that day. (ECF No. 24, PageID.224.) Plaintiff did not directly notify Sedgwick at its 1-888 number of the absence, but he disputes whether he followed the instructions in the letter when he called only FCA's “1-800 number” to report the absence. (Id.; ECF No. 22-2, PageID.144.) Defendant FCA recorded Plaintiff's call-in to its “1-800 [attendance] number” on December 6 and has now produced a certified transcript:
It is undisputed that Plaintiff was also absent from work the next day, December 7, 2017, but FCA indicates it has no record of Plaintiff calling in that day to report his absence, and that no recording exists. (ECF No. 22, PageID.98; ECF No. 22-12, PageID.179.) Plaintiff disputes this point, contending that he called FCA's attendance hotline like he did the day before. (ECF No. 22-2, PageID.143, 150.)
On December 8, 2017, Plaintiff again called FCA's attendance hotline, this time to report that he would be late. Defendant has also produced a transcript of this call:
(ECF No. 22-16, PageID.195-97.)
Once Plaintiff returned to work on December 8, either Plaintiff or his direct supervisor informed LaVonda Mitchel, the Human Resources Manager at Trenton Engine, that Plaintiff was now claiming he had called in his absences the previous two days as FMLA leave. (ECF No. 22-3, PageID.163; ECF No. 22-2, PageID.144.) Because Plaintiff's absences show up as unexcused in FCA's timekeeping system, Mitchel sent an email to a Sedgwick representative at 10:24 pm on December 8, stating that Plaintiff “claims calling FMLA absent for 12-6-17 and 12-7-17. . . [and] tardy for 128-17.” (ECF No. 22-3, PageID.163; ECF No. 24-13, PageID.382.) Mitchel's email requested that Sedgwick provide documentation on whether Plaintiff had actually called in an FMLA absence on those dates and to verify that Plaintiff was actually certified for FMLA leave. (Id.) A Sedgwick representative replied to Mitchel's email on December 11; the reply stated that Plaintiff was indeed conditionally approved for FMLA leave, however, “no absences [were] coded as FMLA.” (ECF No. 24-13, PageID.381.)
On January 5th, 2018, Plaintiff again called FCA's attendance hotline, informing the operator in a recorded call that he would be late to work:
(ECF No. 22-16, PageID.198-99.)
Because Defendant FCA recorded all these absences and tardies as unexcused, Plaintiff was subsequently terminated by FCA on January 11, 2018, for “multiple violations” of his conditional reinstatement agreement. (ECF No. 22-4, PageID.169.) Following his termination, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the UAW. (ECF No. 22-2, PageID.148-49.) When the UAW declined to pursue that grievance, he filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging a failure to represent him. (Id.) Plaintiff's charge was later rejected as untimely. (Id.) As part of the charge, however, Plaintiff submitted a sworn affidavit which states that “[i]n 2017 I was on FMLA sick leave from 12/6/17 to 12/7/17 - I had come down with the flu and also I have a documented FMLA (anxiety) sickness.” (ECF No. 22-17, PageID.203 (emphasis added).)
In his statement of facts, Plaintiff now appears to admit that he used such “flare-up” and “really sick” language during the calls. However, Plaintiff posits that Defendant FCA actually knew Plaintiff was requesting FMLA leave for a qualifying reason. (ECF No. 24, PageID.225.) Plaintiff was questioned about his previous affidavit during his deposition for the present case:
In October 2019, Plaintiff filed the present suit challenging his termination alleging violations of the FMLA by FCA. (See ECF No. 1.) Discovery has now been completed in the matter and Defendant FCA moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (ECF No. 22.)
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must show “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the...
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