Renee v. Duncan
| Decision Date | 10 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 08–16661.,08–16661. |
| Citation | 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5106,2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6110,282 Ed. Law Rep. 812,686 F.3d 1002 |
| Parties | Sonya RENEE; Candice Johnson, a minor, by Sonya Renee, her guardian ad litem; Maribel Heredia; Jose Aldana, a minor, by Maribel Heredia, his guardian ad litem; B. Doe, a minor, by N. Doe, her guardian ad litem; Mariel Rubio; Danielle Rubio, a minor, by Mariel Rubio, her guardian ad litem; Stephanie Rubio, a minor, by Mariel Rubio, her guardian ad litem; Guadalupe Gonzalez; Daisy Gonzalez, a minor, by Guadalupe Gonzalez, her guardian ad litem; Jazmine Johnson, a minor, by Deanna Bolden, her guardian ad litem; Adriana Ramirez, a minor, by Arcelia Trinidad Ramirez, her guardian ad litem; Jane Doe, a minor, by John Doe, her guardian ad litem; Californians for Justice Education Fund; California Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Arne DUNCAN, in his official capacity; United States Department of Education, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Held Invalid
34 C.F.R. § 200.56(a)(2)(ii)John T. Affeldt and Tara Kini, Public Advocates, Inc., San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Alisa B. Klein, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for the defendants-appellees.
Charles T. Christopher Compton and Lisa A. Davis, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati P.C., Palo Alto, CA, for The National Coalition of ESEA Title I Parents, Inc., et al., as amicus curiae.
Donald B. Verilli, Jr., Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, D.C., for Teach for America, et al., as amicus curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:07–CV–04299–PJH.
Before: D.W. NELSON, WILLIAM A. FLETCHER and RICHARD C. TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge WILLIAM A. FLETCHER; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge TALLMAN.
This court's opinion filed September 27, 2010, and reported at 623 F.3d 787, is supplemented with the attached.
The petition for rehearing, filed on October 12, 2010, is GRANTED.
Appellants Sonya Renee, et al., appeal the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees U.S. Department of Education and Arne Duncan, Secretary of Education 1 (collectively, “the Secretary”). Appellants challenge a federal regulation permitting teachers who are participating in alternative-route teacher training programs, but who have not yet obtained full State certification, to be characterized as “highly qualified teachers” under the No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”). The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary.
This case has a complicated history. We initially vacated the judgment of the district court for lack of Article III standing in a published opinion, with one panel member dissenting. Renee v. Duncan, 573 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.2009) ( Renee I ). We subsequently granted a petition for panel rehearing and withdrew our prior opinion. We reversed the district court on the merits in a new published opinion, now with a different panel member dissenting. Renee v. Duncan, 623 F.3d 787 (9th Cir.2010) (Renee II ). After issuance of our opinion in Renee II, Congress changed the statutory provision upon which we had based that opinion. The new statutory provision, Section 163 of the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act of 2011, became effective on December 22, 2010. Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, Pub.L. No. 111–322, § 1, 124 Stat. 3518, 3521 (2010) (hereinafter “Section 163”). Section 163 expires at the end of the 2012–2013 academic year. Absent further congressional action, the statutory provision upon which we based our opinion in Renee II will again be in effect.
We conclude several things in this opinion. First, we conclude, as we concluded in Renee II, that before the passage of Section 163 the challenged regulation violated NCLB. Second, we conclude that after the passage of Section 163 and so long as it is in effect, the challenged regulation is consistent with NCLB. Third, we conclude that despite the passage of Section 163, this appeal is not moot. Fourth, we conclude that before the passage of Section 163, NCLB required the reports to Congress concerning “highly qualified teachers,” as that term was then defined in the statute. However, Appellants are not entitled to judicial enforcement of that reporting requirement. Finally, we conclude that Appellants are not entitled to attorney's fees based on their success in Renee II.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
The No Child Left Behind Act was enacted in 2002. Its overarching goal is “to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and state academic assessments.” 20 U.S.C. § 6301. NCLB seeks to close the “achievement gap between high- and low-performing children, especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers.” Id. § 6301(3).
NCLB provides funds to states and schools under several of its provisions, one of which is central to this appeal. Specifically, Title I funds are used to supplement the educational needs of disadvantaged students. Id. § 6301 et seq. The Secretary has the authority to withhold funds or to take other enforcement action if a state fails to comply substantially with NCLB's requirements. Id. § 1234c ().
A premise of NCLB is that good teachers—defined by Congress as “highly qualified” teachers—are crucial to educational success. NCLB requires that by the end of the 2005–06 academic year only “highly qualified” teachers should instruct core academic classes in school districts receiving Title I funding (the “100% requirement”). Id. § 6319(a)(2). “Core academic subjects” are “English, reading or language arts, mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and government, economics, arts, history, and geography.” Id. § 7801(11); 34 C.F.R. § 200.55(c).
NCLB requires that states and school districts develop and submit plans to meet the mandates of the statute. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(a)(1), 6311(b)(8)(C), 6319(a)(2) (state plans); id.§§ 6312(b)(1)(N), 6312(c)(1)(I), 6319(a)(3) (district plans). Each state is responsible for ensuring compliance by its local school districts. Id. §§ 1232c, 7844(a). To receive funds under Title I of the statute, NCLB requires states to identify steps they will take to ensure that “poor and minority children are not taught at higher rates than other children by inexperienced, unqualified, or out-of-field teachers.” Id. § 6311(b)(8)(C).
NCLB also requires that states and school districts report annually on their progress toward meeting the 100% requirement. Id. §§ 6311(h)(1)(C)(viii), 6311(h)(2), 6319(b)(1). States must provide this information to the Secretary, id. §§ 6311(h)(4)(G), 6319(b)(1)(B), who must report nationwide statistics on “highly qualified teachers” to Congress, id. § 6311(h)(4)–(5). Schools receiving Title I funds must inform a parent when his or her child is taught for four or more weeks by a teacher who is not “highly qualified.” Id. § 6311(h)(6)(B)(ii).
If a “State educational agency” fails to submit to the Secretary a “plan” satisfying the requirements of NCLB, id. § 6311(a)(1), the Secretary may withhold federal funds until the state has done so. Id. § 6311(g)(2) (); id. § 6311(b)(8)(C) ().
NCLB contains a lengthy definition of “highly qualified teacher.” Of central concern in this litigation, before the passage of Section 163, “highly qualified” meant that:
the teacher has obtained full State certification as a teacher (including certification obtained through alternative routes to certification) or passed the State teacher licensing examination, and holds a license to teach in such State, except that when used with respect to any teacher teaching in a public charter school, the term means that the teacher meets the requirements set forth in the State's public charter school law[.]
20 U.S.C. § 7801(23)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
On December 2, 2002, the Secretary promulgated regulations providing a more detailed definition of the statutory term “highly qualified teacher.” 34 C.F.R. § 200.56. Section 200.56 provides, in pertinent part:
[A] “highly qualified teacher” ... meets the requirements in paragraph (a) [].
(a) In general.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(3) of this section [covering charter schools], a [“highly qualified”] teacher ... must—
(i) Have obtained full State certification as a teacher, which may include certification obtained through alternative routes to certification; or
(ii)(A) Have passed the State teacher licensing examination;...
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