Renee v. Peralez

Decision Date03 August 2017
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 7:16-CV-281
PartiesAUTUMN RENEE, Plaintiff, v. FELIPE SANTIAGO PERALEZ, III, et al, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Now before the Court are Defendants Geovani Hernandez, Ramon Gonzalez, Julia Cruz, Feleciano Ramos, Mike Alaniz, and City of La Joya's ("City of La Joya Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim, (Dkt. Nos. 22, 31);1 Defendants Elizabeth Garza, Abelardo Gutierrez, Roel Bermea, and the City of Penitas's ("City of Penitas Defendants") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Dkt. No. 24); and Defendant Nancy Venecia's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, (Dkt. No. 32). Also before the Court is Plaintiff Autumn Renee's Request for Entry of Default against Defendant Felipe Santiago Peralez, III, (Dkt. No. 39). After considering the Motions and the responsive briefing, (Dkt. Nos. 25, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38), the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings should be granted in part and denied in part and that Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default should be granted.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Autumn Renee filed her Original Complaint in this Court on May 27, 2016.(Dkt. No. 1). She alleges that on May 29, 2014, after being arrested by officers of the Penitas, Texas Police Department and while being held in custody at the La Joya City Jail in La Joya, Texas, she was sexually assaulted by Defendant Felipe Santiago Peralez, III. Id. Ms. Renee further alleges that the remaining Defendants failed to provide her access to medical attention, to investigate the incident, or to report the assault to an independent law enforcement agency. Id. In her Original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated her rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eight, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, bringing claims against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986. Id. After the City of La Joya Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (Dkt. No. 15), Ms. Renee sought to amend her complaint, (Dkt. No. 20), which motion this Court granted, (Dkt. No. 26).

A. Factual Allegations

The following is a summary of the facts of the case as alleged in Ms. Renee's Amended Complaint, (Dkt. No. 27). On May 29, 2014, Ms. Renee was arrested by an officer of the Penitas Police Department pursuant to a warrant for a misdemeanor probation violation and for failure to identify. She was transported to La Joya City jail pending her arraignment. While in custody at La Joya City Jail, Ms. Renee was approached by Defendant Felipe Santiago Peralez, III, who was at the time a Communications Officer with the La Joya Police Department. Mr. Peralez told Ms. Renee that he would "make things right for her if she wanted to use the phone." Mr. Peralez subsequently sexually assaulted Ms. Renee, inserting his fingers, his entire hand, and other objects painfully into her vagina and buttocks and forcing her to perform oral sex on him and to masturbate him. The incident was recorded on the jail's video surveillance system.

Ms. Renee alleges that, after the sexual assault, Defendants Hernandez, Gonzalez, Alaniz, Ramos, Cruz, Venecia, Bermea, Garza, and Gutierrez (collectively, the "Individual Defendants") learned about the assault but did nothing to provide her medical treatment, to gather evidence, or to report the assault to an independent law enforcement agency.

Specifically, during the incident on May 29, La Joya Officer Nancy Venecia noticed that Mr. Peralez was not at his station at the La Joya Police Department's Communications Desk and sent a text message to La Joya Officer Jose Bustillos asking him to come to the station. Upon arriving, Officer Bustillos saw Mr. Peralez inside the booking area with Ms. Renee and told him that he was not supposed to be there. La Joya Sergeant Feleciano Ramos was advised of the incident.

The next day, on May 30, Sergeant Ramos called La Joya Lieutenant Ramon Gonzalez and told him that Mr. Peralez had been seen inside the booking area with Ms. Renee. That day, Lieutenant Gonzalez, Sergeant Ramos, and then-La Joya Police Chief Geovani Hernandez reviewed a video recording of Ms. Renee's assault that was taken on the department's surveillance cameras. The three men watched the video up to the point where sexual contact is made, after which Chief Hernandez ordered Lieutenant Gonzalez and Sergeant Ramos to continue to review the video while he left the office to brief La Joya City Administrator Mike Alaniz about the assault. Subsequently, Lieutenant Gonzalez took a statement from Ms. Renee about the assault, at which point he declined Ms. Renee's request for medical attention. On the same morning, Lieutenant Gonzalez asked La Joya Officer Julia Cruz to take Ms. Renee to the women's restroom to see if Ms. Renee said anything about what had happened the night before. While in the restroom, Ms. Renee told Officer Cruz about the assault.

Later that day, while Ms. Renee was being transported from the La Joya City Jail to thePenitas Police Department by Penitas Officer Elizabeth Garza, Ms. Renee told Officer Garza about the assault, which had occurred the night before. Officer Garza told her that she should "forget all about the incident and go on with her life, because 'people come up missing all the time in the valley.'" Id., at ¶ 33. Officer Garza then told Penitas Police Chief Roel Bermea about the assault, and Chief Bermea had Officer Garza write a report of Ms. Renee's statement. Officer Garza also notified Penitas Lieutenant Abelardo Gutierrez about the assault.

Ms. Renee asserts that at no point was she examined or treated for the physical and mental injuries caused by the sexual assault. She also asserts that at no point was she examined for the purposes of collecting evidence regarding the assault. She asserts that, while Mr. Peralez was suspended on May 30 and eventually resigned, "no follow-up investigation was ever conducted at the direction of the Chief of Police." Id. at ¶ 73.

Indeed, it appears from the Amended Complaint that no further action was taken regarding the incident until more than 6 months later, on December 4, 2014, when Texas Ranger Robert Garcia learned about the incident while conducting a separate criminal investigation. Ranger Garcia's report, which includes statements from several of the City of La Joya Defendants regarding the incident, are incorporated in Ms. Renee's complaint. (Dkt. No. 27-1). Defendant Peralez was ultimately charged with—and pleaded guilty to—charges of Official Oppression under § 39.03 of the Texas Penal Code and Violating the Civil Rights of a Person in Custody under § 39.04 of the Texas Penal Code. Id.; see generally State v. Peralez, No. CR-4244-15-F (332nd Dist. Ct., Hidalgo County, Tex., filed August 20, 2015).

B. Overview of Claims Asserted

In her Amended Complaint, Ms. Renee brings causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against each Defendant, as well as claims for intentionalinfliction of emotional distress against the Individual Defendants. (Dkt. No. 27). In addition to money damages, she seeks declaratory judgment that her rights under the Fourth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. Id. Before addressing Defendants' Motions, the Court first reviews the claims brought by Ms. Renee.

1. Claims Under § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986

Ms. Renee brings claims against each Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (Dkt. No. 27). Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any "person" who, "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State," violates another's rights under the U.S. Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also, e.g., Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013). To state a § 1983 claim, "a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Id. (quoting James v. Tex. Collin Cty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff may bring a § 1983 claim against a person in his individual or official capacity, or against a local government entity. Goodman v. Harris Cty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (municipalities and other local government units are "persons" subject to suit under § 1983). Meanwhile, Section 1985 provides a cause of action for three prohibited forms of conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, namely conspiracies using "force, intimidation, or threat," directed at preventing federal officers from performing their offices, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1), conspiracies aimed at the right of participation in federal judicial proceedings, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), and conspiracies aimed at depriving any person or class of person of equal protection under the law or of preventing a person from lawfully voting, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); see also, e.g., Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010).Section 1986, in turn, creates a cause of action against a person who knows of a conspiracy in violation of § 1985 and, having the power to prevent it, fails to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

Here, Ms. Renee has sued the City of La Joya, the City of Penitas (collectively, "the City Defendants"), and the remaining Defendants in their individual and official capacities for violations of her rights under the Fourth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Dkt. No. 27). She asserts that the City Defendants failed to adopt...

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