Renfro v. Shropshire
Decision Date | 04 May 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 5149,5149 |
Citation | 566 S.W.2d 688 |
Parties | Mike RENFRO et al., Appellants, v. Doris SHROPSHIRE, County Clerk, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Ralph A. Rash, Kuhn, Collins & Rash, Austin, for appellants.
Robert O. Smith, Austin, for appellee.
This appeal is from a judgment granting Doris Shropshire, County Clerk of Travis County, declaratory relief against the Commissioners Court of Travis County. Trial was before the court, which found that it had jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act and held that the Commissioners Court had no right to prescribe qualifications of persons to be employed in the county clerk's office and also the Commissioners Court had no right to require the clerk to complete "Form F" as a condition precedent to the submission of her requested budget. The Commissioners Court appeals. We affirm in part and reverse and dismiss in part.
Appellee agrees to the following fact statement by appellants:
"In April 1975, Jim Johnson, the personnel director for Travis County drafted a compensation and classification policy for all county employees which was approved by the commissioners court. The personnel policies embodied in the document include a salary system for classified personnel by which all positions are assigned to a range number on a pay scale of 1 through 30, with the lowest paying positions being placed at range 1 and the highest at range 30, and with each range containing seven salary steps beginning with a six-month probationary period at step A with salary increases each year thereafter through step G on a merit basis.
Under these adopted policies, no person recruited by the county clerk can be employed or placed on the payroll of her office without the permission of a personnel coordinator appointed by the commissioners court and approval by the commissioners court.
The commissioners court promulgated a budget package which is disseminated to department heads and county officials prior to budget hearings. It is contemplated that the department heads and officials will complete the budget package and return it to the auditor for eventual review by the commissioners court. Included in this budget package is a "Form F" questionnaire.
The auditor received the county clerk's budget request in September or October of 1976, complete except for the "Form F". A memorandum purporting to be from the County Judge and Commissioners Court to Herbert Freitag, Assistant County Auditor, dated September 24, 1976 stated that:
But for that memorandum the county auditor would have presented the budget furnished to him by the county clerk to the commissioners court for evaluation and hearing . . ."
Appellants urge the trial court erred in holding that the Commissioners Court has no legal right to prescribe minimum qualifications for persons to be employed at the various salary steps established by the Commissioners Court.
In its judgment, the trial court held:
Appellants contend the issue for resolution is whether the power of the Commissioners Court to fix salaries of county employees paid wholly with county funds also gives the County Commissioners Court by implication the power to adopt and implement a plan to aid them in determining what salary is proper with respect to each employee.
Commissioners Courts may exercise only such powers as the Constitution or the statutes have specifically conferred upon them. Canales v. Laughlin,147 Tex. 169, 214 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.1948); Starr County v. Guerra, 297 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1956, no writ). Article 5, § 18 of the Texas Constitution says in part:
". . . The County Commissioners so chosen, with the County Judge as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners Court, which shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed."
The court in Glenn v. Dallas County Bois D'Arc Island Levee Dist., 275 S.W. 137 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1923, no writ) considering the authority of the Commissioners Court to handle "county business" said:
". . . Within the meaning of the Constitution creating and conferring jurisdiction upon commissioners' courts, we think it is proper to give to the term 'county business' a broad and liberal construction so as not to defeat the real purpose that was intended to be accomplished by the law in providing that the commissioners' court shall exercise such power and jurisdiction over all county business as is conferred by the Constitution and the laws of the state, or as may be hereafter prescribed; and not that meaning which would restrict the powers of jurisdiction to the business of the county in and for which said court was created, but to any and all business of that county and any other business of that county connected with or interrelated with the business of any other county properly within the jurisdiction of such courts under the Constitution and laws of the state . . ."
See also Rodgers v. County of Taylor, 368 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1963, writ ref. n. r. e.).
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 3912k, § 1 provides "Except as otherwise provided by this Act and subject to the limitations of this Act, the commissioners court of each county shall fix the amount of compensation, office expense, travel expense, and all other allowances for county and precinct officials and employees who are paid wholly from county funds, but in no event shall such salaries be set lower than they exist at the effective date of this Act."
This article must be considered together with Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 3902, which says in part:
Appellants argue that the legislature, by commanding the commissioners court to fix salaries of county employees, must have intended that the process of fixing the salaries be in accordance with some objective standards. To fix salaries, they argue, the commissioners court must be vested with the power to secure information about employees' qualifications.
Chief Justice Hickman, while serving on this court, considering Article 3902 in Neeper v. Stewart, 66 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1933, writ ref'd) said:
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...v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex.1993) (citing Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S.W.2d 451, 453 (1948); Renfro v. Shropshire, 566 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e)). However, the Guynes court noted that “[a]s the administrative head of county ......
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Guynes v. Galveston County
...ultimately in the constitution or statutes. Canales v. Laughlin, 214 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex.1948); Renfro v. Shropshire, 566 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Civ.App.--Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As the administrative head of county government, a commissioners court also possesses broad implied po......
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...courts do not have any power over who is selected to assist in county offices. See, e.g., Renfro v. Shropshire, 566 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.Civ. App.—Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tarrant County v. Smith, 81 S.W.2d 537 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1935, writ ref'd); Neeper v. Stewart, 66 S.W.2d 81......
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White v. Eastland
...Texas Constitution or statutes. Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 214 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex.1948); Renfro v. Shropshire, 566 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). These implied powers include the authority to contract with experts when necessary, including attorne......