Renner v. Boston Coach Corp., Civ. No. 97-3441 (DRD) (D. N.J. 1999)
| Decision Date | 01 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 97-3441 (DRD). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
| Parties | RICHARD RENNER and BARBARA RENNER, per quod, Plaintiff, v. BOSTON COACH CORP., BOSTON COACH — NEW JERSEY CORP., FTM CORP., FMR CORP. and RUSSELL COOKE, Defendants. |
Riley E. Horton, Esq., Imperial, Zazzaro & Calabro, P.A., Montclair, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
John M. Nolan, Esq., David B. Lichtenberg, Esq., Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, Morristown, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendants.
In this wrongful termination and age discrimination action under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and various common law tort and contract theories, defendants move for summary judgment on all ten counts of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs Richard Renner and Barbara Renner, who claims per quod, oppose the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion will be granted and the Amended Complaint will be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.
Defendant Boston Coach-New Jersey Corp. ("Boston Coach") is an executive transportation company with its main facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey. From March 21, 1994 through September 20, 1996, Boston Coach employed Renner as the general manager of its New York/New Jersey operation. Renner reported directly to defendant Russell Cooke, who was then the Vice President of Boston Coach. Renner was 49 years old when he started working for Boston Coach.
Before joining Boston Coach Renner was employed by TNT Express-Worldwide ("TNT"). In or about 1992 Renner was offered the general manager position by Boston Coach, but he decided not to pursue the offer at that time. In late 1993 Renner was again approached by Boston Coach, and on or about January 15, 1994 he filled out and signed an employment application. On the signature page of the application, above Renner's signature, was the following language: "I understand that if I am hired, my employment is at-will and may be terminated by me or my employer at any time." Renner Dep. at 93:1-5; Nolan Cert., Ex. C.
Renner received an offer letter from Cooke dated February 18, 1994 (the "Offer Letter"). Nolan Cert., Ex. D. The Offer Letter began, "I am pleased to confirm the terms and condition[s] of our offer of employment extended to you." Id. The Offer Letter provided for an annualized salary of $100,000, plus a guaranteed bonus of $35,000 for 1994 and a guaranteed signing bonus of $5,000 if Renner was employed at the time those payments were made. Id. In addition, Renner was to receive certain other employee health, welfare and fringe benefits. Id.
Renner testified that during his negotiations with Cooke he was promised equity in the company but that promise was not put in writing in the Offer Letter:
[T]here's one thing [Cooke] did say he did not put in writing, that he said, "One thing you need to — you will be considered for, and I can absolutely promise you, is equity in the company," because when I saw there was no equity mentioned or there was nothing about equity mentioned in the letter, he said, and I said, and that's really what closed the deal.
Renner Dep. at 74:5-18. Later in his deposition Renner again acknowledged that no promise of equity was mentioned in the Offer Letter or put in writing elsewhere:
Q. Now, there is nothing in this letter, correct, about promises of equity?
A. That's correct.
Q. Are there any written documents that corroborate your assertion that you were promised equity in the company?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you write to Russ Cooke after you received this document and say, in words or substance, "Hey, Russ, there's nothing in here about this promise of equity in the company"?
A. No. He explained that prior to this — prior to the arrival of this document.
Q. What did he explain to you?
A. Well, he said that — as I mentioned earlier, that he could — I think the phrase was get me equity — along with he and Perry [Solomon, President of Boston Coach]— in the company if I did a good job in the first year of employment, but he couldn't raise the issue . . . until my performance was established.
Id. at 121:17 — 122:11.
Renner also testified that Cooke had assured him that he would be joining a growing company:
Q. Any other false promises that you contend were made...?
A. Well, I can only go by the word of — again, or Russ Cooke, when I first started with — or before I started with Boston Coach, how it was like a family and that our future was secure, "We're going to grow the business," "We're going to do things like open up in Europe," "With your background with the Europeans, we'd probably want you to do that," things like along those lines....
Id. at 104:22 — 105:7. When asked if it was his contention that Cooke's statements were false when they were made, Renner replied, "I believe in my heart of hearts that Russ meant every word he said at that time." Id. at 105:12-13.
Renner signed the Offer Letter and returned it to Cooke, Nolan Cert., Ex. D, and began working for Boston Coach on March 21, 1994. Effective January 1, 1995 Renner received 5,000 incentive shares from Boston Coach. Nolan Cert., Ex. E. Renner considered these shares to be equity in the company but was disappointed with the amount of equity distributed and the plan itself. Renner Dep. at 166:19-167:24.
Under a policy in effect at Boston Coach during Renner's tenure as general manager, drivers were not to work more than 70 hours per week for safety reasons. Id. at 139:14 — 140:1; Nolan Cert., Ex. F. By way of an e-mail message sent to him and the general managers of the other Boston Coach branches by William Gemmell on or about July 19, 1996, Renner was aware that Boston Coach printed an "Over 70 Hours Report" listing Boston Coach drivers whose hours totaled more than 70 hours in a given week and that the "Over 70 Hours Report" was distributed to Boston Coach's upper management in the corporate offices in Boston. Renner Dep. at 20:9-20:23; 143:11 — 143:13; Nolan Cert., Ex. F. On July 19, 1996 Renner sent Gemmell's e-mail message to Chester (Chet) Greco, one of his subordinates, and added: . Nolan Cert., Ex. F. Renner was aware that Boston Coach had a legal duty to maintain accurate records regarding the hours its employees worked and that Boston Coach was subject to review by the U.S. Department of Labor. Renner Dep. at 138:24-139:13.
In or about September 1996, several weeks after Renner's e-mail message to Greco, Renner became aware that Greco had moved two hours worked one week by Boston Coach driver Robert Prisco to the following week in the record keeping system because Prisco was over 70 hours for that week. Id. at 142:21 — 142:25. While Renner denies authorizing or consenting to Greco changing Prisco's hours to avoid the "Over 70 Hours Report," id. at 24, he did not tell Greco to correct the alteration of hours after Greco explained what he had done. Renner acknowledges that Greco in essence falsified corporate records and that after he became aware of Greco's falsification he did nothing to correct it. In addition, Renner did not inform his superiors at Boston Coach that Prisco's hours had been altered. Id. at 142:21 — 143:22.
Cooke learned about the Prisco incident and on September 20, 1996 requested that Renner voluntarily resign from Boston Coach. Renner refused to resign, and Cooke terminated his employment. At the time of his termination Renner was 51 years old. Greco was briefly suspended as a result of the Prisco incident but his employment was not terminated.
Renner filed his wrongful termination action in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division in Essex County on May 13, 1997. On July 10, 1997 the defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity of citizenship of the parties. Renner filed his Amended Complaint on December 30, 1997 asserting claims of fraudulent misrepresentation (Count One), negligent misrepresentation (Count Two), age discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (Count Three), intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Four), interference with contract and prospective economic advantage (Count Five), defamation (Count Six), breach of oral contract (Count Seven), breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count Eight), loss of consortium on behalf of his wife (Count Nine) and promissory estoppel (Count Ten). The parties engaged in extensive discovery and defendants filed the motion for summary judgment now before the Court on July 13, 1998. Oral argument was heard on September 28, 1998.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party establishes that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the non-moving party to carry its burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts in question." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986), rev'g, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983). The opposing party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel...
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