Renner v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 28 August 1969
• Docket Number: No. 10331,10331
• Citation: 93 Idaho 836,475 P.2d 530
• Parties: Earl RENNER and Zella Renner, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clifford J. EDWARDS, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 530

475 P.2d 530

93 Idaho 836

Earl RENNER and Zella Renner, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clifford J. EDWARDS, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 10331.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Aug. 28, 1969.

On Rehearing Oct. 8, 1970.

Melvin J. Alsager, Moscow, for appellants.

Eugene L. Miller, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.

Langroise, Clark, Sullivan & Smylie, Boise, amicus curiae.

SHEPARD, Justice.

This case presents for decision a single question, to-wit: in an action for medical malpractice involving an alleged misdiagnosis, should this Court adopt the 'discovery rule' previously adopted by this Court in medical malpractice actions involving the negligent leaving of a foreign object in a patient's body during surgery? The 'discovery rule' sets forth that the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the patient learns, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have learned, of the negligence.

The instant case is an appeal from the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint for the reason that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The complaint alleges that the defendant-respondent held himself out to the public as a competent physician and surgeon, and the plaintiffs-appellants engaged his services in 1961. Upon examination of Zella Renner, he diagnosed a 'gastrointestional condition/pathology' necessitating surgery in the form of a colostomy, which surgery he performed on March 21, 1961. It is alleged that the patient for three years thereafter suffered, among other problems, continual pain and inability to control her bodily functions. Treatment by a different surgical specialist resulted in corrective surgery on July 15, 1964. Plaintiffs-appellants filed the instant action on June 6, 1966 seeking to recover a total of $114,623.60 as special and general damages, alleging that the defendant-respondent had misdiagnosed the patient's condition, acted in a field of surgery for which he was unqualified, and performed unnecessary surgery.

The applicable statutes of limitations are I.C. § 5-201, which, in pertinent part, provides:

'Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter after the cause of action shall have accrued, * * *.'

and I.C. § 5-219, which, in pertinent part, provides:

'Within two years:

'4. An action to recover damages for an injury to the person, or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.'

Appellants contend that the time the cause of action accrues is the time when the plaintiff had knowledge, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have had knowledge, of the negligence constituting malpractice. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the cause of action accrues at the time of the alleged malpractice, to-wit: the misdiagnosis and the initial surgery.

This Court in Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964), first enunciated the 'discovery rule' in Idaho, therein setting forth the time when a cause of action accrues in a medical malpractice action as that point in time when a patient learns or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have learned of the negligence. In the Billings case a foreign object was involved, to-wit: a gauze sponge had been left in the patient's body during surgery and remained undiscovered for 15 years thereafter until a second exploratory operation revealed its existence. A year after the second surgery a suit for malpractice was brought and the trial court dismissed the action on the basis that it was barred by our statutes of limitation. This Court reversed and, as aforesaid, adopted the 'discovery rule.' The Billings decision was restricted to the particular facts of that case involving the leaving of a foreign object in a patient's body.

Respondent contends, therefore, that in Idaho at least the so-called 'discovery rule' applies only in foreign object cases, relying not only on Billings, but also upon Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817, rehearing 380 F.2d 310 (9th Cir., 1967). This latter case interpreted the restrictive language in the Billings opinion and predicted that this Court would restrict the 'discovery rule' to medical malpractice cases involving foreign objects. While Owens v. White, supra, may have been a correct inference based on the then existing Idaho decisions, our opinion today renders that decision an incorrect prediction of the future actions of this Court.

In Mr. Justice McQuade's opinion in Billings he amply reviews the conflicts in theory which led to the existing diversity in the various jurisdictions as to the adoption or non-adoption of the 'discovery rule' in medical malpractice actions. He deals with the various exceptions which have been devised in some jurisdictions, such as the 'continuing negligence' exception, wherein the cause of action is said to be non-accruing while the patient remains under the doctor's care, the theory of couching malpratice complaints in terms of contract, thereby giving the plaintiff the benefit of a longer period of time within which to file an action, and the third exception of the fraudulent concealment theory wherein the physician is claimed to be, either actually or constructively, fraudulent in concealing his negligent conduct from the patient. This Court in Billings rejected the opportunity of forcing that factual pattern into one of the previously mentioned exceptions, and clearly and forthrightly announced its adherence to the 'discovery rule.' No purpose would be served in discussing the number of jurisdictions which reject or adhere to the 'discovery rule' in misdiagnosis fact patterns. Suffice it to say that what was once termed the 'majority' has been so eroded by recent opinions of various jurisdictions that adherence to or rejection of the 'discovery rule' can in either case be considered the keeping of respectable company.

We are, as herein stated, faced with the problem of the application of the 'discovery rule' to medical malpractice cases falling into categories other than foreign object cases. We believe the theories and reasons enunciated in Billings for the adoption of the 'discovery rule' are equally applicable to the case at bar. See also Iverson v. Lancaster, N.D., 158 N.W.2d 507 (1968); Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 433 P.2d 220 (Hawaii, 1967); Wilkinson v. Harrington, R.I., 243 A.2d 745 (1968); Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963); Sacks, Statutes of Limitation and Undiscovered Malpractice, 16 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 65 (1967); Foreign Object Discovery and Misdiagnosis-Is There a Difference?, 29 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 341 (1967); Discovery Rule: Accrual of Cause of Action for Malpractice, 25 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 78 (1968).

We conclude that the statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or should have known of the defendant's negligence.

Respondent directs us to those cases which hold that statutes of limitations are statutes of repose designed to promote stability in the affairs of men and to make difficult, if not impossible, the litigating of stale or fraudulent claims. As was well said by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Wilkinson v. Harrington, supra:

'(Statutes of limitations) are founded in the soundest principles of public policy. Their existence stimulates the bringing of actions within the designated time limits when events and circumstances are still fresh in the minds of the parties and witnesses. Wood v. Carpenter, (101 U.S. 135, 25 L.Ed. 807 (1879)); 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, (§§ 2, 3, pp. 4-7 (4th ed., 1916)).

'The nature of the statute of limitations, however, and the underlying purpose which it serves are not that which is advanced here by respondents. The defense asserts that the paramount function of the statute of limitations is that it preserves social tranquility and that it should be narrowly construed to better achieve its purpose. We think their argument fails to take proper cognizance of the fundamental concept for which the statutes were designed. It is eminently clear that statutes of limitations were intended to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard for want of seasonable prosecution. They are, to be sure, a bane to those who are neglectful or dilatory in the prosecution of their legal rights. 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, § 4, p. 8. As a statute of repose, they afford parties needed protection against the necessity of defending claims which, because of their antiquity, would place the defendant at a grave disadvantage. In such cases how resolutely unfair it would be to award one who has willfully or carelessly slept on his legal rights an opportunity to enforce an unfresh claim against a party who is left to shield himself from liability with nothing more than tattered or faded memories, misplaced or discarded records, and missing or deceased witnesses. Indeed, in such circumstances, the quest for truth might elude even the wisest court. The statutes are predicated on the reasonable and fair presumption that valid claims which are of value are not usually left to gather dust or remain dormant for long periods of time. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 19 L.Ed. 257; 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions, supra, § 4; Spath v. Morrow, supra (174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581). To those who are unduly tardy in enforcing their known rights, the statute of limitations operates to extinguish the remedies; in effect, their right ceases to create a legal obligation and in lieu thereof a moral obligation may arise in the aid of which courts will not lend their assistance. Cf. 34 Am.Jur., 'Limitation of Actions,' § 11, p. 20.

'Our statute of limitations is bottomed on the same theory and policy mentioned above. We cannot subscribe to the contentions of the defense that the statute is at odds with the discovery rule in malpractice cases. On the contrary, we believe...