Rennick v. GLASGOW RLTY., INC.

• Decision Date: 09 March 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 78-331.
• Citation: 510 F. Supp. 638
• Parties: George W. RENNICK and Joan Rennick, Plaintiffs, v. GLASGOW REALTY, INC. and Glasgow Arms, Inc. d/b/a Glasgow Arms Restaurant, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

510 F. Supp. 638

George W. RENNICK and Joan Rennick, Plaintiffs, v. GLASGOW REALTY, INC. and Glasgow Arms, Inc. d/b/a Glasgow Arms Restaurant, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 78-331.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

March 9, 1981.

James P. D'Angelo and Edward T. Ciconte of D'Angelo & Ciconte, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiffs.

F. Alton Tybout of Tybout, Redfearn, Casarino & Pell, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LATCHUM, Chief Judge.

This is a civil action, based on diversity of citizenship, brought by the plaintiffs, George Rennick and his wife, Joan, to recover money damages from the defendants, who operated the Glasgow Arms Restaurant, for personal injuries and loss of consortium allegedly sustained as a result of an accident which occurred at the restaurant on June 9, 1977. The case was tried by a jury in January 1980 and verdicts were returned in favor of the plaintiffs. However, on April 17, 1980, the Court set aside the jury verdicts and granted a new trial because the Court concluded that it had given an erroneous instruction of Delaware law to the jury relating to the nature of the duty owed by the defendants to Mr. Rennick in the circumstances of this case. (Docket Items "D.I." 53 & 54.)

The facts of this case are rather simple and for the most part were undisputed at the first trial. Mr. Rennick ate lunch at the Glasgow Arms Restaurant on June 9, 1977. Upon finishing his lunch he proceeded to the parking lot and discovered that he had locked his keys in his car. He then returned to the restaurant in order to obtain a metal coat hanger to use to unlock the door of his car. While in search of such a hanger, Mr. Rennick entered a private storage area located in the restaurant building and fell through an open trapdoor. At the first trial, the testimony was in dispute as to whether Mr. Rennick was directed to the private storage room by the restaurant hostess, in which case the Court instructed the jury he would have been a licensee, or whether he proceeded there on his own initiative, and thus would have been a trespasser. Hence, the Court instructed the jury that they could find Mr. Rennick was either a licensee if he entered the private storage room at the direction of the hostess or a trespasser if he entered the room on his own initiative. The Court further instructed the jury that the duty of care owed by the defendants to the plaintiff would vary according to whether he was classified as a trespasser or licensee. The duty of the defendants to the licensee was then explained to the jury based on Restatement 2nd Torts, § 342 (1965). The duty of the defendants to a trespasser was described as a more limited duty to refrain from intentionally causing an accident or causing the accident by the wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others. Those instructions were an incorrect statement of Delaware law.

Under the law of Delaware, which is controlling in this diversity case, an owner or occupier of land owes the same limited duty to all licensees (who are considered guests without payment) as to trespassers. Acton v. Wilmington and Northern R.R. Co., 407 A.2d 204 (Del.Supr.1979); Bailey v. Pennington, 406 A.2d 44 (Del.Supr.1979). The Delaware Supreme Court in Acton stated:

We think that the Statute Delaware Premises Guest Statute, 25 Del.C. § 1501, by imposing strict requirements on any plaintiff who enters the owner's premises "as a guest without payment or as a trespasser," is intended to include the category of "licensees" within the term "guest without payment." It would make no sense to read the statute as imposing a strict rule of proof requirements on trespassers and social guests, but leaving licensees in a statutory interstice. Therefore, we view the current Statute so as to make sense as a whole, by construing the term "guest without payment" to include all licensees. (Emphasis supplied.)

407 A.2d at 206.

Thus, the duty (defined in the Delaware Premises Guest Statute in effect at the time of Mr. Rennick's injuries) that was owed by the defendants was the duty to refrain from intentionally causing injury to a licensee or trespasser and to refrain from causing injury to them through the wilful or wanton disregard of rights to others. 25 Del.C. § 1501; Bailey v. Pennington, supra at 46. The Court, therefore, erred at the original trial when it instructed the jury that the defendants would owe Mr. Rennick a higher duty of care if he were a licensee than they would owe if he were a trespasser. A new trial was thus granted.

The case is now before the Court on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (1) declaring as a matter of law that the Delaware Premises Guest Statute, 25 Del.C. § 1501, as it existed at the time of the accident in 1977, is no longer applicable to this case because that statute was amended on July 8, 1980, 62 Del.Laws, c. 322 § 1, or alternatively, (2) that even if 25 Del.C. § 1501 as it existed at the time of the accident is applicable to this case, the Court should declare as a matter of law on the basis of alleged undisputed material facts that Mr. Rennick was a business invitee (a paying guest) at the time and place of the accident and thus was owed the duty of reasonable care to prevent injury from any defective conditions existing in the room where the accident occurred. (D.I. 61.)

1. The Retroactive Issue

The Delaware Premises Guest Statute, 25 Del.C. § 1501, as it existed at the time of the accident, read as follows:

No person who enters onto the premises owned or occupied by another person, either as a guest without payment or as a trespasser, shall have a cause of action against the owner or occupier of such premises for any injuries or damages sustained by such person while on the premises unless such accident was intentional on the part of the owner or occupier or was caused by the wilful or wanton disregard of the rights of others.

After its amendment¹ on July 8, 1980, the statute was changed to read as follows:

No person who enters onto private residential or farm premises owned or occupied by another person, either as a guest without payment or as a trespasser, shall have a cause of action against the owner or occupier of such premises for any injuries or damages sustained by such person while on the premises unless such accident was intentional on the part of the owner or occupier or was caused by the wilful or wanton disregard of the rights of others.

There is no dispute that the above amendment of the Delaware Premises Guest Statute terminated its applicability to all premises other than private residential or farm premises after that date. The question thus becomes whether the amended statute retroactively changed the substantive rights of the parties as they existed at the time of the accident. If the amended statute is applied retrospectively as plaintiffs contend, there is no question but that the duty of care owed by the defendants to Mr. Rennick at the time of the accident was substantially increased some three years after the accident by the amendment.

Delaware courts have made it quite clear that a retroactive law is one which takes away or impairs rights acquired under existing law, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability to past acts or transactions. Monacelli v. Grimes, 9 Terry 122, 99 A.2d 255, 266-67 (Del.Supr.1953); DiStefano v. Lamborn, 7 Terry 195, 83 A.2d 300, 301 (Del.Super.1951); State v. Mills, 57 A.2d 99, 102 (Super.Ct. en banc 1947); Bowing v. Delaware Rayon Co., 8 W.W.Han. 111, 188 A. 769, 770 (Del.Super.1937). If applied retroactively, the amended statute would bring about changes involving substantive rights in this case and effectively would impose a new duty upon defendants which did not exist at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the Court believes the amended statute if applied to this case so markedly affects substantive rights that the Delaware Supreme Court would refuse to construe it to apply retrospectively.

Moreover, Delaware courts have held that whether or not a statute is given a retroactive effect is a matter of legislative intent and courts will be reluctant to arrive at such a construction unless the language of the statute permits of no doubt as to the meaning of the Legislature. If it is doubtful whether an amendment was intended to operate retrospectively, the doubt must be resolved against such operation. DiStefano v. Lamborn, supra 83 A.2d at 301.

Turning to the amended statute, this Court perceives nothing which indicates a legislative intent that it be applied retroactively. The verbs "enters" and "shall have a cause of action" are present and future tense and not past tense. Furthermore, the synopsis of the amending statute explains it as follows:²

At present, owners of commerical sic swimming pools are protected from any liability to a child who wanders onto the premises and is killed or injured. It is the purpose of this Act to restrict such immunity only to private residential property, and farms.

This explanation reveals that the drafters of the statute considered the limitations on liability contained in the statute prior to the amendment to be effective "at present" and that the statute was anticipated to have prospective operation for acts occurring after its adoption.

The plaintiff argues that the amended statute is an exception to the retroactive doctrine because the statute is remedial or procedural in nature. It is quite true that a statute which enacts a rule of procedure and does not in any manner affect substantive rights will ordinarily be applied retrospectively. Bowing v. Delaware Rayon Co., supra 188 A. at 770. But this is not what the amended statute does; it clearly affects the substantive rights of all parties because it broadens the circumstances under which "a guest without payment or a trespasser" may recover damages in a visit to a commercial establishment and at the same time narrows the...