Reno Club, Inc. v. Young Inv. Co.

Decision Date07 July 1947
Docket Number3478.
Citation182 P.2d 1011,64 Nev. 312
PartiesRENO CLUB, Inc., v. YOUNG INV. CO.
CourtNevada Supreme Court

Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Wm McKnight, Judge.

Action by Reno Club, Inc., against the Young Investment Co. for specific performance of a contract to lease property. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and cause remanded with instructions.times theretofore renewed original lease between them, complaint would be construed as alleging in effect that unexpired portion of last renewal lease should be restored to lessee, and as alleging an option in which provisions and covenants of original lease were implied in fact, and as so construed complaint was not incomplete, uncertain or ambiguous as failing to allege all essential elements of option.

M. A. Diskin, of Reno, for appellant.

Morgan Brown & Wells and Harland L. Heward, all of Reno, for respondent.

HORSEY Justice.

This is an action for specific performance. Appellant will be referred to herein as plaintiff, respondent as defendant.

The defendant, in the district court, demurred to the amended complaint, the demurrer was sustained, the plaintiff elected to stand upon its amended complaint, and judgment of dismissal was thereupon ordered by that court, and this appeal is from such judgment.

Besides the formal allegations, it was alleged, in substance, in the amended complaint that the defendant corporation, at all times mentioned therein, was the owner of the premises consisting of that certain storeroom and basement known as 232 North Virginia Street, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, in what is known as the 'Quinn Building', together with the appurtenances, certain fixtures and personal property situated upon said premises.

That on the 29th day of October, 1934, defendant, as lessor of the above described premises, made, executed and delivered to plaintiff, as lessee, a written lease for the period beginning October 27, 1934, and ending October 26, 1937, at a monthly rental of $250, the first and last month being paid in advance; that under the terms and provisions of said lease, plaintiff, as lessee, was granted the option of extending said lease for an additional period of three years; that immediately after the execution of said lease plaintiff entered into possession of said premises, and fully complied with the terms thereof.

That, pursuant to the said option for three years' extension of said lease, the defendant, on August 29, 1936, granted plaintiff, as lessee, an extension of said lease, from October 26, 1937, to October 26, 1940, under the same terms and conditions as in the original lease, and at the same time, in the same instrument, the defendant, as lessor, gave and granted to plaintiff, as lessee, an option for a further extension of said lease, and said lease was thereupon renewed for a period expiring October 26, 1943.

That on November 25, 1939, by an agreement in writing, and for the consideration therein expressed, the defendant, as lessor, gave and granted plaintiff, as lessee, the right and option to extend or renew the lease dated October 29, 1934, to and including October 26, 1948, under the same terms and conditions.

That during all the time mentioned in the amended complaint, and to and including May 11, 1942, plaintiff was in possession of the said premises, and had fully complied with all the terms of said lease and extensions thereof; that plaintiff, at great cost and expense, had fitted and furnished the said premises with a complete Tango counter, and 100 cushioned stools, and a complete public address system with microphones, together with office equipment and furnishings.

That on May 11, 1942, plaintiff was in complete possession of the premises hereinabove described, and had complied with all the provisions of said lease, and was entitled to retain possession of the said premises as lessee until October 26, 1943, and, as above stated, owned and possessed a written option for an extension of said lease until October 26, 1948. That on said May 11, 1942, the defendant promised and agreed with the plaintiff that if plaintiff would surrender possession of said premises, and would surrender said lease and option for renewal, to defendant for cancellation, that defendant would immediately make, execute and deliver to plaintiff a written option, under the terms of which plaintiff would have the right at any time after one (1) year from May 11, 1942, to lease the aforesaid premises for a period extending to October 26, 1948, at a rental of $350 per month.

That on May 11, 1942, in reliance upon said representations and agreement of defendant, plaintiff surrendered possession of the aforesaid premises to defendant, and delivered to defendant for cancellation the aforesaid lease and option for renewal, and thereupon the defendant prepared, executed and delivered to plaintiff an option in words and figures as follows, to wit:

'Reno, Nevada,
'May 11, 1942
'Reno Club, Inc.
'Reno, Nevada.
'Gentlemen:
'In consideration of the sum of $1.00 paid to the undersigned, Young Investment Company, a corporation, together with other good and valuable consideration, the undersigned hereby gives and grants to the Reno Club, Inc., or to its assigns, the exclusive right and option to lease the premises known as 232 North Virginia Street, Reno, Nevada, together with the appurtenances, fixtures, trade fixtures and equipment now therein, upon the termination of a lease which the undersigned has executed to William Harrah, which lease extends for a period of one year.
'In the event that the general war in which the so-called 'United Nations' are at war with the Axis Nations of the world has not been concluded and peace treaties executed at the end of one year, then this option shall continue from month to month thereafter until the general treaty of peace has been concluded between the Axis Nations on the one part and the United Nations on the other part.
'The lease for which this option is given shall be for a term which is to be concluded October 26, 1948, and the rental shall be $350.00 per month.
'Young Investment Company,
'By F. P. Quinn
'President
'(Seal)
'Wm. M. Kearney
'Secy.'

The foregoing allegations of the amended complaint are followed by other allegations therein appropriate to complete the statement of a cause of action for specific performance.

The plaintiff, in the prayer to the amended complaint, demands judgment that the defendant be required to specifically perform the said agreement, and to execute and deliver a lease for the premises described, and to let plaintiff into possession thereof, and for such further relief as may be equitable, and for costs of the action.

The defendant demurred to the amended complaint upon the following grounds:

'I. That the said amended complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.'

'II. That the allegations contained in the second sentence in paragraph VII of plaintiff's amended complaint are uncertain in that it cannot be determined therefrom, or at all, when the improvements were made upon the premises in question, what the cost of the improvements was at the time they were constructed and what the value of said improvements now is.'

The district court sustained the defendant's said demurrer, and District Judge McKnight, in his written order so doing and ordering that judgment of dismissal be entered, stated, as grounds and reasons for sustaining the demurrer, the following:

'(a) That under the terms of the option agreement set forth in Paragraph IX of the amended complaint, the plaintiff has no legal right to demand a lease from defendant for the premises described, until the general Peace Treaties have been concluded between the United Nations and the Axis Nations.

'(b) That plaintiff's action in instituting this suit is premature, and no legal obligation exists in defendant to execute to plaintiff a lease for the said premises until the Peace Treaties between the United Nations and the Axis Nations are concluded.

'(c) That the memorandum agreement set forth in Paragraph IX of said amended complaint, is incomplete, uncertain and ambiguous in its provisions, and not capable of being specifically performed.

We are, on this appeal, required to determine the correctness of the district court's foregoing order sustaining the demurrer and ordering the entering of judgment of dismissal.

The option agreement appears to be in ordinary and plain language. Its meaning seems clear. With a usual recital as to consideration, it unequivocally and unconditionally, in the first paragraph of the option, in the form of a letter 'hereby gives and grants to the Reno Club, Inc., or to its assigns, the exclusive right and option to lease the premises known as 232 North Virginia Street, Reno, Nevada, together with the appurtenances, fixtures, trade fixtures and equipment now therein, upon the termination of a lease which the undersigned has executed to William Harrah, which lease extends for a period of one year.' There is no condition or proviso attached to the sentence, to the effect that the option, or the right to exercise it, is conditional upon the conclusion of the war, or the execution of any peace treaty, or treaties. By the language used, 'gives and grants hereby', the conclusion that the defendant thereby agreed to, and granted, an immediate and unconditional option to lease the said premises 'upon the termination of a lease which the undersigned has executed to William Harrah, which lease extends for a period of one year', seems clearly indicated. The optionee, Reno Club, Inc., was given the definite, positive right to exercise the...

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