Renouf v. Aegis Relocation Co. Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 November 2022
• Docket Number: 5:22-cv-497
• Parties: BRIAN RENOUF, PLAINTIFF, v. AEGIS RELOCATION COMPANY CORP., DEFENDANT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

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BRIAN RENOUF, PLAINTIFF, v. AEGIS RELOCATION COMPANY CORP., DEFENDANT.

No. 5:22-cv-497

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

November 15, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SARA LIOI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Presently before the Court is the motion of plaintiff Brian Renouf (“plaintiff” or “Renouf”) for default judgment pursuant to the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (“Carmack Amendment”), 49 U.S.C § 14706 et seq., and state law. (Doc. No. 15 (Motion); Doc. No. 16 (Memorandum in Support).) The motion is unopposed. For the reasons that follow, default judgment is granted as to plaintiff's Carmack Amendment claim, the state law claims are dismissed, and damages and fees are awarded as set forth below.

I. Background

Defendant Aegis Relocation Company Corp. (“defendant” or “Aegis”) is an active Florida-based corporation listed with the U.S. Department of Transportation. (Doc. No 1 (Complaint) ¶¶ 4, 8.) In August 2021, Renouf hired Aegis to transport his family's household belongings from Oregon to Ohio. (Id. ¶ 5.) Upon arriving at Renouf's residence in Oregon on the date of the scheduled move, employees of Aegis informed Renouf that the company would not honor its original estimate and increased the rate it charged Renouf by 33%. (Id. ¶ 9.) Aegis also unilaterally changed the delivery date, causing Renouf to cut short a pre-planned family vacation. (Id. ¶¶ 10-12.) During the interstate move, Aegis damaged a majority of the Renouf family's personal belongings. Renouf later learned that Aegis had also failed to properly pack the family's belongings as promised. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) Additionally, Aegis failed to unpack the goods as promised, instead “leaving them damaged in the boxes in which they were delivered.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Renouf was required to hire a second moving company to unpack the goods at considerable additional cost. (Id.)

In the months that followed, Renouf, through his employer's legal department, provided Aegis with documentation and photographs of the damaged items. On November 11, 2021, Renouf submitted a claim for the replacement cost of the items damaged in the move, and Aegis confirmed receipt of Renouf's claim and evidence. (Id. ¶ 17.) On November 29, 2021, Renouf requested that Aegis provide a bill of lading, as one was not provided at the time of shipment. Aegis failed to provide the requested documentation. (Id. ¶ 18.) Follow-up requests for a bill of lading were also denied, and Aegis ultimately “wholly failed to respond to the claim.” (See id. ¶¶ 19-20.)

On March 29, 2022, Renouf filed the present action in federal court, seeking damages under the Carmack Amendment. Renouf also asserted claims under state common law for breach of contract, negligence, gross negligence, and fraud in the inducement. (Id. ¶¶ 29-46.) In his prayer for relief, Renouf requested “actual damages, exemplary damages, costs and attorneys' fees, and prejudgment and post-judgment interest[.]” (Id. at 7.^[1])

On April 1, 2022, a process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve a copy of the complaint and summons upon Aegis. (Doc. No. 7 (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Expedited Substituted Service) ¶ 3.) On April 8, 2022, a process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve a copy of the complaint and summons upon Aegis's listed statutory agent. (Id. ¶ 4.) On May 25, 2022, the Court granted Renouf's motion for substituted service. (Doc. No. 8 (Order); see Doc. No. 6 (Motion for Substituted Service).) Thereafter, Renouf's counsel submitted a declaration attesting to the perfection of substituted service of Aegis on May 25, 2022. (Doc. No. 9 (Declaration of Service of Mike Seely).) Renouf applied to the Clerk for entry of default against Aegis (Doc. No. 10 (Application); Doc. No. 12 (Amended Application), and the Clerk entered default on June 29, 2022. (Doc. No. 14.)

Renouf's motion for default judgment is supported by his declaration. (Doc. No. 16-1 (Declaration of Brian Renouf).) Appended to Renouf's declaration is a spreadsheet cataloguing the items damaged in the move and their respective values (Exhibit 1-A), and Aegis's Interstate Revised Written Estimate. (Exhibit 1-B.) In support of his request for attorneys' fees, Renouf offers the declaration of his attorney. (Doc. No. 16-2 (Declaration of Mike Seely in Support of Attorneys' Fees).) In all, Renouf seeks damages in the amount of $133,533.00, attorneys' fees in the amount of $28,027.71, pre-judgment interest, and post-judgment interest. (Doc. No. 16 at 5.) Renouf also seeks an award of exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the Court. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs default and default judgment. Default has been entered by the Clerk against defendant pursuant to Rule 55(a). (See Doc. Nos. 10, 12, 14.) Once default is entered, the defaulting party is deemed to have admitted all the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint regarding liability, including jurisdictional averments. Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F.Supp.2d 837, 846 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (citation omitted).

Under Rule 55(b)(2), the Court may enter default judgment without a hearing, but may conduct a hearing if the Court needs to: (1) conduct an accounting; (2) determine the amount of damages; (3) establish the truth of any allegations by evidence; or (4) investigate any other matter. In this case, the Court has examined the record before it and Renouf's submissions in support of its motion for default judgment and concludes that a hearing is not necessary to rule upon the motion.

The decision to grant default judgment is within the Court's discretion. See AF Holdings LLC v. Bossard, 976 F.Supp.2d 927, 929 (W.D. Mich. 2013) (citing, among authority, 10A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2685 (3d ed. 1998) (“This element of discretion makes it clear that the party making the request is not entitled to a default judgment as of right, even when defendant is technically in default and that fact has been noted under Rule 55(a).”)). Thus, Aegis's default does not automatically entitle Renouf to relief.

In order to rule upon Renouf's motion, the Court must determine whether the factual allegations in the complaint deemed admitted by Aegis's default, and reasonable inferences derived therefrom, are sufficient to satisfy the elements of Renouf's legal claims for which he seeks default judgment. See Zinganything, LLC v. Imp. Store, 158 F.Supp.3d 668, 672 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (finding even though defendant has defaulted, the court must determine whether factual allegations accepted as true state a claim for relief with respect to the claims for which plaintiffs seek default (citation omitted)); see also Kwik-Sew Pattern Co. v. Gendron, No. 1:08-cv-309, 2008 WL 4960159, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2008) (“[A] court may not enter default judgment upon a legally insufficient claim.” (citations omitted)). Legal conclusions in the complaint are not deemed admitted by a defendant's default.

In addition, “[a]n entry of default judgment requires some affirmation that the person against whom the default judgment is obtained is not (1) ‘an infant or incompetent person' who is unrepresented; (2) a member of the armed services who is entitled to protection against default pursuant to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. Appendix § 401 et seq.; or (3) an officer or agency of the United States.” Leach v. Lifeway for Youth, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-200, 2008 WL 1990390, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2008) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b), (c), (e); Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55, Supplementary Note.). As a business entity, Aegis is not a minor, incompetent person, or subject to the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act of 1940. See Zinganything, LLC, 2016 WL 362359, at *2 (citing Hitachi Med. Sys. Am., Inc. v. Lubbock Open MRI, Inc., No. 5:09-cv-847, 2010 WL 4638057, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2010) (“As corporations, the Defaulting Defendants are clearly not infants or incompetent persons.”)).

III. Discussion

A. Liability on Plaintiff's Claims

1. Carmack Amendment Claim

Count One of the complaint alleges a claim under the Carmack Amendment. To set forth a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment, a shipper must establish the following: (1) the delivery of goods to the carrier in good condition, (2) the arrival of goods in damaged condition, and (3) the amount of damages measured by actual loss. Great W. Cas. Co. v. Flandrich, 605 F.Supp.2d 955, 966 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (citing Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 138, 84 S.Ct. 1142, 12 L.Ed.2d 194 (1964)). The Carmack Amendment also has a jurisdictional threshold of $10,000 that must be satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of an action brought under section 11706 or 14706 of Title 49, only if the matter in controversy for each receipt or bill of lading exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”). If the shipper establishes a prima facie case, and exceeds the threshold floor, the burden of proof shifts to the carrier “to show both that it was free from negligence and that the damage to the cargo was due to one of the excepted causes relieving the carrier of liability.” Missouri Pac. R.R., 377 U.S. at 138 (citations omitted).

Here, Renouf sufficiently alleges that the goods in question were received by Aegis in good condition, that the goods arrived at their final destination in damaged condition, and that the amount of actual damages was in excess of $75,000.00. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 9-15, 29-31.) As to evidentiary proof of damages, Renouf has appended to his motion the aforementioned declaration, spread sheet, and estimate from Aegis.

Accepting Renouf's allegations of...