Rensenhouse v. Seeley

Decision Date28 November 1888
Citation40 N.W. 765,72 Mich. 603
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesRENSENHOUSE v. SEELEY.

Error to circuit court, St. Joseph county; NOAH P. LOVERIDGE Judge.

S. M. Constantine, (W. G. Howard, of counsel,) for plaintiff.

Dallas Boudeman, for defendant.

LONG J.

This is an action of assumpsit brought under section 4225 How. St., to recover money paid defendant as agent of the Fraternal Alliance, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois. Suit was commenced by summons before a justice of the peace of St. Joseph county. The declaration was on the common counts in assumpsit. Plea, general issue, with notice of special matters of defense. Plaintiff recovered judgment in a justice's court. Defendant appealed to the circuit court for St. Joseph county, where the cause was tried before the court without a jury, and defendant had judgment for costs. On the trial the court found the following facts and conclusions of law " First. That the Fraternal Alliance is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, and that it was so organized on or about the 30th day of September, A. D. 1885, and is located in the city of Chicago and county of Cook. Second. That the charter or articles of association of said corporation declares that the object for which it is formed is to establish a secret order, which shall cultivate social and fraternal relations among its members, and furnish aid to those of them that may become sick or disabled; no annual dues or premiums to be required, and all aid and assistance to be by voluntary contributions. Third. That said association proceeded to organize a supreme body under such charter, known as the 'Supreme Council of the Fraternal Alliance,' a social order, and adopted a constitution and by-laws for its government. Fourth. That said association entered upon its use and exercise of its privileges, and has continued to use and exercise them, receiving initiation fees and dues, and paying losses and benefits. Fifth. That on or about the 15th of June, 1886, by virtue of said association and supreme council, at Chicago, a subordinate council, known as 'No. 32,' was organized at Three Rivers, in said county of St. Joseph, with a membership at one time of about 90 persons, among whom was the plaintiff and defendant in this suit; that said council No. 32 was organized by the appointment of a chairman, a deputy, and a board of managers; that the defendant was such deputy, and as such it was his duty to secure members of said Fraternal Alliance order, and to receive and remit to the said association at Chicago the monthly dues or voluntary contributions of the members, and one dollar of each initiation fee, of the remaining four dollars of such initiation fee, was to be paid to the examining surgeon, and three dollars retained by the deputy for his services. Sixth. That on the 29th day of September, 1886, the plaintiff became a member of said Council No. 32, and of said order of Fraternal Alliance, and received a certificate of membership, which recited, among other things, that in consideration of a voluntary contribution of one and 50 one-hundredth dollars to the funds of said order, to be made on or before the 25th day of each and every month during the continuance of this membership, Henry Augustus Rensenhouse shall, after the expiration of sixty days from the date of this certificate, when temporarily disabled from prosecuting his usual vocation by reason of sickness or disability, be entitled to receive from the benefit fund of the order a weekly benefit of twelve and 50 one-hundredth dollars. The certificate contains a further provision that, in the case of the death of the plaintiff, the wife may continue to make voluntary contributions, for the purpose of participating in the equalization of benefits at the end of seven years, or in lieu thereof receive, within fifteen days after furnishing proof of death, the amount contributed by said member to the benefit fund of the order, less the amount of benefits received by him. Seventh. That the plaintiff paid to the defendant, as deputy or agent of said association, an initiation fee of $5.00, and his monthly dues for nine months, from the 25th day of October, 1886, to the 25th of June, 1887, of one and 50 one-hundredth dollars each month, a receipt being given at the time of each monthly payment of dues in form following, viz.: 'Received of H. A. Rensenhouse, Council No. 32, certificate No. 319, one and 50 one-hundredth dollars, as his voluntary contribution to the funds of the order of the Fraternal Alliance for the month of October, 1886. H. B. CHANDLER, Secretary. I. W. SEELEY, Deputy.' Eighth. That said Fraternal Alliance deposited the moneys paid to it for dues and other voluntary contributions with the Corn Exchange Bank of Chicago, and that the defendant remitted to said bank the dues received by him from said plaintiff, and such part of the membership fee not retained by him for the purposes before stated. Ninth. That at the time of the commencement of this suit the said Fraternal Alliance was doing business in the state of Michigan, but not by virtue of or under any authority granted or issued to it by the commissioner of insurance of said state, and at the time the said money was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, and before this suit was commenced, the treasurer of the state of Michigan had no deposit from the said Fraternal Alliance, as is contemplated by section 4225, How. St. That after the formation of said corporation, the Fraternal Alliance, the officers thereof applied to the commissioner of insurance aforesaid for license or permission to do business in this state, if he deemed it such a company as required a license or permission, and said commissioner never granted any license or permission, alleging as a reason that he did not consider it to be such a corporation as was required, under the laws of this state, to have any license or permission granted. Tenth. This action was brought to recover the money paid by the plaintiff to the defendant for his voluntary contribution or monthly dues to the Fraternal Alliance, and the amount paid by him to become a member thereof, in all the sum of eighteen and 50 one-hundredth dollars." Conclusions of law: " First. That the said Fraternal Alliance is not a life insurance company, within the meaning of section 4225, How. St., in requiring a deposit of one hundred thousand dollars securities with the state treasurer, nor is it an insurance company, within the designation of section 4244 of said Statutes, and amendments thereof, requiring a like deposit. Second. The moneys paid by the plaintiff, which he now seeks to recover, were voluntary contributions or payments made by him as a member of the order of the Fraternal Alliance to the defendant as a member and officer of such association, and he cannot maintain this action to recover them back. Third. The defendant should have judgment against the plaintiff for his proper costs and charges. NOAH P. LOVERIDGE, Circuit Judge." Judgment was entered in said court on the above findings, on the 27th day of February, 1888. Afterwards, and on the 20th day of March, 1888, the said court, on the request of counsel for defendant, made the following as an additional finding in the cause: "The Fraternal Alliance is a fraternal society, which is under the supervision of a supreme body, and furnishes relief to its members by the payment to them of weekly sums while they are disabled, by reason of sickness, from carrying on their usual business, and that it neither pays commissions nor employs any paid agents, the moneys which are paid by its members as a membership fee being the only money used for the payment of its medical examiners, solicitors, and others engaged in the management of its business; that said Fraternal Alliance is not incorporated under any act of this state." Exceptions were filed to these findings. Plaintiff brings the case to this court by writ of error.

It appears that in September, A. D. 1885, this corporation was formed under the laws of the state of Illinois. The management of its affairs is placed in a board of seven directors, and its object, as stated in its articles, is "to establish a secret order, which shall cultivate social and fraternal relations among its members, and furnish aid to those of them that may become sick or disabled; no annual dues or premiums to be required, and all aid and assistance to be by voluntary contributions." It is contended by defendant's counsel that this company is not an insurance company, within the statutes of this state, but that it is a fraternal order, and chartered as such under the laws of the state of Illinois, and that its business is carried on in accordance with its charter, and the plan set forth in its constitution and by-laws, and the certificate of membership; that the object of the association is not speculative, but social and benevolent, in its relations furnishing aid to those that may become sick or disabled, and that only indirectly does it pay a death loss. The only important question involved in the controversy is, is it, in effect, a life insurance company, within the meaning of chapter 131 of Howell's Statute? Section 4225 of said chapter 131 reads as follows: "No company organized or existing under any authority whatsoever, other than the statutes of this state shall be at liberty to transact the business of life insurance within this state until such company, in addition to the requirements now made by law, shall have deposited with the state treasurer one hundred thousand dollars of the like securities required to be deposited by companies formed under this act, which shall be held as security for any losses," etc. This...

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