Rensselaer v. Viorst

• Decision Date: 29 January 1948
• Docket Number: No. 17.,17.
• Citation: 57 A.2d 49,136 N.J.L. 628
• Parties: VAN RENSSELAER v. VIORST et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

136 N.J.L. 628

57 A.2d 49

VAN RENSSELAER

v.VIORST et al.

No. 17.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Jan. 29, 1948.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Vincent Van Rensselaer against Betty Viorst and Louis Viorst for personal injuries. From the judgment, defendant Louis Viorst appeals.

Affirmed.

Chancellor OLIPHANT, The CHIEF JUSTICE, and Justices COLIE, EASTWOOD and BURLING, dissenting.

John C. Grimshaw, of Newark (David E. Feldman, of Newark, of counsel), for appellant.

Winne & Banta, of Hackensack (George Winne, of Newark, of counsel), for respondent.

HEHER, Justice.

Late in the afternoon of August 21, 1946, plaintiff was struck by an automobile operated by appellant Louis Viorst, while crossing State Highway Route No. 4 on foot, between Hartley Street and Grunauer Place, in Fair Lawn, and suffered injuries for which he seeks compensation in this action in tort for negligence. There was a directed verdict in favor of defendant Betty Viorst, the owner of the vehicle, for failure of proof of agency in its operation; and the jury awarded damages to plaintiff against Louis, who has taken this appeal.

It is assigned for error that the trial judge denied appellant's motions to nonsuit and direct a verdict in his favor because (a) there was no evidence of negligence on his part, and (b) the proofs established that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law. We find no error in these rulings.

The refusal of a nonsuit for failure of proof of negligence is not reversible error if such evidence be later supplied by either party during the course of the trial, and we shall therefore consider these questions as one. Layden v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 129 N.J.L. 54, 28 A.2d 96; LeBavin v. Suburban Gas Co., 134 N.J.L. 10, 45 A.2d 664.

Route No. 4, known as Broadway at the point where the mishap occurred, is a sixlane highway, 83 1/2 feet wide. Proceeding in a southerly direction across the highway, way, some distance from the nearest cross-walk to the east, plaintiff was close to the center line when he was struck by the automobile, moving in a westerly direction in the third lane. There was considerable traffic at the time; but plaintiff testified that when he began the crossing, the nearest vehicle on the westbound lanes was 200 feet away. This car passed him. He moved along; and when he reached a point about 10 feet from the center line of the highway, he observed the approach of defendant's vehicle, then 30 or 40 feet away. He ‘continued on to get to the white line, to the center’; and he had taken three or four steps when the collision occurred. He said: ‘There was no traffic behind him (referring to appellant). There was nobody else there, and I was under the impression that he would go in back of me; I was so close to the line.’ A witness testified that plaintiff was 5 to 7 feet from the center line of the highway when he was struck, and that the left wheels of the vehicle were ‘about on the center line.’ There was evidence that the speed of the automobile was about 30 miles per hour. Tire skid marks on the road surface indicated that the vehicle had proceeded a distance of 38 feet after the application of the brakes before it was brought to a stop. Defendant testified that his car was in the third traffic lane, moving at a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour, just before the collision occurred; and there was ‘very heavy traffic’ in both directions. He continued: ‘As I approached I saw Mr. Rensselaer, and all of a sudden another car comes out from my right hand side; I don't know just where he came from; but he almost hit Mr. Van Rensselaer in the back; and he turned around and he saw the car, and he couldn't-he avoided hitting him, and he jumped right into my car. I didn't hit Mr. Van Rensselaer at all. He just jumped into my car. I applied my brakes, and I couldn't go either way, because if I had gone to my left I definitely would have been hit by another car, so I applied my brakes and just went straight ahead.’ He applied his brakes, he admitted on cross-examination, just as his car struck plaintiff. He conceded plaintiff was thrown some distance upward. Later on, on redirect examination, he said plaintiff was some 25 or 30 feet away when he ‘stepped in front’ of the automobile to avoid the other vehicle, which, he said, had been pursuing an erratic course, moving from one lane to another. When again cross-examined, he denied he said plaintiff had ‘jumped in front’ of his car; he insisted he had said that plaintiff had ‘jumped into the side’ of his car.

Thus, there was a sharp divergence in the evidence as to matters vitally affecting the issues of negligence and contributory negligence; and the ascertainment of the facts was therefore within the exclusive province of the jury. If the circumstances were as related by the plaintiff, men of ordinary prudence might well differ as to whether defendant had exercised reasonable care, and it was for the jury to determine whether negligence ought to be inferred; and this was likewise true of the conduct of plaintiff. The defendant, himself, suggests that the collision would have been avoidable if it had not been for the interference of traffic proceeding in the same direction, particularly the vehicle that was then moving...